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Abstract 
 
This thesis addresses the question of how structural and perceived privilege impact on political 
participation in the United Kingdom. In doing so it adopts the causal propositions of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model as its starting point and adds Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of economic, 
social, and cultural capital, which are argued to encompass structural privilege. Perception of 
privilege is posited to be constituted by self-perceived status, explanations for that status, and 
explanations for status differences in society. Subsequent politically relevant components are 
perceptions of the difference and privilege of politically active people. Thus, the thesis 
proposes a model running from background characteristics through capital profiles to 
perception of privilege and thence political engagement and participation. An original survey 
covering these areas was designed and fielded online to a representative sample of 1,480 
British adults. The resultant data is analysed using structural equation modelling, which allows 
for the simultaneous estimation of underlying tendencies and the structural relationship 
between them. The results of that model generally support the causal hypotheses of the 
research, as well as providing evidence of the impact of the three forms of capital and 
perception of privilege. In particular, a strong positive effect of legitimate cultural capital is 
observed and found to be more important in influencing political participation than the 
previously observed effects of social and economic capital. In addition, perception of privilege 
is found to promote participation and to channel people towards individualised political 
activities, especially where they subscribe to the fundamental attribution error. These effects 
are as hypothesised and confirm the role of both structural and perceived privilege in 
influencing political participation in the United Kingdom. 
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Introduction: A Motivating Conundrum 
 
 From the minister proclaiming that election turnout is important to the anti-cuts 
campaigner recruiting to their local group there is recognition that democracy, however 
envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. As such the concern about declining 
participation amongst those who practice politics has been matched by the piquing of academic 
interest in the topic.2 That interest has been additionally keen because of the mixed political 
engagement effects of rising levels of education, which had been anticipated to deliver a 
participatory dividend.3 However, the focus on those topics is only a contemporary 
manifestation of one of the key motivating conundrums of political behaviour research: why 
do people participate or not in political activity?4 This is a question that has been considered 
extensively through three overarching approaches to explaining behaviour; those of rational 
choice, psychology, and sociology. 
 Rational choice theory has been one of the most influential in political science and, in 
its mainstream form, posits that individuals are self-interested utility maximisers with existing 
sets of preferences. Further it argues that they have the ability, when confronted with a choice, 
to rank options and choose the most beneficial to themselves.5 Using the classic example of 
voting, rational choice theory suggests that individuals will rank parties' policies against their 
preferences, assess the benefits to themselves of each party being elected, consider the chance 
that their vote will affect the outcome of the election, and calculate the costs to themselves of 
                                                     
2 John Curtice and Ben Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation?', in Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson, Lindsey 
Jarvis, Catherine Bromley (eds.), British Social Attitudes, The 20th Report (2003/2004 Edition): Continuity and change over two 
decades (London, Sage Publications, 2004), pp. 93-104; Susan E. Scarrow, ‘Declining memberships, changing members? 
European political party members in a new era’, Party Politics, Vol. 16, No. 6 (May, 2010), pp. 823-843; Peter Mair and Ingrid 
van Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 1980-2000’, Party Politics, Vol. 7, No. 5 (2001), pp. 5-21. 
3 Curtice and Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation', p. 93; Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, ‘Citizens and 
Political Behavior’, in Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 3-26, p. 14; Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, 'Beyond SES: A 
Resource Model of Political Participation', The American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, (Jun., 1995), pp. 271-294; 
Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman , and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics 
(Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 73-74. 
4 Max Kaase, ‘Perspectives on Political Participation’, in Dalton and Klingemann, The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, 
pp. 783-796. 
5 Hugh Ward, ‘Rational Choice’, in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), pp. 65-89, pp. 68-71. 
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voting. The exceptionally low chance of any individual vote influencing the outcome of an 
election leads the theory to suggest that most people should not vote. Thus emerges the much-
studied paradox of voting in which most (or at least many) people turn out to vote despite it 
being strictly irrational for them to do so.6 This is especially the case because voting is an 
example of collective action in which the benefits of the outcome (i.e. the election of a 
government and implementation of its policies) cannot be withheld from non-voters.7 
 It has been argued that voting is poor example of behaviour with which to test rational 
choice theory because it is such a low cost and low benefit activity.8 Nevertheless, the debates 
around the paradox of voting have had implications for rational choice theory as it is applied 
to other behaviour. Additional components of the calculations that underpin political 
behaviour have been proposed, for example in terms encompassing duty and other expressive 
motivations.9 In fact, a general incentives model encompassing selective, collective, and 
expressive motivations has been found to do a good job of accounting for party activism, and 
voluntary and political activity more generally, in the context of the United Kingdom.10 
However, it has been argued that such additions, whilst adding explanatory power, run the risk 
of tautology and may undermine the case that the models remain meaningfully about 
instrumental rationality.11 Crucially, such additions also point to the social contexts that create 
and give meaning to expressive motivations.12 Thus, the process of amending rational choice 
models has raised questions about how motivations and preferences emerge. 
 Another amendment to rational choice theory has proposed that individuals act with 
bounded rationality, which is to say that they have incomplete information and that their 
                                                     
6 William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, ‘A Theory of the Calculus of Voting’, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
62, No. 1 (Mar., 1968), pp. 25-42, p. 25. 
7 Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Good and the Theory of Groups (New York, Schocken Books, 1968), p. 
50. 
8 John H. Aldrich, ‘Rational Choice and Turnout’, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 1 (Feb., 1993), pp. 247-
278,  
9 Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings, 'Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications', British Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Jul., 2011), pp. 645-670. 
10 Paul Whiteley, Patrick Seyd, Jeremy Richardson, and Paul Bissell, 'Explaining Party Activism: The Case of the British 
Conservative Party', British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), pp. 79-94. Charles Pattie, Patrick Seyd and 
Paul Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain: Values, Participation and Democracy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p.181. 
11 André Blais, To Vote or Not to Vote: The Merits and Limits of Rational Choice Theory (Pittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 2000), pp. 4-5. 
12 Hamlin and Jennings, 'Expressive Political Behaviour', pp. 657-661. 
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calculations may be imperfect.13 In that light individuals may satisfice by alighting on the first 
satisfactory option rather than expending the effort to obtain all information and identify the 
optimum option. Further, they may deploy heuristics, or decision-making shortcuts, rather than 
going through the laborious process of ranking all the options against their preferences. As an 
example, an individual who votes for a party because it has historically been associated with 
the interests of their class is deploying a heuristic, rather than being purely rational by 
assessing the potential impact of its policies. This could also constitute an example of 
satisficing if an alternative party would actually be the optimum choice based on consideration 
of their policies. This may imply that bounded rationality leads to poor decision making but, 
in fact, it has been argued that the efficient decision-making that results, and which can take 
in more than purely instrumental considerations, is ‘more than rational’.14 
By introducing the idea of shortcuts to speed up decision-making, the amendments of 
bounded rationality bridge the divide between rational choice theory and psychological 
approaches to accounting for human behaviour. One such approach has proposed that humans 
have two systems, based on intuition and reason, that function in parallel to enable decision 
making.15 Intuitive thoughts, such as heuristics, are highly accessible and frequently used 
making them a fast route via which to make decisions. Intuitive thoughts are thus the basis for 
most easy day-to-day decision-making but are monitored by the more considered, and slower, 
reason-based system. That system assesses the appropriateness of decisions in light of the 
context and amends or tweaks them as necessary. Elsewhere these have been referred to as the 
disposition and the surveillance systems, and it has been argued that the latter system is 
activated by negative emotional responses to inappropriate decisions or behaviour stemming 
from the former system. It is thus posited that, far from being irrational, emotion has a key role 
                                                     
13 Herbert A. Simon, ‘Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science’, The American Political 
Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 2 (Jun., 1985), pp. 293-304. 
14 Arthur Lupia, 'Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting in California Insurance Reform Elections', The 
American Political Science Review, Col. 88, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 63-76; Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts 
and Bolts for the Social Sciences (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 342. 
15 Daniel Kahneman, 'A Perspective on Judgement and Choice: Mapping Bounded Rationality', American Psychologist, Vol. 58, 
No. 9 (Sep., 2003), pp. 697-720. 
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to play in improving decision-making and behaviour, affirming when they're appropriate but 
prompting review when they're not.16 
A key feature of the intuition or disposition system is that it is immediately available 
and thus allows fast responses, which points to the importance of the concept of accessibility 
in the psychological approach to explaining behaviour. It has been repeatedly observed that 
the opinions expressed by humans are based, to a large extent, on the information that is most 
accessible to them.17 Thus, although humans may possess underlying values (of varying 
strengths), the particular opinions that they express on, amongst others, political issues will 
also be affected by the information that they access in their minds. The importance of available 
information means that opinions may also be affected by exposure to the prevailing narratives 
that exist in a particular context.18 This, of course, has implications for political behaviour 
because prevailing narratives may be stocked with information that promotes or stifles political 
participation, for instance if individuals are socially connected to others who express 
scepticism and uncertainty about political participation.19 
The fact that the decision-making processes studied by the psychological approach are 
affected by prevailing information and social norms points to the importance of the 
sociological approach to accounting for behaviour. This approach focuses on the role of social 
structures in defining behaviours and access to opportunities. In so doing it addresses a major 
weakness of the psychological and, especially, the rational choice approaches, which is their 
lack of consideration of individuals' differential ability to behave in particular ways, for 
instance by getting involved in politics. The sociological approach suggests the possibility that 
such differences in ability to participate may be due to advantage or disadvantage stemming 
from social structures. Crucially, such explanations are arguably causally prior to those offered 
                                                     
16 George E. Marcus, W. Russell Neuman and Michael McKuen, Affective Intelligence and Political Judgement (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 46-64. 
17 Roger Tourangeau, Lance J. Rips, and Kenneth Rasinski, The Psychology of Survey Response (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), pp. 7-8, pp. 62-99. 
18 John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 40-49, pp. 59-
75. 
19 Julia Partheymüller and Rüdiger Schmitt-Beck, 'A "Social Logic" of Demobilization: The Influence of Political Discussants on 
Electoral Participation at the 2009 German Federal Election', Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, vol. 22, No. 4 
(Nov., 2012), pp. 457-478. 
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by the psychological and rational choice approaches, in that social structures are likely to affect 
individual psychological dispositions and processes as well as the calculus of decision-making 
rather than vice-versa. In other words, whether or not one can get involved in politics precedes 
whether or not one decides to do so. 
Drawing on the sociological approach, the idea that politics in the United Kingdom is 
dominated by those with inherited advantage is supported by the unrepresentative prevalence 
of privately educated white men in Parliament.20 Thus, privilege, albeit often filtered through 
class narratives in public discourse, is highly relevant to the context of the United Kingdom.21 
Beyond being folk wisdom, though, the importance of privilege may offer an answer to the 
opening conundrum. Indeed, research has suggested that despite the emergence of new forms 
of political activity, participation remains structured by inequalities, and there is 'very little 
evidence of a more level participatory playing field' in politics.22 
Answering the question of why people do or do not participate in politics with the 
refrain that 'it's all down to privilege', however, is hardly satisfactory. This is not least because 
the status of that sentiment as folk wisdom suggests that holding such a belief, or perceiving 
                                                     
20 The Sutton Trust 'The Educational Background of Members of Parliament 2010', The Sutton Trust, Monday 10 May 2010, 
viewed at http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/1MPs_educational_backgrounds_2010_A.pdf on 
27.08.2013; Afua Hirsch, 'UK Election results: Number of minority ethnic MPs almost doubles', The Guardian, Friday 7 May 
2010, viewed at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/black-minority-ethnic-mps-2010 on 27.08.2013; Kira 
Cochrane, 'Election results for women to celebrate – and worry about', The Guardian, Friday 7 May 2010, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/may/07/women-parliament-election-losses-wins on 27.08.2013.  
21 Nadia Gilani, 'Snobbery is in a class of its own', Metro, Monday 07 October 2013, viewed at http://metro.co.uk/2013/10/07/are-
you-a-snob-4134407/ on 25.10.2013; Jonathan Freedland, 'British stereotypes: do mention the war, please!' The Guardian, 
Thursday 26 January 2012, viewed at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/26/british-stereotypes-please-mention-war on 
27.08.2013; Stephanie Flanders, 'Do we really want more social mobility?', BBC, Monday 24 June 2013, viewed at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-23040308 on 27.08.2013, and accompanying programme listened to at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b02yjf15 on 01.07.2013; Hannah Richardson, 'Elite Firms "exclude bright working class"', 
BBC, Monday 15 June 2015, viewed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33109052 on 12.08.2015; Will Hutton, 'State or 
private? Painful school choice that still fuels inequality in Britain', The Guardian, Sunday 28 June 2015, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/28/state-or-private-education-painful-decision-britains-class-divide on 
12.08.2015; Katherine Sellgren, 'Privately educated graduates "earn more" than state school colleagues', BBC, Thursday 06 
August 2015, viewed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-33775082 on 12.08.2015; Owen Jones, Stephen Moss, Lucy 
Mangan, Imogen Fox, and Archie Bland, 'How to pass the posh test: "Do you know Marmaduke Von Snittlebert?"', The Guardian, 
Monday 15 June 2015, viewed at http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/15/posh-test-privately-educated-war-pros-and-
cons-pass on 12.08.2015; Tom Beardsworth and William Pimlott, 'Buller, Buller, Buller! Just who is the modern Bullingdon Club 
boy?', London Evening Standard, Friday 12 April 2013, viewed at http://www.standard.co.uk/lifestyle/esmagazine/buller-buller-
buller-just-who-is-the-modern-bullingdon-club-boy-8568320.html on 12.08.2015; Louise Mensch, 'How about some reality-
based feminism?', The Guardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/30/reality-based-feminism-louise-mensch on 13.08.2015; Laurie Penny, 
'Louise Mensch, take a lesson on privilege from the internet', The Guardian, Friday 31 May 2013, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/may/31/louise-mensch-privilege-internet on 13.08.2015; Hadley Freeman, 
'Check your privilege! Whatever that means', The Guardian, Wednesday 05 June 2013, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2013/jun/05/check-your-privilege-means on 13.08.2015; Zoe Williams, 'Are you too white, 
rich, able-bodied and straight to be a feminist?', The Guardian, Thursday 18 April 2013, viewed at 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/apr/18/are-you-too-white-rich-straight-to-be-feminist on 13.08.2015.  
22 William A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, ‘Conclusions: Professionalization and individualized political action’, in William 
A. Maloney and Jan W. van Deth, New Participatory Dimensions in Civil Society: Professionalization and individualized 
collective action (London, Routledge, 2012), pp. 231-242, p. 241. 
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the importance of privilege, is itself an important factor in people's approaches to politics. 
Whilst the sociological approach accounts for the impact of social structures on individual 
behaviour it does not address the intricacies of the decision-making processes at work within 
an individual. Such processes may function in ways that reinforce or challenge the behavioural 
patterns that emerge from social structures. Therefore, if we are to understand the impact of 
privilege on political participation we must consider the understanding of privilege that people 
have and the relevance of the concept to them. Perception of privilege, as well as structural 
privilege, may have an important impact on individual political participation. As such, both 
sociological and psychological approaches are brought to bear in attempting to explain such 
participation in the following chapters. 
The adoption of both approaches allows this research to account for two major steps 
in the causal process that leads to political participation. First, the sociological approach 
considers some of the opportunities that individuals may be afforded and the behavioural 
norms that they may learn. Second, the psychological approach considers some of the ways 
that individuals think about themselves, about politics, and about participation. Indeed, it is 
argued that these are the first two steps in a process that leads from structural inequalities 
through the perceptions that result from them, which underpin the assumptions that allow 
intuitive decision-making, to decisions about whether or not to participate in politics. It is only 
at the last stage, if the reason-based decision-making system is activated, that rational choice 
theory becomes relevant to the process. Thus, the sociological and psychological approaches 
are the focus of this research because they account for processes that are constant influences 
on behavioural outcomes, and that are causally prior to those addressed by rational choice. 
Developing that latter point, and as will be argued subsequently, explanatory factors that fall 
further back in the funnel of causality but have a continuing effect are more interesting than 
influences that are more proximal to the outcome under study.23 Thus, this research is primarily 
concerned with the impact of factors that are not directly related to political activity in 
                                                     
23 Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York, John Wiley & 
Sons, 1964), pp. 24-25. 
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accounting for that behaviour. Despite this ultimate goal of the research, it must start by 
considering how the behaviour of interest is conceptualised. This is the first step in answering 
the central research question of how, if at all, privilege and perception of it impact on political 
participation in the United Kingdom. 
 Chapter One will begin by presenting a broad definition of political participation and 
adapting existing typologies to fit with that definition. It will then move on to present in detail 
an established sociological model of the processes that lead from background characteristics 
to unequal political participation. The focus of that work on inequality will then be linked to 
wider work on inequality, which provides the bridge to the key concept of privilege. Literature 
identifying various effects of inequality and privilege will then be presented before the first 
chapter is rounded off with an outline of the flaws of the preceding literature. In particular it 
will be noted that, despite the relevance of the concept, the established model lacks a holistic 
theory of privilege and is thus theoretically and substantively incomplete. In particular, it will 
be argued that the established model lacks potentially important, and causally prior, 
components that fall within the concept of privilege and contribute to inequality in political 
participation. Further, and of particular importance, it will also be noted that the literature in 
general and the established model in particular account for structural privilege alone and, as 
such, provide an insufficient account of its workings. It will thus be argued that a full account 
of the concept must also accommodate its perceived component. 
 In addressing the above flaws Chapter Two will begin by presenting a holistic theory 
of the workings of privilege, which is argued to function through the economic, social, and 
cultural forms of capital. It will then draw on work that adapts that theory to the context of the 
contemporary United Kingdom, in particular with reference to its identification of cultural 
omnivores and the persistence of elites. More crucially, and drawing on the same work, it will 
argue that the forms of capital act as the mechanisms of privilege rather than just components 
of class. As such, background class will be argued to be one of many background 
characteristics that impact on capital profiles, which in turn influence political behaviour. This 
adaptation allows the forms of capital to be reconciled with the approach to causality adopted 
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in the established sociological model outlined in the first chapter. As such it will be suggested 
that privilege, as embodied in forms of capital, can be subjected to a more robust causal 
analysis than has previously been the case. 
Chapter Three will then address the final criticism of the established sociological 
model outlined in the first chapter. That is to say it will move beyond the sociological approach 
to accounting for political behaviour to introduce the complementary psychological approach. 
Specifically, theories drawing on that approach will underpin the introduction of the concept 
of perception of privilege. That concept will address the previous chapters' failure to 
accommodate internal considerations in the causal processes leading to political behaviour. 
The impact of perception of privilege will be argued to work through the intuition-based, or 
fast, decision-making system that is, at times, superseded by the reason-based system that leads 
to more rational decision-making. However, such reason-based decisions will be argued to be 
too causally proximal to the behaviour of interest and thus beyond the purview of this research. 
Finally, to close the chapter it will be argued that structural and perceived privilege encompass 
parts of a causal process that leads from background characteristics to capital profiles and then 
through perception of privilege to political behaviour. In doing so, it will complete the 
theoretical work underpinning this research. 
With the theoretical groundwork laid in the first three chapters, Chapter Four provides 
details of the online survey that was designed for the current research and fielded to a 
representative, though non-probability, sample of British adults. One of the major advantages 
of fielding the survey online is the number of questions that could be included, and the chapter 
will outline the measures of key concepts that are included in the survey. It will then consider 
the representativeness of the resulting sample by comparing it with census data, concluding 
that the sample is similar to the population in terms of sex and region of residence but not in 
terms of age, ethnicity, or religion. These flaws in representativeness are argued to be less 
important for the current research because of its focus on the relationships between variables, 
rather than their distributions in the population. As such, it is more important that there is 
sufficient variation in the measures to allow associations between them to be tested, which is 
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revealed to be the case in the subsequent chapter. Before that the fourth chapter outlines, in 
detail, analytical approach that is adopted: structural equation modelling. That approach allows 
for the simultaneous estimation of latent factors underpinning multiple indicators in the data 
and the testing of structural relationships between those factors. Thus, the approach is argued 
to be suited to the focus of the current research on testing hypothesised causal relationships 
between the concepts of interest. 
 With the data and analytical approach outlined the Chapter Five commences the 
substantive analysis by outlining the latent factors in the full structural model embodying the 
theoretical propositions of the research. Before doing so, however, it briefly considers the 
distributions of the variables that are underpinned by those factors, and compares them to 
equivalent variables in data emerging from previous research. This task is hampered by the 
fact that most of the variables in the dataset were original or adopted altered wording or 
formats to reflect the focus of the research or the limited survey space available. Thus the 
distributions of the variables are frequently distinct from those in other datasets, although in 
many cases the differences are not too dramatic. Crucially, as noted, the focus of the research 
on hypothesised causal relationships means that the key concern is that there is sufficient 
variation in the measures, and this observed to be the case. Those measures are found to load 
onto factors in line with expectations, and the bulk of the chapter focuses on describing the 
factors, and their distributions and correlations. 
In line with the findings of Citizenship in Britain, Political participation is found to be 
represented by distinct individualised, contacting, and collective activity factors, which are 
nonetheless highly correlated with each other. Political engagement is embodied in factors 
representing perceived engagement, knowledge of politics, external and internal efficacy, and 
recruitment requests, as specified by the Civic Voluntarism Model. Those factors are also 
generally positively correlated, although the negative relationship between knowledge and 
recruitment suggests the channelling of political energies to either observation or engagement 
with political networks. The next chapter observes this to be related in part to perception of 
privilege, which is embodied as expected in factors relating to self-perceived status, 
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explanations for status differences in society, equivalent explanations relating to the self, 
perception of the difference of politically active people, and perception of their privilege. 
Again, the factors tend to be positively correlated, but contrasting positive and negative effects 
of self-perceived status on perception of privilege in society and one’s own life provides an 
early indication of the importance of the fundamental attribution error.  
 Turning to the forms of capital, economic capital is underpinned by a single factor but 
cultural capital is embodied in nine factors, with the first four covering work-based civic skills, 
attendance at legitimate cultural performances, visits to legitimate cultural venues, and 
consumption-based activities. The subsequent five relate to cultural tastes, and specifically to 
preferences for educational films, family-friendly films, blockbusters, bass and sample heavy 
music, and legitimate cultural tastes. Focussing on the latter eight, Bourdieusian, factors, their 
generally positive correlations are indicative of a tendency towards omnivorousness amongst 
respondents. However, the opposition between attendance at legitimate cultural performances 
and preferences for blockbuster movies and bass and sample heavy music suggests a limit to 
that omnivorousness. Finally, social capital is embodied in five factors covering number of 
friends, diversity of friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and help received from 
close and loose networks, and those factors tend to be positively correlated with each other. 
Crucially, all of the factors identified display decent levels of variation, and the distributions 
of factor scores are themselves rather varied.  
 With the factors encompassing the key concepts described, Chapter Six turns to the 
main focus of the research in the form of the structural relationships between those factors. 
Before considering those relationships, however, the chapter outlines the theoretically 
informed hypotheses that are being tested in some detail. The hypotheses relate to the factors 
of interest, which is to say the forms of capital and the elements of perception of privilege, and 
thus provide a focus for the subsequent sections of the chapter. The analysis in those 
subsequent sections reveals that, in addition to the expected positive effects of recruitment, 
perceived political engagement, and internal efficacy, there are unexpected direct effects of 
visits to legitimate cultural venues, and perception of the difference of politically active people. 
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The former of those loadings is positive as expected but the positive effect of the latter is 
counter to expectations and hints and the subsequent importance of the ‘fundamental 
attribution error’. 
 Going one step further back in the structural model, that chapter observes that cultural 
capital is found to be important in promoting perceived engagement with politics, which is to 
say interest in, discussion of, and perceived knowledge of the topic. Legitimate tastes also play 
a role in promoting external and internal efficacy, whilst perception of the privilege of political 
activists suppresses external efficacy. Further, perception of the role of privilege in society 
prompts perceived engagement with politics, whilst perception of the role of privilege in one’s 
own life is negatively related to political knowledge, which is again suggestive of role of the 
fundamental attribution error. The elements of perception of privilege are interrelated to a 
significant degree, as expected, and they tend to be additionally influenced by social and 
economic, rather than cultural, capital. 
 With the direct effects at the various stages of the model outlined, the chapter turns to 
consider the total effects, both direct and indirect, of key factors on political participation. 
These reveal that cultural capital is amongst the most important influences, and functions as 
the main mechanism by which education is translated into participation. Further, the patterns 
of political activity associated with perception of privilege suggest that the previously 
mentioned fundamental attribution error has a role to play. Specifically, those who apply 
consistent privilege-based explanations for their own status and status differences in society 
also more readily engage in all forms of political activity, whilst those low perception of their 
own privilege but high perception of privilege in society are less apt to engage in socially-
orientated political activity but still able to undertake self-motivated acts. With this in mind, 
the chapter analyses the effects of hypothesised interactions between the elements of 
perception of privilege, finding few to have significant effects. Despite this, the chapter notes 
that most of the tested hypotheses are at least partially supported, and thus the causal 
propositions of the research are generally supported. The chapter then concludes that the first 
main contribution of the research is the strong, positive, and sometimes direct, effect on 
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political participation of cultural capital, especially in its legitimate form. This is 
complemented by the second main finding of the research, which is that perception of privilege 
differentiates the type of participation that people engage it, with those who consistently 
perceive privilege having a broader participatory repertoire. 
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Chapter One: Participation, Inequality, and Privilege 
 
What is Political Participation? 
 Before examining its causes it is important to consider what is meant by political 
participation. The concept is defined in broad terms in the current research and taken to be any 
attempt by an individual, in interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or 
conserve an element of society at some level. Within that overarching definition there is a 
'kaleidoscope' of political causes that individuals can support but the focus here is on the range 
of modes of participation.24 The distinctions between those modes are many and varied, from 
broad differentiation between ‘organized civil society’ and ‘not as well (as in ad-hoc, 
“temporarily”) organized civil society’,25 to the more specific typology that ‘categorizes 
different participation acts according to type of influence, initiative required, level of conflict 
and scope of outcome.’26 There has been notable consistency in the distinction between 
conventional and unconventional participation, with the former described as 
‘institutionalised’, ‘traditional’, ‘normal’, and ‘legitimate’.27 Unconventional participation is 
not necessarily the opposite; rather it may just be less institutionalised, traditional, normal, or 
legitimate. The most complete definition differentiates not only between institutionalised and 
non-institutionalised modes but also, within the latter, between the individual, contacting, and 
collective modes.28 That three part distinction has then, in turn, been re-applied to both 
institutionalised and non-institutionalised acts, and found to apply to the United Kingdom.29 
Importantly, such definitions accommodate new forms of participation such as ethical 
                                                     
24 Richard C. Cornuelle, Reclaiming the American Dream (New York, Vintage, 1965), p. 38. 
25 Bruno Kaufman and Johannes W. Pichler (eds.), The European Citizens’ Initiatives: Into New Democratic Territory (Wein, 
NWV Neuer Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 2010), p. 63. 
26 Jan E. Leighley, ‘Attitudes, Opportunities and Incentives: A Field Essay on Political Participation’, Political Research 
Quarterly, Vol. 48, No. 1 (Mar., 1995), pp. 181-209, p. 197. 
27 Reingard Spannring, Günther Ogris and Wolfgang Gaiser (eds.), Youth and Political Participation in Europe: Results of the 
Comparative Study EUYOUPART (Leverkusen Opladen, Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2008), pp. 16-17; Lester W. Milbrath and M. 
L. Goel, Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago, Rand McNally, 1977), p. 20. 
28 Achim Goerres, The Political Participation of Older People in Europe: The Greying of our Democracies (Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillian, 2009), p. 160. 
29 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain, pp. 133-137. 
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consumerism that have become relevant in recent years.30 Whilst new in themselves these 
modes of participation have proven to be no more accessible to new participants.31 
In contrast to new modes of political participation the most well-established mode, 
voting, is also the most widely engaged in. However, this has not stopped the case being put 
for its exclusion from analyses. This is on the basis that it is such a low cost and low benefit 
activity that it is difficult to usefully consider motives relating to it.32 That suggestion was 
made from the perspective of rational choice theory but has been supported by survey evidence 
from the United Kingdom.33 The limitations of focussing on voting alone, thus, point to the 
expedience of adopting an inclusive definition of political participation so that the impact of 
different influences on various modes can be observed.34 
The different modes of participation that have been identified previously include 
giving financial support, campaigning in elections, attending meetings, standing for election, 
and discussing politics with friends, acquaintances, or strangers (especially with the goal of 
persuading them of something).35 Elsewhere, other modes have been suggested to include 
joining organisations, signing petitions, wearing badges, contacting public officials or 
politicians, and protesting.36 Ultimately, the broadest definition of participation encompasses 
both the civic form, including activities such as local religious group involvement and 
volunteering for charities, and the political form, including all the activities just outlined.37 
This distinction underpins the typology developed by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, 
and Henry E. Brady in their work on civic voluntarism. 
Demonstrating the centrality of political participation to the work, Voice and Equality: 
Civic Voluntarism in American Politics begins by outlining key concepts in the area, resulting 
                                                     
30 Spannring, Ogris and Gaiser (eds.), Youth and Political Participation in Europe, p. 23. 
31 John Curtice, 'Political Engagement Bridging the gulf? Britain's democracy after the 2010 election', in Alison Park, Elizabeth 
Clery, John Curtice, Miranda Philips and David Utting (eds.), British Social Attitudes, The 28th Report (2011-2012 Edition) 
(London, Sage Publications, 2012), pp. 1-15, pp. 14-15; Milbrath and Goel, Political Participation, p. 20; Kaase, ‘Perspectives 
on Political Participation’, pp. 783-796; Max Kaase, ‘Social Movements and Political Innovation’, in Dalton and Kuechler, 
Challenging the Political Order, pp. 84-101; Maloney and van Deth, 'Conclusions', p. 237. 
32 Aldrich, ‘Rational Choice and Turnout’, pp. 247-278, pp. 264-266. 
33 Curtice and Seyd, 'Is there a crisis of political participation', p. 97-98. 
34 Kaase, ‘Perspectives on Political Participation’, p. 793. 
35 Susan E. Scarrow, ‘Political Activism and Party Members’, in Dalton and Klingemann, The Oxford Handbook of Political 
Behavior, pp. 636-654, pp. 646-650. 
36 Goerres, The Political Participation of Older People in Europe, p. 160. 
37 Cliff Zukin, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins and Michael X. Delli Carpini, A New Engagement? Political 
Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 63-64. 
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in the definition of political participation as 'activity that is intended to or has the consequence 
of affecting, either directly or indirectly, government action.'38 The difficulty of measuring 
political participation and its effects is recognised but it is suggested that its different forms 
can be arrayed along two spectrums.39 The first spectrum runs from voting, in which the 
volume of participation is the same by law (i.e. one person one vote), to making donations to 
political causes, through which individuals can participate to hugely different degrees (i.e. one 
donation may be many multiples of another). The second spectrum runs again from voting, 
which is severely restricted in the amount of information that it can convey about an individual 
(i.e. only their preferred candidate or party), but this time to direct contact with representatives, 
which can convey a large amount of complex and in-depth information (e.g. if a face-to-face 
meeting is arranged).40 
 Further to the above, political activity must be voluntary and, as such falls within the 
broader concept of 'civic voluntarism' that encompasses other activities such as involvement 
in neighbourhood groups, religious engagement beyond attendance, or participation in a range 
of civic bodies such as school boards. Interestingly, there has been less of a decline in civic 
voluntarism overall than in many areas of political participation in particular.41 In fact, it was 
found that the vast majority of Americans engage in at least two of secular, religious, and 
political volunteering.42 Civic activity is posited to be linked to, and often to underpin, political 
participation to the extent that there is a 'fuzzy border between the two.'43 In both being 
inclusive and acknowledging the blurred boundaries between modes this typology of political 
activity and civic voluntarism fits well with the broad definition of political participation 
provided at the outset. 
Adopting such a broad overarching definition in conjunction with Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady’s typology of participation is intended to suggest the political nature of civic 
                                                     
38 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 9. 
39 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 13. 
40 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 9-10. 
41 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 73-79. 
42 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 81-84. 
43 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 7, pp. 38-39, p. 59; Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, 
A New Engagement, p. 52. 
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engagement. That is to say that by volunteering for a charity or participating in a local 
community group individuals are, in interaction with an institution or organisation, attempting 
to change or conserve an element of society at some level. Thus, the current research departs, 
if only semantically, from the typology of participation presented as part of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model. It refers to civic engagement instead as implicit political participation 
whilst those activities referred to previously as political participation are identified as explicit 
political participation. With this main distinction established it is worth specifying in a little 
detail the modes that explicit and implicit forms of participation include. 
The previously identified distinction between institutionalised and non-
institutionalised participation, onto which individual, collective, and contacting modes map, 
now falls within the domain of explicit political participation. This means that a whole range 
of activities, from writing a letter to an elected representative to padlocking oneself to the gates 
of a coal-fired power station, are encompassed by explicit political participation. Implicit 
political participation is similarly broad, including as it does all of the secular and religious 
activities that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady were interested in. As such some modes of 
implicit political participation are equivalent to modes of explicit political participation and 
differ only on the basis of the organisation that they relate to. For instance, donating to a charity 
is considered to be implicit political participation whereas donating to a political party or 
campaigning organisation is considered to be explicit political participation. Of course, a key 
defining feature of both explicit and implicit political participation is that they are voluntary, 
meaning that the current research is not concerned with paid work for any causes. For ease of 
reference Table 1.1, presented below, maps Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's political 
participation and civic voluntarism onto explicit and implicit political activity alongside 
previous typologies, and gives examples of each. 
Again, it is worth noting that in the United States there has been less of a decline in 
implicit than explicit political participation, which suggests that there may be different 
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processes at work in relation to each.44 Of course, the continuing attraction of implicit political 
participation does not reduce the importance of its explicit counterpart, and it has been argued 
that both are necessary for meaningful societal change.45 This is particularly the case because, 
as will be outlined below, there is a risk that explicit political participation can become 
dominated by particular groups, leading to representatives acting more in their interests than 
those of the general population. The idea of differential access to politics and its outcomes is 
key to the current research and suggests the need to consider the factors that underpin political 
participation. Thus, having defined the dependent variable the next sections move on to 
consider, in some detail, a set of independent variables that may impact on it. 
 
Table 1.1. Mapping Implicit and Explicit Political Participation 
onto the Civic Voluntarism Model and Previous Typologies 
Current Typology 
Civic Voluntarism 
Model Typology 
Previous 
Typologies 
Example Activities 
 
Implicit Political 
Participation 
 
Religious 
Volunteering 
 
 
N/A. 
 
Donating 
Fundraising 
Event organisation 
Committee involvement 
Giving time 
 
Secular 
Volunteering 
 
 
Explicit Political 
Participation 
 
Political 
volunteering 
 
Institutionalised 
 
 
Voting 
Donating to a party or 
campaigning organisation 
Party or campaigning 
organisation membership 
Committee involvement 
Standing for election 
 
 
Non-
institutionalised 
(including 
individual, 
contacting, and 
collective) 
 
Boycotting 
Signing a petition 
Contacting the media 
Contacting representatives 
Contacting companies 
Mass demonstrations 
Direct action 
 
                                                     
44 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 74-81. 
45 Zukin, Keeter, Andolina, Jenkins, and Delli Carpini, A New Engagement, p. 207; Mary Pattillo-McCoy, Black Picket Fences: 
Privilege and Peril among the Black Middle Class (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 208. 
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The Causes of Political Participation and the Civic Voluntarism Model: 
 As noted in the introduction the question of why people do or do not participate in 
politics is one of the key motivating conundrums of political behaviour research. In seeking to 
solve that conundrum it is useful to refer again to the work of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
in Voice and Equality, which provides the established model that this research builds upon. 
That model emerged from the call to move 'beyond SES', or socio-economic status, and focus 
on how background characteristics translate into trends in political participation.46 In 
advocating consideration of how those processes work rather than just observing correlations 
the model provides not only some of the key independent variables for the current research but 
also, crucially, the causal approach that is adopted by it.47 Thus, the Civic Voluntarism Model 
is taken as the established sociological model of political behaviour because it elucidates 
processes that link background characteristics to unequal outcomes. Those processes, it will 
be argued, are incomplete but the idea that the mechanisms that reproduce inequality should 
be accounted for is sound.  
 Focussing on the United States, the Civic Voluntarism Model is interested not in 
aggregate participation but in who participates, especially in political activity. As expected on 
the basis of previous research it is found that the likelihood of political participation, and the 
amount of money and time given when participating, reflect the societal cleavages of class (as 
measured using wealth), race and ethnicity, and gender. Specifically, the wealthy participate 
in political activity more than the less wealthy, whilst Anglo-Whites participate more than 
African-Americans, Latino citizens, and Latino non-citizens in that order, and men participate 
more than women.48 Interestingly these patterns of political participation do not apply across 
the board in relation to religious and secular volunteering. Whilst the same patterns relating to 
race and ethnicity apply to secular voluntary activity, African-Americans are the most likely 
to attend religious services and give time and money to their church, whilst Latinos attend 
                                                     
46 Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 'Beyond SES'; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 3, pp. 19-20. 
47 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 24-25. 
48 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 187-196, pp. 202-204, pp. 231-235, pp. 254-257. 
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services more than Anglo-Whites but give less time and money.49 Women are roughly as likely 
as men to be involved in secular volunteering, and are more likely to be involved in church 
activities. However, they give the same amount of time and less money when they get involved 
than do men.50 This observation of participation in non-political volunteering being less 
structured by background characteristics fits with the observation that the majority of 
Americans participate in at least two of secular, religious, and political activity. 
  Confirmation of the importance of background characteristics in structuring political 
activity, whilst interesting, is not the purpose of Voice and Equality, which focuses instead on 
explaining those well-documented patterns. In doing so it begins by considering motivations 
for political participation. Drawing on an expanded version of rational choice theory, these are 
identified as selective material (i.e. focussed on material benefits to the individual), selective 
social (i.e. focussed on social benefits to the individual), selective civic (i.e. focussed on the 
duty or social expectation of involvement), and policy-based (i.e. focussed on specific policies 
that spark interest).51 The possibility that such motivations are post-hoc rationalisations is 
accepted but, if this is the case, their importance remains because they can influence future 
behaviour and contribute to the discourse around civic voluntarism.52 
Selective material motivations are found to be highly relevant to involvement in work-
related political action committees (PACs), contacting representatives about issues of 
particular importance to one's self, political organisation affiliation, and church involvement. 
By contrast, selective social motivations are found to be important for campaigning, protest, 
political organisation affiliation, and church involvement. Selective civic motivations are then 
found to be important across the board, though less so in relation to involvement in work-
related PACs, contacting representatives about issues of  particular importance to one's self, 
and non-political organisation affiliation. Last, policy motivations are found to be generally 
quite important, and especially so in relation to voting, campaign work, candidate 
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contributions, work-related PACs, issue-based organisation affiliation, contacting 
representatives about community or national issues, and protest.53 Importantly, such 
motivations have also been found to play an important role in defining political behaviour in 
the United Kingdom.54 
Motivations are clearly an important part of the process that leads to political 
participation and the above findings are of interest in their own right. However, their utility in 
explaining the processes that lead from background characteristics to political participation is 
less clear. It seems unlikely that differences in participation between classes, races, and 
genders, are based on those groups possessing markedly different motivations. If there are, in 
fact, different trends in motivations between those groups then the reason for those differences 
would need to be explained. In fact, it seems more likely that there are barriers to participation 
that affect some groups more than others, regardless of their motivations, and it is this line of 
thinking that informs the direction of Voice and Equality as well as this research. 
In moving beyond motivations to find a more complete explanation for patterns of 
political participation the Civic Voluntarism Model focuses on the importance of resources, 
engagement, and recruitment. The first of those concepts encompasses the money, time, and 
civic skills that are at the disposal of individuals.55 Of those components the first two are 
familiar but the third requires further explanation. The acquisition of civic skills: 
begins early in life in the family and in school and continues throughout 
adulthood in non-political domains – at work, in organizations, and in church. 
These civic skills are, thus, developed in the course of activities that have 
nothing to do with politics: making a presentation to a client, organizing a 
celebrity auction for a charity, or editing the church’s monthly newsletter. 
Once honed, however, they are part of the arsenal of resources that can be 
devoted, if the individual wishes, to politics.56 
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The role of socialisation in transmitting civic skills is apparent and indicates a link from 
background characteristics to resources. This suggests, in turn that there may be patterns in the 
distribution of resources between different groups. 
 Based on their survey data Verba, Schlozman, and Brady find that resources are, 
indeed, distributed unevenly across the population. Education and employment status, which 
are related to background characteristics, are positively related to income and thus to the 
resource of money. Free time is more evenly distributed than money, though the unemployed 
have more of it and, in employment, Latinos have the least, followed by African-Americans 
and then Anglo-Whites.57 Of course, there are other factors that impact on time, such as having 
pre-school or school-aged children to look after, and housework to do, both of which 
responsibilities are still more likely to fall to women.58 Moving beyond money and time, civic 
skills are related to job status, with Anglo-White men most likely to have high-level 
employment and thus the skills that come with it. At the same time, civic skills are also related 
to the patterns in non-political volunteering noted previously. Thus, whilst White-Anglo men 
are again advantaged in terms of civic skills by their tendency to be more involved in secular 
voluntary activity, African-Americans and women can gain civic skills from their greater 
engagement with religious activities.59 This tendency for churches to provide a route to civic 
skills for groups that are less involved in high-status work or secular volunteering leads to the 
suggestion that they act as an equalising force in American political participation in a similar 
manner to trade unions in Europe, at least in the past.60 
 The second concept posited by the Civic Voluntarism Model to be of importance in 
political participation is engagement. That concept encompasses interest in politics, belief in 
the efficacy of political action, level of political information held, and identification with a 
political party.61 These components of political engagement are often considered in research 
on political behaviour, and are commonly understood, so further explanation is not required. 
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Of interest, however, is the fact that their distribution is observed to be uneven and related to 
background characteristics. In particular, education and income are positively related to all of 
the components of political engagement except party identification. Further, White-Anglos are 
more engaged that African-Americans and Latinos in relation to all of the components with 
the exception that African-Americans have the strongest party identification. Interestingly, 
gender is of little significance in relation to political engagement although women tend to hold 
less political information. However, this latter finding has been queried on the grounds that it 
may reflect differences between the genders in how knowledge questions are answered rather 
than actual knowledge held.62 
 Before considering the final component of the Civic Voluntarism Model, recruitment, 
it is worth noting the emphasis in Voice and Equality on the greater importance of resources 
and engagement. This is because they are considered necessary for political participation to 
occur whereas recruitment tends to activate those who have the requisite levels of resources 
and engagement rather than be a necessity in itself.63 Nevertheless, the fact that recruitment 
fulfils such a role is important, not least because resources point only to who can get involved 
in politics rather than who does.64 Further, whilst engagement may suggest who does get 
involved in politics it is beset by issues of causality because components such as political 
interest and information could result from political activity rather than cause it.65 With these 
points in mind, the impact of recruitment is found to be complemented by that of resources 
and engagement. 
 The concept of recruitment is centred on requests to take part in political activities. 
Such requests may come from an array of sources including family and friends but the interest 
is in those that come in institutionalised contexts such as the workplace, church, or meetings 
of secular voluntary organisations.66 In a similar vein to the observations relating to resources 
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and engagement, there are different patterns of recruitment between groups. The starkest of 
those patterns is based on educational level and income (with the former strongly linked to the 
latter), which are positively related to requests to participate in political activity in the work, 
church, and secular voluntary organisational settings. Requests are also patterned by race and 
ethnicity, with Anglo-Whites receiving the most followed by African-Americans and then 
Latinos. This applies in both the work and secular voluntary organisation settings but African-
Americans are most likely to receive requests in the church setting.67 It is also the case that a 
higher proportion of men than women are recruited to political activity in church or secular 
voluntary organisation settings, while the opposite is the case in workplaces, though all these 
trends are slight.68 
These patterns again point to religious institutions in the United States providing a 
route for otherwise marginalised groups to get involved in politics; not only do they offer a 
context in which civic skills can be developed but they also act as a source of requests to 
participate.69 Of course, there is the risk that those who undertake more political activity 
subsequently receive more requests for further participation. As with engagement, this poses 
questions of causality relating to recruitment because we cannot be sure that requests to 
participate in politics necessarily precede that participation.70 
 The fact that there are causal questions relating to two of the key concepts in the Civic 
Voluntarism Model, namely engagement and recruitment, suggests the utility of considering 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's approach to causality. As is common practice in political 
science they utilise statistical analyses to examine probabilistic relationships.71 As such, they 
do not merely describe the distribution of particular variables, or even the associations between 
sets of descriptive variables, in the population. Rather, they outline testable relationships 
between variables in which some are causally prior to, and argued to impact on, others. That 
approach allows them to propose a causal path that begins with background characteristics 
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such as gender, race and ethnicity, and parental class. Those characteristics precede and 
influence pre-adult experiences of politics at home, education, and extra-curricular activity at 
high school, which in turn impact on adult institutional involvement such as job status, 
organisational affiliations, and religious attendance. Ultimately, the preceding stages of the 
causal path are posited to influence the distribution of the participatory factors that constitute 
the Civic Voluntarism Model; resources, engagement, and recruitment.72 
 Having proposed a detailed causal path Voice and Equality dedicates considerable 
space to testing its propositions, primarily by means of Two-Stage Least Squares statistical 
analyses. This leads to the conclusion that: 
The data confirm the existence of two paths from characteristics of one 
generation to the acquisition of the factors that foster political participation in 
the next. The starting point of each one is the education of the parents, and 
respondents’ educational attainment figures importantly in both. One path is 
more or less socioeconomic. The main effect along this path is the impact of 
parents’ education on respondents’ education and from there to the job and 
income levels that they ultimately attain. The second path runs through 
political stimulation in the home and school. Well-educated parents are more 
likely also to be politically active and to discuss politics at home and to 
produce children who are active in high school.73 
Having established that the proposed causal process leading to the formation of the key factors 
in the Civic Voluntarism Model is supported by empirical evidence it is useful to turn to the 
last step in the causal process, that is the impact of the key factors on political participation. 
 The effects of resources and engagement are found to be wide-ranging and statistically 
significant. In relation to time-based political activities they find that civic skills, political 
interest, political efficacy, and political information are all positively related to participation. 
Turning to voting, it is found that political interest, partisanship, and political information are 
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positively related to turning out. Unsurprisingly, income is unchallenged as the most 
significant factor relating to political donating whilst interest and information are positively 
related to political discussion. There are of course other factors that are found to relate to 
participation such as education, which is positively related to time-based activity, and 
citizenship, which is related to voting.74 However it is resources and engagement that are, as 
predicted by the model, found to be crucial components of the causal process that leads to 
political participation. The third factor in the model, recruitment, whilst arguably activating 
rather than enabling participation, is also found to be positively related to it.75 
  Building on the above model they note that, like recruitment, particular issues can 
activate political participation. In the mid-1990s when the research for Voice and Equality was 
being conducted abortion was, as it continues to be, a major motivating issue in American 
politics. Focussing on that issue it was found that there is a strong link between holding 
staunchly pro- or anti-abortion opinions and being active in that area. Such activation does not 
result from all issues on which people hold equally strong opinions so it is not the case that 
topics that provoke staunch positions are necessarily those that will motivate political 
activity.76 Additionally, and crucially, issue activation does not trump the impact of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model: 
For a group that is resource-deprived, issue engagements go only so far in 
elevating a depressed level of participation. For a group that is well-endowed 
with participatory resources, issue engagements can give an additional 
participatory push. Thus, political participation is deeply enmeshed with the 
substance of politics. Yet the way in which political issues and conflicts are 
manifest in participatory input also depends fundamentally upon the structure 
of participatory factors having their origins outside politics.77 
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Thus, whilst acknowledging the importance of other factors, the Civic Voluntarism Model is 
retained as the primary account of the causal process that leads to political participation. 
 To summarise, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady present a model that posits a causal path 
from background characteristics through early socialisation and subsequent organisational 
affiliation to the key concepts of resources, engagement, and recruitment, which account to a 
great degree for political participation. Those key concepts draw on well-established 
components such as income and political interest as well as a new component of resources in 
the form of civic skills. The posited model, including new and existing components, is tested 
using survey data gathered for the purpose and found to work as predicted. The model is not 
intended to be complete and other factors including motivations and issue activation are found 
to work alongside it without reducing its efficacy. Thus Voice and Equality provides an 
intellectually convincing and empirically robust account of the mechanisms that translate 
background characteristics into different patterns of political participation. Crucially, in 
providing that account it is not attempting to explain away the participatory inequalities that 
exist between sexes, races and ethnicities, and classes but to illuminate how and why those 
very real inequalities do exist.78 
 Unequal levels of political participation across key societal cleavages are of particular 
significance because they can contribute to unequal outcomes resulting from the political 
process. In fact, the voting records of elected representatives have been shown to reflect the 
opinions and interests of wealthy constituents, which may be in part because those constituents 
are more active.79 The fact that political participation is structured by race and ethnicity, and 
gender as well as class suggests that the interests and opinions of privileged groups more 
generally may be better reflected by elected representatives. This lends additional significance 
to the ultimate and succinct conclusion of Voice and Equality 'that the voices heard through 
the medium of citizen participation will be often loud, sometimes clear, but rarely equal.'80 
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Inequality and Privilege: 
 The identification of inequalities in political participation highlights the impact of 
structural forces on individuals.  Whilst the Civic Voluntarism Model provides a strong 
account of the processes that link background characteristics with unequal political 
participation it is just that, a model, and does not identify a broad theory that can accommodate 
its findings. As such, it is only a starting point for this research, which identifies the concept 
of privilege as one that can encompass the inherited advantage related to gender, race and 
ethnicity, and class. The theories around privilege are numerous so it is expedient to begin the 
consideration of the concept with a basic definition upon which the following can rest: 
“Privilege,” both in its legal and its everyday use, indicates what someone or 
something has in virtue of being singled out for advantageous treatment. A 
privilege is necessarily reserved for a few not given to all.81 
Privilege may be positive, entitling the holder to certain benefits, or negative, freeing 
the holder from restrictions, and in either case may be earned or unearned.82 In its earned form 
it may be associated with particular positions that one can attain, with a classic example being 
parliamentary privilege, in which those elected to a legislature are protected from prosecution 
for statements made or actions done in that legislature. In its earned form, privilege is not 
necessarily associated with particular background characteristics but with particular formally 
or informally held positions in society. Of course, such positions may be dominated by groups 
with particular backgrounds but the privileges are not a direct consequence of the individual 
characteristics of the post-holders. 
By contrast, unearned privilege is granted to certain groups, usually on the basis of 
particular background characteristics, for reasons other than merit. This granting of privilege 
may be explicit or not but, in either case, it is in this way that social structures are recreated 
and different groups are afforded different opportunities and inducted into different 
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behaviours. In this form privilege has been likened to an 'invisible weightless knapsack of 
special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, code-books, passports, visas, clothes, 
compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.'83 That knapsack allows those with privilege to 
go about their lives easily and without considering the advantages that have been bestowed 
upon them. It is thus unearned rather than earned privilege that is the focus of this  research. 
Questions about the effects of such unearned advantage are closely linked to the wider 
debate around the effects of inequality. The politically heated nature of that debate has led to 
questions about how to define and measure inequality. For instance, it has been noted that the 
distribution of income is less dispersed than the distribution of wealth, and that lifetime income 
is more equally dispersed than is annual income, whilst some have argued that personal 
expenditure should be the measure of inequality.84 Such measurement effects inform the 
criticism that ‘measures such as the Gini coefficient are not purely “statistical” and they 
embody implicit judgements about the weight to be applied to the inequality at different points 
on the income scale.’85 Despite such criticisms the Gini coefficient is widely used and has 
underpinned work arguing that greater inequality is linked to worse outcomes at aggregate 
level. These have been observed in a range of areas including levels of trust, prevalence of 
mental health issues, obesity rates, average educational attainment, numbers of teenage births, 
levels of violence, proportion of the population imprisoned, and social mobility.86 More 
directly pertinent to the current research, higher income inequality has also been linked to 
lower turnout rates in national elections.87 It is not only important that inequality impacts on 
politics, however, and it has been argued that inequality is a political phenomenon.88 It has 
been shown that the policies of political parties can impact on levels of inequality and yet that 
people continue to vote for parties that arguably do not act in their best interests.89 
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 As noted previously, evidence has also suggested that elected representatives’ voting 
records more closely reflect the views of their wealthy constituents than of their poor 
constituents.90 Thus, the day-to-day advantages of having a higher income or more wealth may 
be complemented by policy-making that reflects your interests and views and sustains your 
day-to-day advantages. Such advantages might be reasonable if they were earned but, 
returning to the focus of the current research, the literature on privilege suggests the pervasive 
influence of unearned advantage. Although those effects also relate to areas such as sexuality,91 
disability, and age, privilege is most frequently cited in relation to the three commonly 
identified social cleavages of sex, race, and class.92 
 Moving beyond aggregate level observations of inequality more critical approaches 
have documented the pervasive workings of privilege at all levels of society. Research has 
demonstrated that, even as explicit sexism and racism are challenged, the overrepresentation 
of white men in senior management jobs remains constant across most sectors despite the 
growth in white collar job numbers.93 At higher levels, women in elite jobs are less supported 
by traditional family structures, and have access to fewer elite networks to sustain their 
positions.94 In fact, it has been noted that opponents of affirmative action ignore the 
institutionalised affirmative action that previously functioned, as a matter of course, in favour 
of white men.95 Indeed, blindness to the benefits of being white and male has been posited to 
constitute a nonconscious ideology that pervades society, assigning roles to individuals with 
little consideration for their abilities or aspirations.96 
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 Mirroring the complexity of the relationships between race and ethnicity, and sex and 
gender,97 arguments regarding what constitutes class have been widespread.98 This is reflected 
in the number of contending class structures that have been posited, operationalised, and 
measured,99 though the concept itself is generally accepted to be of import. Research 
controlling for educational attainment has revealed that class and gender limit social mobility 
in the United Kingdom, with higher social class providing insurance against downward 
mobility.100 This undermines the claim that Britain constitutes a meritocracy in which ability 
alone determines societal position. It has been argued that this is morally problematic as well 
as, based on formal mathematical models, economically inefficient. This is because the most 
able individuals are excluded from appropriate employment, which may also be the 
employment that they wish to pursue, by less qualified but more privileged individuals.101 
 In addition to wider societal inequalities based on privilege there is also evidence of 
the specific relevance of sex, race, and class to political participation. Gender stereotypes 
associate masculine and feminine traits in candidates with competence in certain policy areas, 
and inform the widespread belief, held by both sexes, that men know more about politics than 
women.102 Such beliefs may contribute to the exclusion of women from politics, with even 
otherwise progressive groups sometimes becoming dominated by men, raising the need for 
organisations to positively encourage female participation.103 At the same time, turnout and 
representation in the UK differs between races, and a range of models have been tested 
elsewhere to explain observed differences in general political participation rates between 
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races.104 Those models have suggested that socio-economic factors and levels of psychological 
engagement with politics can explain some of the differences in rates of participation, though 
those variables can have different effects amongst different races.105 In relation to class, it has 
been argued that occupational status is still significantly related to both volume and type of 
political participation, and that class is still related to party choices.106 There is also evidence 
that political participation can be related to other factors such as religion and, to a very great 
extent, age.107 Crucially, the structuring of political participation by background 
characteristics, whatever they may be, can be difficult to overcome when dominant groups fail 
to acknowledge their privilege by resisting information that runs counter to their existing 
beliefs.108 This can underpin opposition to attempts to make participation more open, and thus 
sustain patterns of exclusion based on privilege.  
 It is often asserted that people are advantaged or disadvantaged by background 
characteristics such as sex, race, and class; the idea that society is structured by these cleavages 
is commonplace. Nevertheless, that observation is unsatisfactory when it comes to explaining 
why people do or do not engage in political activity; to simply observe such patterns is not to 
explain them. This recognition led to the previously noted call for research to move 'beyond 
SES' when attempting to account for political behaviour.109 In answering this call it is possible 
to deploy privilege as the overarching concept accommodating the mechanisms through which 
background characteristics translate into advantage or disadvantage. The nature of those 
mechanisms will be more fully elucidated below but there are two points about their 
relationship with background characteristics that must be made. First, they are not simple 
relationships; characteristics such as sex, race, class, sexuality, religion, age, disability, and 
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location, interact to give each individual a unique privilege profile.110 Second, each individual 
cannot be placed in a neat privilege compartment but will hold a unique position on a spectrum 
of privilege relating to any context,111 such as political participation. 
The above two points suggest that privilege as formulated here can work well 
alongside the concept of intersectionality, which encompasses the idea that different forms of 
privilege and discrimination intersect to advantage and disadvantage different groups. In this 
light, the experiences of, for instance, black women cannot be understood in terms of 
discrimination against black people in general or against women in general, but only as an 
intersection of those discriminations resulting in a particular set of experiences.112 Extending 
the argument, white men do not enjoy the privileges of being white and male separately but in 
a combined fashion that makes their experiences, again, particular to them. Understanding 
discrimination and privilege in these terms has led to the suggestion that those campaigning 
for the rights of groups that are discriminated against should be aware of their own privilege. 
Further they should be alive to the possibility that the groups they are campaigning on behalf 
of may have differing goals from their own because of their particular experiences.113 
 To summarise, the literature on inequality and privilege emphasises the impact of 
background characteristics on unequal outcomes across society, including in political 
participation. That literature often focuses on the frequently cited cleavages of sex, race, and 
class but the concept of privilege can also accommodate the impact of other characteristics 
such as sexuality, religion, disability, age, and location. Thus, it acts as an overarching concept 
that can accommodate the mechanisms that translate those background characteristics, in 
interaction, into advantage or disadvantage. One account of those mechanisms was presented 
in Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's work but it did not provide a complete concept of privilege, 
to which the next section turns. 
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A Fuller Concept of Privilege: 
 Thus far, this chapter has illustrated the extent of the literature that relates to political 
participation and the inequalities in such activity that stem from background characteristics. 
The literature has provided numerous categorisations of political participation which have 
been amalgamated to create the typology adopted in the current research. That typology draws 
on the work of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, who also provide the established model of the 
causal processes that translate background characteristics into unequal political participation. 
The account has been supplemented by the wide-ranging literature on the impact of inequality 
and privilege, the latter of which has been introduced as the broad concept that can 
accommodate the observations outlined in Voice and Equality. 
 Extensive though the outlined literature is there remain crucial gaps. First, the 
preceding section outlined a host of texts that have observed the connections between 
background characteristics and unequal outcomes, and the relevance of privilege to those 
connections, but no holistic theory of privilege that can elucidate all of the processes of 
interest. There has been an extensive focus on economic inequality and on the direct effects of 
key social cleavages but no complete account of how they result in unequal outcomes. The 
established model proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady also adopts an incomplete 
approach to the workings or privilege, presenting only some of the mechanisms by which 
background characteristics may be translated into the advantage and disadvantage that 
underpin unequal outcomes. Further, some of those mechanisms, in particular political 
knowledge, interest, efficacy, and recruitment, are very close to political participation in the 
funnel of causality and are therefore not especially illuminating in accounting for it. As will 
be shown below, it is quite easy to accommodate those mechanisms within a broader, and 
richer, theory of privilege that includes components with more causal distance from the 
dependent variable. This fuller conception will also aim to address the fact that, despite 
providing a useful account of the causal processes that lead to political participation, the 
established model leaves considerable room for improvement in accounting for that 
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behaviour.114 Indeed, in the context of the United Kingdom, other models have been found to 
perform better than the Civic Voluntarism Model in accounting for participation.115 This may 
be to do with the causal proximity of some of the independent variables to the dependent 
variable in those, better performing, models but it may also reflect the incompleteness of the 
Civic Voluntarism Model itself. 
 Further, all of the above observations relate to the impact of structural forces on 
individual behaviour, failing to account for the effects of internal affective and cognitive 
processes that have important implications for behaviour. Thus, the current research aims to 
go one step further than adopting a more holistic account of the structural workings of privilege 
by also considering the role of perception of privilege. In doing so it will address the paucity 
of research considering the importance of perceived privilege and its interactions with its 
structural counterpart. In addressing that paucity it will be advancing a more meaningful 
understanding of the causal processes that lead to political participation. Indeed, the lack of 
previous consideration of perceived privilege should be considered an oversight; how can the 
mechanisms that translate privilege into political participation be understood if individuals' 
internal processes are not considered? Thus, perceived privilege represents a key link in the 
causal chain that must be considered alongside its structural counterpart. Providing this more 
complete account may also help to explain the different trends in implicit and explicit political 
participation noted previously. That is to say that it may prove to be the case that the 
importance of privilege is perceived by individual to be different in relation to explicit rather 
than implicit political participation, acting as a barrier in relation to the former but not the 
latter. 
  Finally, in providing a fuller account of the workings of both perceived and structural 
privilege it is the aim of the current research to provide an improved understanding of why 
some people do not participate in politics. As noted at the outset it is commonly recognised 
that democracy, however envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. If that 
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involvement is disproportionately undertaken by certain groups then it is important to 
understand why. Indeed, the approach to addressing participatory inequality should be quite 
different if perception of privilege is found to have an important effect than if structural factors 
alone affect such participation. In that light, the next chapter will provide a holistic account, 
and thus improved conception, of the workings of structural privilege. The subsequent chapter 
will then turn to perception of privilege, outlining the origins and workings of perceptions 
before conceptualising perception of privilege specifically. In doing so those chapters will lay 
the groundwork for analysis that will both offer a more complete account of the processes that 
lead to political participation and insight into how people understand privilege and their 
relation to it. As such, it will shed light on the question of how, if at all, privilege and 
perception of it impact on political participation in the United Kingdom. 
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Chapter Two: Privilege and Capital 
 
Class and Capital: 
 The preceding chapter presented an array of findings that have emerged from the 
sociological approach to accounting for differences in political behaviour. That approach has 
the benefit, through focussing on social structure, of addressing influences on behaviour that 
fall further back in the funnel of causality than do the focuses of either the psychological or 
the rational choice approach. As such, this chapter retains a sociological approach but aims to 
improve upon the established sociological model that was the focus of the previous chapter. It 
does so by proposing the importance of variables that were overlooked by the established 
model, and which have the benefit of being causally prior to some of the variables included 
within that model. Crucially, the additional variables emerge from the main work of this 
chapter, which is its introduction of an overarching theory of privilege that accommodates and 
the established model and explains unequal outcomes more generally. 
Theories relating to the workings of inherited advantage or disadvantage are numerous 
and have extended to account for the workings of privilege over the whole course of human 
history.116 The goal here, however, is to seek an overarching theory of the mechanisms of 
privilege in modern society. In that light it is useful to refer to Pierre Bourdieu's theory of 
class, which posits that it works through the capital that individuals hold and: 
can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is 
immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized 
in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on 
certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the 
form of educational qualification; and as social capital, made up of social 
obligations (“connections”), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into 
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economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title or 
nobility.117 
The above provides a concise summary of Bourdieu's approach to capital but his work is 
extensive and rich enough to warrant more in-depth consideration. In particular, his seminal 
work Distinction is full of fascinating thick description of the cultural capital possessed by 
people of different classes in 1960s France. Based on a mix of sources including survey data, 
interviews, and photographs, the description of his subjects encompasses their musical tastes, 
artistic preferences, choice of literature, home decoration, trips to the theatre and cinema, food 
preferences and body shape, clothing and appearance, favoured sports, use of language and 
speech patterns, and choice of newspaper.118 In each of these areas there are 'legitimate', 
'middle-brow', and 'popular' tastes, which are more or less widespread and accessible.119  
 Beyond the presentation of detailed descriptive content Bourdieu used Distinction to 
posit a cultural market in which there is competition not only to obtain capital but also to define 
which capital is most legitimate.120 This competition is partly an effort to obtain the best rates 
for the cultural capital held when exchanging it into economic capital, but also to assert the 
opposition between cultural capitals and the superiority of some forms over others.121 This 
struggle for superiority is a manifestation of the class struggle that motivated Bourdieu's work, 
and it led to an original conception of class relations. He posited that class is not defined only 
in economic terms but also in relation to the other two forms of capital, though the cultural 
form was the focus of Distinction. The introduction of these other elements of class allowed 
him to expand upon purely economic definitions of the concept as posited by Karl Marx.122 
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 Bourdieu's analysis included additional complexity because he focussed not only on 
the volume but also the composition of capital that was held by different classes.123 This theory 
was reflected in the correspondence analysis that he undertook, which allowed him to 
differentiate between fractions within the dominant and dominated classes. Amongst the 
bourgeoisie he profiled the cultural and economic distinctions between old industrialists and 
new entrepreneurs.124 Similarly, within the middle class he distinguished between the 
professionals and the petty bourgeoisie, and even within the working class between more and 
less politically aware fractions.125 Thus he maintained the division between the dominant and 
the dominated classes and, at the same time, accommodated the complexity of relations within 
them by positing that fractions vie for dominance over each other. He also accepted that other 
structural factors such as sex, age, and location could affect the capital held by individuals, 
though such factors were accommodated within the overarching analysis of class 
competition.126 Thus, for Bourdieu, social class is not defined by a single property ‘but by the 
structure of relations between all the pertinent properties which gives its specific value to each 
of them and to the effects they exert on practices.’127 
 Bourdieu's focus on the structure of relations between the volume and composition of 
capital held by different classes was expressed through his proposition of the concept of 
habitus, in which 'all the practices and products of a given agent are objectively harmonized 
among themselves, without any deliberate pursuit of coherence, and objectively orchestrated, 
without any conscious concertation, with those of all members of the same class.'128 Since it is 
an original concept that was developed by Bourdieu, it is useful to give two examples of how 
he applied it, in this instance in relation to the different manners of classes. For him, the 
bourgeoisie expresses: 
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a habitus of order, restraint, and propriety which may not be abdicated. . . . It 
is also a whole relationship to animal nature, to primary needs and the populace 
who indulge them without restraint; it is a way of denying the meaning and 
primary function of consumption, which are essentially common.129 
By contrast, the working class habitus stands for: 
sincerity, for feeling, for what is felt and proved in actions; it is the free-speech 
and language of the heart which make the true “nice guy”, blunt, 
straightforward, unbending, honest, genuine, “straight down the line” and 
“straight as a die”, as opposed to everything that is pure form, done only for 
form’s sake; it is freedom and the refusal of complications, as opposed to 
respect for all the forms and formalities spontaneously perceived as 
instruments of distinction and power.130 
For the sake of clarity, and since it is a complex concept, habitus is here understood to be the 
totality of and connections between all of the habits, preferences, and understandings 
possessed by virtue of being socialised into a particular class. 
 One of the key means by which such socialisation occurs is education, which Bourdieu 
describes as institutionalised or formalised cultural capital.131 Education is thus a means by 
which to transmit advantage and, as such, is closely linked to background.132 The possession 
of advantage resulting from education can lead to a sense of qualification to engage with topics 
such as politics,133 which is of particular relevance to the current research. Crucially, the sense 
of qualification to talk on topics is part of a wider confidence that is imbued by the transmission 
of cultural capital through both formal and informal means. Such confidence is expressed in 
relation not just to politics but in a whole host of settings in which '[i]t confers the self-certainty 
which accompanies the certainty of possessing cultural legitimacy, and the ease which is the 
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touchstone of excellence'.134 This ease is communicated not only through words but also a 
manner of being: 
What is learnt through immersion in a world in which legitimate culture is as natural 
as the air one breathes is a sense of the legitimate choice so sure that it convinces by 
the sheer manner of the performance, like a successful bluff.135 
Such confidence is linked not only to one's habitus but also to the trajectory that results from 
the current combination of capital, and people are additionally classified by whether they are 
seen to have upward mobility.136 In fact, part of the competition between classes is around the 
creation of high status jobs that fit the capital profiles, including educational qualifications, of 
their members to ensure that their trajectory is positive.137 
 To summarise, Bourdieu's work in Distinction, which is commonly cited as one of the 
most important books of twentieth century sociology,138 presents a complex and original 
theory of class. He posits that it is about more than economics and proposes that the market in 
which the classes compete is based around the volume and composition of both economic and 
cultural capital (with social capital considered subsequently). Thus, whilst accepting the 
fundamental divide between dominant and dominated classes, he describes the contending 
factions of the bourgeoisie, the middle class, and the working class. From that description he 
develops a new concept, habitus, to summarise the relationship between all of the habits, 
preferences, and understandings possessed by each class and fraction. Habitus is linked to 
future status through trajectory and is communicated through, amongst other things, formal 
educational qualifications and a general sense of confidence. Crucially, he achieves all of the 
preceding based on a rich descriptive account of class in 1960s France that draws on a range 
of quantitative and qualitative data. As such, in addition to his engaging, powerful, and 
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important theoretical contributions, Bourdieu can be seen as an early proponent of mixed 
methods research.139 
 Focussing on his theory rather than his methods, Bourdieu's impact has been reflected 
in the extent of the literature related to the three forms of capital. Recent research has utilised 
survey and census data to show that economic capital in the form of parental wealth is at least 
equal in significance to parental income in affecting children’s educational attainment and 
future occupations.140 It is posited that wealth provides an insurance function allowing children 
to make riskier educational decisions such as choosing long or expensive courses without 
concern for the costs of failure.141 The findings apply across mobility regimes characterised 
by the different educational, social welfare, and redistributive systems in the United States, 
Germany and Sweden.142 In the United Kingdom, wealth is related to an array of important 
outcomes including infant mortality, educational attainment, anxiety levels, obesity rates, 
alcohol and tobacco consumption, drug use, and life expectancy.143 The importance of wealth 
in influencing outcomes also relates to government policy towards job creation and social 
services, which it has been argued should complement local community action.144 
 Whilst there have been differing suggestions of what the best measures of economic 
capital are (e.g. income or wealth), the debates around social capital have been more 
fundamental and have led to its identification as an 'essentially contested concept'.145 Most 
famously, Robert Putnam identified social capital as aggregate levels of engagement with the 
civic organisations and public spaces that bind society together.146 More specifically, it was 
identified as the 'features of social organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that 
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facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.'147 For him, social capital is both a 
positive end in itself and an important component of a functioning democracy, with its decline 
considered to be a trend that should be halted. The relationship between social capital and trust 
has been focused on elsewhere, leading to the argument that together they facilitate 
cooperation that could not happen if enforcement institutions alone regulated human 
interaction.148 These definitions focus on social capital as the glue that binds society and allows 
it to function but Putnam also distinguishes between ‘bridging (or inclusive) and bonding (or 
exclusive)’ social capital, likening the former to ‘a sociological WD-40’ and the latter to ‘a 
kind of sociological superglue’.149 This distinction is key for Bourdieu, who is concerned 
primarily with the bonding form, which can encompass the importance of access to social 
networks with higher or lower social status. His view of social capital, as with the other forms, 
is of something that is held as part of the habitus of a particular class position. As its name 
suggests, it can be accumulated or exchanged for other forms of capital in the market that he 
described. Thus, although it is possible to see social capital as a communal resource binding 
society, from Bourdieu's perspective it is much more something that is distributed unevenly 
and sustains the class inequalities of society. 
Based on Bourdieu's definition, social capital stemming from privilege has been 
identified most explicitly in the transition from school to university. In the United States elite 
schools lobby through well-established links with university admissions offices to ensure that 
the playing field is tilted in favour of their students even when they are not the best qualified 
candidates.150 The children of alumni also receive preferential treatment in admissions to elite 
universities, a phenomenon referred to as the ‘legacy preference’.151 This suggests that social 
capital is something that can function in the interests of those who hold it without action on 
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their part. Nonetheless survey research has illustrated that the children of high status parents 
can be quite aware of the social capital that they possess.152 At the other end of the spectrum, 
it has been argued that the dislocation associated with large council estates in Britain destroyed 
working class communities by removing social capital embodied in traditional family 
networks.153 In fact, more recent work has also shown that relocation resulting from urban 
regeneration projects can also have negative effects by removing people from their established 
social networks.154 
 Recent research based on official records in Denmark has demonstrated the power of 
social connections in relation to voting. A special edition of the Journal of Elections, Public 
Opinion, and Parties included work that showed the lower likelihood of turning out associated 
with leaving home before the habit of voting, inherited from parents, has taken hold.155 This 
decline in voting amongst young people is also associated with later maturation; young people 
are leaving education, getting married, and having children later. This means that they are less 
settled in one location and, in part because of the social networks that they are therefore part 
of, less likely to vote.156 At the other end of the age scale, people are found to 'retire' from 
voting as their social networks decline with old age.157 The effects of social connections on 
turnout are not restricted to youth and old age, and evidence also suggests that discussing 
politics with non-voters who communicate their scepticism or uncertainty about voting 
impacts negatively on one's own likelihood of turning out.158 Social connections and pressure 
can also work to promote turnout, as demonstrated in a field experiment that found the prospect 
of having one's choice of whether or not to vote made public significantly raised turnout.159 
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That research is complemented by evidence that voting is contagious within households, and 
that personal connections are more important in mobilisation than are remote messages.160 All 
of the preceding serves to emphasise the importance of social connections in political 
participation. Thus, social capital, in the form of who one knows, what their statuses are, and 
how strong the connections are, has important implications for life outcomes in general and 
political participation in particular. 
 As indicated by the length and complexity of Distinction, cultural capital is perhaps 
the least easy of the three forms to succinctly define, which has led to criticism of the varied 
operationalisation of the concept.161 Further it has been argued that levels of cultural capital 
when entering education have no effect on subsequent attainment.162 Such arguments have not 
deterred the literature from focussing on the role of the educational context in reproducing and 
measuring cultural capital. It has been argued that ‘choice of school appears as the one real 
chance that parents get to structure a significant slice of socialisation beyond the home.’163 In 
that vein, research has illustrated that even when middle-class parents go ‘against the grain’164 
by choosing urban schooling for their children, they do so with specific goals in mind. These 
may be educational, for instance to instil a work ethic, or more broadly experiential, for 
instance to gain diverse cultural experiences in a moderated environment.165 
 Those parents who do choose to send their children to private school may focus on the 
material benefits such as better facilities, more highly qualified teachers, smaller class sizes, 
the array of extra-curricular activities, and better results and prospects for university 
entrance.166 At a less tangible level, they may hope that such schools will build their children’s 
character, instil discipline in them, and generally ‘polish’ them in preparation for their future 
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lives.167 Hence academic qualifications can represent more than ability in certain fields, 
indicating that children have been socialised to be motivated and to understand the 
requirements of their role in any given context.168 Beyond school, ‘[a] college degree confirms 
that the graduate is a responsible, diligent member of society who knows how to conform to 
its requirements.’169 On the other side, for those without the privilege of attending university 
or ‘good’ schools, the educational system can prove alienating as ‘middle-class teachers 
operate a whole series of linguistic and cultural controls which are “dissonant” with those of 
[their] family and peers, but whose mastery is implicitly defined as the index of intelligence 
and achievement’.170 Further, privileged students who conform to the ‘mainstream’ academic 
culture may behave disparagingly towards a lack of privilege that can manifest itself in 
delinquency.171 
On a more material level, the importance of cultural capital extends beyond the 
confines of formal education, for instance into consumption habits. It has been argued that 
rising general wealth leads to ‘[t]he eclipse of “waste” by “taste”’172 as the privileged 
demonstrate their cultural superiority through consumption of particular brands with 
associated images. This re-establishes or reinforces control of cultural signifiers including 
habits and brands because ability to consume excessively loses its value.173 Interestingly, and 
as with social capital, children of high status parents are often aware of the impact that family 
background has on consumption habits.174 
Higher levels of education can also translate into higher levels of interest in politics 
and participation in political activity.175 As noted previously, Bourdieu also identifies the link 
from education to a sense of entitlement to express political opinions. That observation, 
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however, is only part of his assessment of the role of cultural capital in individuals' approaches 
to politics and, in fact, he gives over a section in Distinction to the topic. In it he suggests 
political opinions and issue positions, for instance on policies relating to minimum wages and 
accommodation for the working classes, are based on class position.176 Further, and more 
fundamental than opinion, he argues that an inclination towards political engagement itself is 
a facet of the middle-class habitus.177 The importance of class can be seen in the domination 
of politics by those who speak using a particular style and, in so doing, demonstrate their 
political qualifications.178 The dominance of the political style of expression means that even 
representatives of the working classes, such as those who rise through the ranks of trades 
unions, end up being detached from the class that they came from.179 This detachment is such 
that '[a]bstentionism is perhaps not so much a hiccup in the system as one of the conditions of 
its functioning as a misrecognized – and therefore recognized – restriction on political 
participation.'180 Further, the requisite manner of performance in politics acts as a structural 
barrier to political participation in which those outside politics hold: 
suspicion of the political “stage”, a “theatre” whose rules are not understood 
and which leaves ordinary taste with a sense of helplessness, [and which] is 
often the sources of “apathy” and of a generalized distrust of all forms of 
speech and spokesmen.181 
This speaks of the potential importance of cultural capital in enabling political participation, 
and empirical work has shown the link between the two in Denmark, albeit based on very 
restricted measures of the former concept.182 The possible relationship between the two, then, 
needs to be examined in more detail whilst taking into account the other elements of privilege. 
 In summary, Bourdieu's seminal work suggests the importance of cultural tastes, 
habits, and consumption patterns, as well as social networks, alongside economic capital. He 
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argues that those three forms of capital are exchangeable but that their distribution is defined 
by the ongoing struggle between classes and the fractions within them. The defining role of 
class means that there are homologies between the different types of each of the three forms 
of capital, which come together to form the habitus of each class and fraction. Thus, Bourdieu 
presents a detailed account of the workings of class, the importance of which has been reflected 
in the extensive empirical work relating to the impact of economic, social, and cultural capital. 
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Adapting Capital: 
 There have, of course, been critiques of Bourdieu's theories, not least stemming from 
those adhering to economically based definitions of class. For instance, it has been argued that 
Bourdieu's claim that certain class traits lead to misrecognition of economic exploitation 
cannot, for instance, explain why workers in the former Soviet Bloc rejected their exploitation. 
Instead, Gramsci's concept of false consciousness is developed to suggest that particular 
systems of work mystify, and thus sustain, economic exploitation.183 That argument posits the 
continuing centrality of economic relations to understanding class and exploitation. This is a 
point that has been developed elsewhere in the suggestion that Bourdieu does not pay enough 
attention to classic European understandings of class as a relation to the means of production, 
be they based on Marx or Goldthorpe. It is argued that Bourdieu fails to accommodate the 
fundamental importance of the power that stems from economic position.184 This point has 
been also been made, albeit in different terms, in criticisms of the Great British Class Survey, 
which applied the forms of capital to describe the contemporary classes in the United 
Kingdom. It has been argued that it is unnecessary and unhelpful to expand the concept of 
class beyond the occupational statuses categorised by the National Statistics Socio-Economic 
Classification (NS-SEC), which is less complex and captures the class hierarchy well.185 
These critiques seem to suggest a particular understanding of the causal processes that 
lead to societal hierarchies, positing that economic structures define access to power and 
hierarchical position. By contrast, this research applies a reading of Bourdieu that suggests it 
is socialisation and life experiences, which are here taken to be influenced by background class 
as well as other background characteristics that furnish individuals with the three forms of 
capital. The resultant capital profiles allow the attainment of particular statuses in any given 
                                                     
183 Michael Burawoy, 'The Roots of Domination: Beyond Bourdieu and Gramsci', Sociology, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 2012), pp. 
187-206. 
184 Flemmen, 'Putting Bourdieu to Work for Class Analysis', pp. 325-343.  
185 Office for National Statistics, ‘SOC2010 volume 3: the National Statistics Socio-economic classification (NS-SEC rebased on 
SOC2010)’, The National Archives, Wednesday 06 January 2016, viewed at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20160105160709/http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/classifications/current-
standard-classifications/soc2010/soc2010-volume-3-ns-sec--rebased-on-soc2010--user-manual/index.html on 24.04.2017. 
60 
 
social hierarchy and thus access to the power that influences, amongst other things, subsequent 
economic outcomes. Thus, in an important respect, this research adapts the forms of capital to 
account not for the workings of class but of privilege. This means that background class can 
be retained as a relatively simple indicator of parental economic status. In that light, some 
element of the criticism of Bourdieu is accepted, in that capital profiles are not considered to 
reflect class in this research, but to reflect the broader encompassing concept of privilege. 
With the above broad adaptation in mind it is useful to consider work in which 
Bourdieu's theories were applied to the context of the United Kingdom with the result that 
certain key, and more specific, adaptations were proposed. In Culture, Class, Distinction, Tony 
Bennett and colleagues set out three key questions: 
Our first question . . . is to assess whether we can detect cultural capital in 
contemporary Britain, and if so, to delineate what form it takes. 
. . . 
Our second question . . . is whether different cultural fields, namely in the 
worlds of music, reading, art, television and film viewing, and sport are 
structured along similar principles, and if so, what is the nature of the 
similarities between them?  
 . . . 
Our third question is to what extent we can see a process whereby established 
middle-class groups are advantaged by the organisation of cultural forms, and 
how similar processes inform the ordering and reproduction of the relations 
between genders and ethnic groups.186 
In addressing those question they adopt a similar mix of research methods to Bourdieu to 
inform their description of the different British classes' tastes and levels of participation in 
areas including music, print news, art, books, television, cinema, sport, clothing, and eating 
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out.187 Unsurprisingly, since the research was conducted in a different country and at a 
different time to Bourdieu's they find notably different cultural capital profiles, not least 
because new forms of entertainment such as television have become relevant.188 Despite this, 
they retain a three-class model for the contemporary United Kingdom whilst noting some 
overlap between those classes.189 Importantly, they find differences in the structure of the 
cultural capital held by the various classes in contemporary Britain. 
Their first departure from Bourdieu is in the identification of the decline in the power 
of legitimate culture in the United Kingdom.190 It seems that the struggle to define the value 
of particular forms of cultural capital in the market has resulted in a situation in which the 
value of almost all forms is accepted, or at least not dismissed. In fact, the research repeatedly 
finds that people are keen to avoid the label of 'snob' and are thus hesitant to pass judgement 
on any form of cultural capital in which they are not interested.191 There are some exceptions 
with, for instance, particular genres of music provoking strong positive or negative reactions 
but the trend towards, if not acceptance, then tolerance of diverse cultural forms prevails.192 
Thus, Bourdieu's posited hierarchy of types of cultural capital is of less relevance with the 
value of capital varying with context. Relating to this, familial social capital is found to have 
continuing greater significance for working class people than for their middle or upper class 
counterparts and, to an extent, substitutes for the more confined cultural tastes and lower levels 
of cultural participation noted below.193 
Extending the above, the second adaptation to Bourdieu that Bennett et al. identify 
relates to the diversity of cultural forms consumed. It seems that, beyond mere tolerance, it 
has become a badge of honour to maintain diverse tastes, leading to the emergence of the 
phenomenon of the 'cultural omnivore'.194 In fact, such wide-ranging cultural preferences seem 
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to act as a new form of distinction; in contemporary Britain it is not important to be familiar 
with particular cultural forms but to know, like, and be comfortable with a large range of such 
forms.195 This finding is suggestive of prioritisation of liberal values such as tolerance amongst 
classes that have begun to deprioritise economic concerns as they enter 'postmaterialism'.196 In 
fact, the extent of the phenomenon has led the authors to suggest that part of the reason for a 
decline in the distinctiveness of working class culture is that many components of it have been 
co-opted by middle and upper class cultural omnivores.197 Interestingly, there is no suggestion 
that middle and upper class culture has been co-opted by similar working class cultural 
omnivores. This is a significant break from Bourdieu's findings, which identified a 
disinterested analytical approach to culture, rather than a willingness to engage in many 
cultural contexts, as the measure of distinction.198 In fact, it seems that only one group in the 
contemporary United Kingdom has retained a cultured detachment in their consumption 
habits: the elite. The distinctiveness of the upper echelons is maintained by some cultural forms 
that have not diffused downwards, such as classical music and opera, though these are now 
the exceptions rather than the rule.199 Indeed, the continued distinction of the elite may be 
exaggerated by the reduced distinction between the middle and working classes based on 
cultural omnivorousness. 
Bennett et al. repeatedly find that an identifiable British elite breaks with the tenor of 
their observations, for instance regarding the declining importance of legitimate culture. This 
small group of senior people in various fields continues to consume cultural forms identified 
as markers of distinction by Bourdieu, as well as holding a more stringent information-
focussed approach to newer forms of entertainment such as television.200 The social circles in 
which such people move allow them to maintain their relationships with other members of the 
elite, potentially working in other organisations or sectors than themselves.201 The fact that the 
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elite seems to be identifiable and detached has important implications for the current research, 
especially since national politicians are likely to fall within that group.202 If the upper echelons 
of society are particularly different from the majority of the population, and can be seen as 
such, this may detach them from the public and create barriers to engagement. 
Notwithstanding the elites, it is wide-ranging cultural tastes that maintain distinction 
in the contemporary United Kingdom, though other patterns are also significant. In their third 
adaptation to Bourdieu, Bennett et al. note that the volume of participation in cultural activities 
outside the home is a key means by which to differentiate the classes.203 Thus it is that, 
although they cannot be easily characterised with reference to particular cultural tastes, the 
middle and upper classes are more likely than the working classes to attend events and venues 
associated with their cultural interests.204 Often the ability to participate reflects access to 
greater levels of economic capital but in all cases frequent participation helps to maintain 
cultural profiles.205 
Building on the identification of changes in the structure of cultural preferences the 
next adaptation proposed by Bennett et al. is more fundamental. Noting that one of the major 
critiques of Bourdieu has been his failure to adequately account for the impact of gender, and 
his inability to consider the impact of ethnicity due to data restrictions, they argue that other 
factors contribute extensively to the formation of cultural capital.206 Throughout Class, 
Culture, Distinction, they find evidence that, whereas Bourdieu accommodated such factors 
within an overarching class analysis, gender, ethnicity, and age actually interact with class to 
create a diverse array of cultural capital profiles in the United Kingdom.207 The significant 
impact of all these factors suggests the utility of the adaptation outlined in opening this chapter, 
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in which the forms of capital are taken as indicators not of class but of privilege, which can 
accommodate all of the relationships between background characteristics and capital profiles. 
The replacement of class with privilege as the focus of research can also address the 
next adaptation to Bourdieu that Bennett et al. suggest. In recognising the complexity of the 
terrain of cultural capital in contemporary Britain, and accepting the role of a number of factors 
on that terrain, they provide the basis to critique the problem of class determinism.208 Whilst 
Bourdieu challenged the economic determinism of Marxist theories it is class that retains a 
central role in his analysis. In particular he presented habitus not only as the possession of 
particular tastes in the various cultural fields but also as the homology between those tastes. 
That is to say, he posited that the structure of relations between classes is the same across all 
of the fields of cultural capital.209 By contrast, their findings allow Bennett et al. to conclude: 
While we find the notion of class habitus unhelpful, we agree with him 
[Bourdieu] that cultural proclivities are closely associated with social class; 
the three classes that we inductively generated from our cultural maps 
transcend particular occupational positions. This does not, however, produce 
exclusive, highly integrated and unified patterns of class behaviour; perhaps it 
is more useful to see classes as force fields, within the parameters of which 
individuals vary, though within limits.210 
In rejecting the assertion of homology across the fields of cultural capital that comprise the 
habitus they are providing scope for probabilistic rather than deterministic analysis. This 
adaptation to Bourdieu is important for the current research because it allows for the possibility 
that multiple factors, rather than just class, influence capital profiles. It also accommodates the 
idea that those capital profiles are part of a causal process that has consequences in the context 
of political participation. In other words, contra Bourdieu, political participation may be 
behaviour that results, in part, from the possession of capital rather than as something that is 
determined by class in the same way as capital profiles. Importantly, the placing of capital in 
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a causal process also allows for the introduction of perceptions as crucial additional steps in 
that causal process. It accommodates the idea that the relevance of privilege is affected by the 
extent to which, and how, it is perceived.  
 To summarise, in Culture, Class, Distinction, Bennett et al. retain a fundamentally 
Bourdieusian analysis but make some important adaptations based on empirical observations 
that render his theories applicable to contemporary Britain. In answering their three motivating 
questions they find, first, that cultural capital does exist in that setting and that it varies across 
the classes. However, they find that the cultural capital profiles of the different classes are 
notably different from those observed in 1960s France. Crucially, in answering their second 
question, they find that there is a less deterministic relationship between fields of cultural 
capital than that posited by Bourdieu, thus challenging the assertion that they are homologous. 
Third, they find that the decline in the significance of legitimate culture has blurred the 
hierarchy of the classes in terms of cultural capital. Instead, those in the higher classes have a 
tendency to have become cultural omnivores, marked by their diverse tastes and frequent 
participation in an array of activities. Finally, in answering their third question, they find that 
trends in cultural tastes and practices are not only structured by class but also by sex, race, and 
age. 
In challenging Bourdieu's overly-deterministic approach to the relationship between 
class and capital, Bennett et al. lay the foundations for the adoption of the broader concept of 
privilege by the current research. Privilege translates the various identified background 
characteristics, as well as others, into the unequal societal outcomes with which they are 
associated. It encompasses the socialisation process by which different capital profiles are 
created, and can be seen as the mechanism through which background characteristics lead to 
advantage or disadvantage. Thus, privilege can accommodate the impact of class, sex, race, 
sexuality, age, religion, disability, and location as they influence the capital profile of each 
individual and thus the outcomes that are more or less available to them. This adoption of 
privilege over class as the focus of the research is the first major departure from the 
Bourdieusian theory that informs it. 
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The second major departure from Bourdieu is in its focus on testing causality. As noted 
previously, Bourdieu adopts a highly descriptive approach and, in utilising correspondence 
analysis, focuses to a great degree on mapping the distribution of and associations between the 
forms of cultural capital. Of course, Bourdieu's is a class analysis and, as such, fundamentally 
asserts a causal process leading from class to homologous profiles across the various fields of 
cultural capital. However, the focus of the work is not on testing or assessing that causal 
process but on describing its results. His use of survey data does not imply the testing of 
hypotheses and, in fact, it is deployed in an inductive manner to illustrate the differences 
between classes.211  
Similarly, although they recognise the importance of sex, race, and age alongside class 
in defining cultural profiles, Bennett et al. do not test those causal relationships. This thick 
descriptive approach stands in contrast to the approaches to assessing causality that are adopted 
by social science researchers who are more informed by practice in the discipline of 
economics. Such approaches, often deployed in analyses of inequality, tend to test the 
aggregate level impact of concepts such as supply and demand, or focus on economic 
calculations at the individual level. Indeed, the established model of inequality in political 
participation that was outlined in the first chapter, though not concerned with such economic 
calculations, adopts such an approach to causal analysis. 
Taking an approach that draws both on the established model and on Bourdieu's 
theories, the current research focuses on testing individual level causal processes. In particular, 
it is concerned with the processes that run from background characteristics through privilege 
to political participation. This is arguably a perversion of the Bourdieusian concepts of 
economic, social, and cultural capital that were conceived as indicators of class rather than 
causal mechanisms. However, as outlined in the previous consideration of the literature that 
has adopted and tested those concepts, this will not be the first time that they have been put to 
such a use. Crucially, it is also considered worthwhile to build on the rich and important 
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descriptive work undertaken by Bourdieu and Bennett et al. by testing the causal impact of the 
processes that work through the forms of capital. Thus, this research is not concerned with the 
dispersion of capital per se, but with its origins and effects. 
Despite the adoption of a different causal approach it remains the case that Bourdieu, 
as adapted by Bennett et al., provides the holistic theory of privilege that was lacking in the 
previously reviewed literature on the concept. In doing so it provides the first main focus for 
the current research; the link from privilege as it is embodied in the three forms of capital to 
political participation. This is posited to be a more illuminating relationship than that between 
background characteristics and political participation because privilege is more than merely a 
summary of those characteristics. The three forms of capital, which indicate privilege, are rich 
in detail and indicate the particular circumstances of each individual in a way that simply 
observing their background characteristics cannot. Habits, preferences, and understandings are 
undoubtedly affected by those characteristics but they also suggest how a person was brought 
up, and they encompass the key factors that were identified by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
as influencing political participation. 
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Reconciling Privilege, Capital, and Political Participation: 
 As has been argued, and despite its relevance, the Civic Voluntarism Model does not 
refer to the concept of privilege that is a crucial component of this research. As was noted in 
the introduction, that concept is also of particular relevance to the context of the United 
Kingdom. This suggests the utility of reconciling the work outlined in the first chapter with 
that outlined so far in this chapter. This will allow the current research to identify the three 
forms of capital as the mechanisms through which privilege works but, at the same time, adopt 
the causal approach and focus on political participation of the Civic Voluntarism Model. Thus, 
it is necessary, reasonable, and intuitively satisfying to reconcile Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady's model with Bourdieu's conceptualisation of economic, social, and cultural capital. 
 First, Bourdieu's economic capital clearly encompasses the money component of 
Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's concept of resources. Of course, and as noted previously, 
money does not come only from income but also from wealth (i.e. a stock of assets that is 
exchangeable into money or provides earnings), which also contributes to unequal 
outcomes.212 Thus, economic capital is here taken to be an amalgamation of wealth and 
income, and to include the money component of the concept of resources from the Civic 
Voluntarism Model. It is also taken to incorporate the time component of resources, though it 
is a more unusual component in terms of its relationship with background characteristics. Time 
is structured along different lines from income and wealth, and has interesting relationships 
with each. Increasing income may be negatively related to free time if it is the result of more 
work but positively related to an increase in wealth if it implies that income from work 
becomes less critical. Time is also arguably heavily related to family structure, with traditional 
divides in housework and child rearing being based on sex.213 Thus, whilst time is marked by 
its relationships with the other components of economic capital, the nature of those 
relationships is complex.  
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The influence of background characteristics on economic capital is apparent; its 
transfer from one generation to another is likely to sustain the structures that existed in the 
previous generation. By definition, wealth that is transferred to children from parents remains 
in the hands of those with the similar background characteristics. At the same time, the 
persistence of income differences between groups, in part due to time constraints imposed by 
factors such as housework and child rearing, complements wealth transfer in structuring 
economic capital by background characteristics. 
Second, Bourdieu's approach to the 'essentially contested concept'214 of social capital 
focuses on the bonding element identified by Robert Putnam, and is more concerned with 
social capital within groups than in society as a whole.215 Thus, Bourdieu's definition focuses 
on who individuals know and, implicitly, what they can expect from those relationships. It is 
relatively easy to reconcile this with Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's concept of recruitment if 
it is accepted that social capital also relates to the requests that are likely to come from the 
people who one knows. This is not a great leap; different acquaintances will have different 
habits of their own so requests for participation will differ depending on who one knows. This 
means that, like the social connections that they stem from, requests are structured by 
background characteristics.216 Thus, social capital is here taken to be the number of social 
connections that one has, the status of the people to whom one has connections, the strength 
of those connections based on what can be expected of them, and the requests that result. 
The maintenance of the structuring of social capital through its transfer between 
generations is easily comprehended; parents can offer introductions to family friends, 
colleagues, or fellow members of organisations. At a less explicit but more fundamental level 
the parental role in choosing schools, supporting extra-curricular activities, and, in some cases, 
vetoing friendships all play a part in defining the social networks in which people find 
themselves. The social skills developed in those networks then influence the networks that 
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develop once one strikes out and leaves home, not least if one attends university (which is, 
again, a decision often influenced by parents). 
Finally, Bourdieu's cultural capital encompasses the bulk of the components of the 
model presented in Voice and Equality. Civic skills, which stem from education (itself a key 
component of cultural capital) and ongoing engagement with employment and voluntary 
contexts, both enable participation and act as a qualification to do so. They are also likely to 
deliver the kind of self-assured manner in a political setting that Bourdieu identified. Thus, 
civic skills both enable individuals to participate and mark them out as able to others. 
Similarly, the components of engagement act as cultural qualifications that incline those who 
possess them towards political activity and suggest to others that they are competent to do so. 
Being interested in politics, believing that one can effectively engage with the political system, 
and holding political information are signifiers of political competence that assure the self and 
others. Party identification is less necessary for political participation and despite its well-
documented decline remains widespread, perhaps because of its utility in the most prevalent 
form of political participation, voting.217 Nevertheless, party identification is here taken to be 
part of cultural capital along with the other components of engagement, civic skills, and 
Bourdieu's originally posited cultural tastes, habits, and activities. Crucially, all of these 
elements share a common origin in that they stem from socialisation. This concept is of wide 
significance but is particularly relevant to cultural capital, and can be defined as: 
“the process by which persons acquire the knowledge, skills, and dispositions 
that make them more or less able members of their society” (Brim 1966, p. 3). 
Socialization does not include all formative processes experienced by 
individuals. It is limited to those associated with acquired characteristics (and 
thus it excludes qualities evolving through biological maturation) which have 
social significance (and thus excludes individual differences that are not 
systematically relevant to social functioning).218 
                                                     
217 Mair and van Biezen, ‘Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies’, pp. 5-21. 
218 Kerckhoff, ‘Family Position, Peer Influences, and Schooling’, p. 94. 
71 
 
It is socialisation that, as Verba, Schlozman, and Brady note, functions both in early years and 
in impressionable adolescence, transferring cultural capital between generations, to form 
Bourdieu's habitus.219 It may be less homologous than he posited but it encompasses patterns 
in civic skills and engagement that are structured, through socialisation, by background 
characteristics. 
To summarise, it is relatively simple to reconcile the Civic Voluntarism Model 
proposed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady with the three forms of capital proposed by 
Bourdieu. For ease of reference Table 2.1, presented below, maps the components of the 
former onto the latter. This exercise is critical for the current research because it reconciles 
work on the key concepts of privilege and political participation by positing a path that leads 
from background characteristics through inheritance, socialisation, and networks to the 
economic, social, and cultural capital, which encompass resources, recruitment, and 
engagement as proposed in the Civic Voluntarism Model. In doing so it also reconciles 
Bourdieu's theory of the forms of capital with the causal rather than descriptive analytical 
approach taken in this research. 
 
Table 2.1. Mapping the Civic Voluntarism Model onto the Three Forms of Capital  
Form of Capital Original Components New Components 
 
Economic 
 
Income 
Wealth 
 
Time 
 
Cultural 
 
Education 
Tastes 
Habits 
Consumption patterns 
 
Civic skills 
Political interest 
Political efficacy 
Political information 
Party identification 
 
Social 
 
Number of social connections 
Strength of those connections 
Status of those known 
 
Requests 
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Conclusion: 
This chapter has presented a holistic theory of privilege in the form of Pierre 
Bourdieu's work on economic, social, and cultural capital. That theory and his in depth work 
on the nature of cultural capital and class competition were taken to offer a detailed explanation 
of the workings not, as he argued, of class but of privilege. Indeed, drawing on criticisms of 
Bourdieu's work it has argued that background class constitutes one among many background 
characteristics that influence capital profiles. Those profiles then go on to influence current 
socio-economic classification as well as a range of other outcomes including political 
behaviour. Building on the key adaptation of the forms of capital to be the mechanisms of 
privilege rather than class, the chapter outlined recent work by Bennett and colleagues that 
render Bourdieu's theories relevant to the context of the contemporary United Kingdom. In 
particular, they introduced a culturally omnivorous approach as the new indicator of cultural 
distinction, with only the small elite remaining distinct on the basis of its consumption of 
highbrow, or legitimate, culture.220 More fundamentally, they introduced the possibility that 
variance, rather than homology, exists within capital profiles constituted of various forms and 
types of capital. As such, they accommodated the possibility that the elements of those capital 
profiles may be influenced by a range of background characteristics beyond class, as is argued 
by this research. Building on those adaptations, the chapter put forward a key argument of the 
research, which is that in focussing on political participation the causal approach of Verba, 
Schlozman, and Brady should be adopted in place of Bourdieu's descriptive approach. In that 
light the propositions of those two key texts were reconciled to provide an outline of the 
process that runs from background characteristics through privilege to political participation. 
 
 
                                                     
220 The term ‘legitimate’ is used in place of ‘highbrow’ throughout the thesis for two reasons. First, it more accurately reflects the 
language used by Bourdieu when outlining the theory underpinning this research. Second, it attempts to avoid valorising the types 
of capital that are described as legitimate by placing them in an explicit hierarchy of ‘highbrow’, ‘middle-brow’, and ‘lowbrow’ 
capital. Thus, the choice of language aims to recognise the kinds of capital that are legitimised by society, and that support political 
participation, whilst not reinforcing the idea of the superiority of that capital, as far as that possibility can be avoided. 
73 
 
 
Chapter Three: The Importance of Perception of Privilege 
 
Perception and Inequality: 
 The preceding chapters have outlined in detail a process that leads from background 
characteristics to political participation and, in doing so, have provided an account of the 
workings of privilege. In considering such mechanisms the focus has been on the impact of 
structural influences at the individual level. In other words, until this point a sociological 
approach has been adopted that accounts for only one part of the causal process that influences 
political behaviour. For a fuller account of that process it is crucial to consider not only 
influences that are external to individuals but also the internal processes that are a crucial 
influence on outcomes. That is to say that what people think and feel is a critical additional 
link in the causal chain from background to behaviour. Thus, the previous chapters have dealt 
with the key externally observable concepts that account for the workings of the overarching 
concept of privilege, and can thus be seen as an account of structural privilege. They do not 
account for perceived privilege, or the thoughts and feelings that people have about their 
backgrounds, how they relate to their current place in society, and their ability to participate 
in certain activities such as politics. 
 Missing the perceptual component out of any account of the influence of privilege on 
political participation renders the causal chain incomplete, undermining any explanation. The 
impact of structural privilege may be crucially related to whether it is perceived and how 
relevant it is seen to be in a given context. Ultimately, behaviour is not influenced only by 
structural forces but also by beliefs about those forces. A key reason for not participating in 
politics may be the belief that one is not able to, perhaps because of a lack of economic, social, 
or cultural capital. Structural privilege may have an impact on political participation but that 
impact will be notably different if it is alive in the minds of individuals. Perception of privilege 
is thus important in its own right but also has the potential to improve our understanding of 
how structural privilege impacts on political participation. Indeed, it may be that a key 
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component of privilege is the perception that one has a high status and thus is able to behave 
in particular ways, for instance by participating in politics. 
 Questions regarding the origins of perception, how it functions, and its effects have 
been a matter for philosophical debate and extensive psychological research.221 The focus of 
the current research is particularly on the components of perception that relate to relations and 
causality.222 Specifically, it is concerned with whether individuals perceive a societal hierarchy 
that encompasses them (relations), and what they perceive to be the reasons for that hierarchy 
and any effects it may have (causality). It has been argued that '[i]ndividual psychology and 
social inequality relate to each other like a lock and key.'223 This is because there is a crucial 
relative component to inequality, with perception of one's own position being related to 
perceptions of the positions of others.224 This recognition of the significance of self-
comparison against others informed the development of relative measures of wealth and 
poverty.225 The relative component of inequality, though, does not just relate to economic 
measures and, in Britain, class labels and their associated places within a status hierarchy are 
of great importance.226 Relative placement is bound up with perception and has consequences 
for political participation. Thus, for the sake of clarity, the focus of this research is not on 
perception in general but specifically on the perception of privilege. It is necessary below to 
consider the workings of some more general components of perception, and the impact that 
they have, but only in so far as they inform our understanding of perception of privilege. 
Survey evidence has suggested that in countries with a history of enforced equality 
the perception of conflict in society, especially between rich and poor, leads to lower support 
for democracy, and a reduced likelihood of participation in it.227 This is complemented by 
survey evidence that negative information, for instance relating to conflict, is more important 
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than positive information in the formation of political impressions and subsequent 
behaviour.228 Aggregate measures also show that higher inequality depresses voter turnout in 
democratic societies.229 Returning to the individual level,  experimental evidence indicates that 
disengagement may be underpinned by low power individuals heightening their perceptions 
of relationships between the powerful, perhaps because of anxiety stemming from the 
perceived threat of an outgroup.230 Heightened perceptions of power relations further up a 
hierarchy could contribute to the ‘paradox of distance’ in which voters can hold negative 
dispositions towards politicians in the abstract whilst being more favourable to individual local 
politicians.231 At the same time, those of higher status tend to inflate their distance from those 
of lower status by perceiving more layers in the hierarchy, which may inhibit reconciliation 
between politicians and the voting public.232 This has led to calls for politicians to emphasise 
positions on issues that are of common benefit to all rather than focussing on specific group 
interests.233 
 Perceptions of certain groups can act as barriers to their participation, with evidence 
suggesting that those who are excluded from social groups display a disparity between how 
others perceive them and their self-perception.234 Such excluded groups may be victims of 
stereotyping based on characteristics beyond their control,235 for instance family status.236 It 
was previously noted that stereotypes of women can lead to their exclusion from politics but 
gender is only one basis for stereotypes that can affect status. Whatever their basis, as the 
importance of stereotypes increases they can create a culture of symbolic politics in which 
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certain groups trigger affective responses in the population that can be played on by 
politicians.237 This is particularly important because survey research has demonstrated that the 
public hold inaccurate perceptions in relation to a range of important policy issues in the 
United Kingdom.238 Indeed, it can be argued that politicians and the media play a part in 
creating, sustaining, and exaggerating such misperceptions and their associated affective 
responses. 
In fact, affect as well as cognition has an important impact on how political 
information is processed and they can work together to influence outcomes.239 The relevance 
of both cognition-based calculations and affect-based expressive motivations in political 
behaviour has led to the proposition that individuals have an 'all-things-considered evaluation' 
that points to their preferred course of action.240 This links back to the overarching account of 
decision-making as based on the parallel intuition- and reason-based systems. In that account 
the role of affect is to signal when decisions made through the intuition-based system are 
inappropriate, thus activating the reason-based system instead. This can lead to a change in 
behaviour as the activation of the reason-based system helps individuals learn what is 
appropriate in unfamiliar contexts. 
The importance of affect and, in particular, anxiety in defining behaviour are the focus 
of the theory of cognitive dissonance. That theory posits that individuals have relatively 
accurate, if imperfect, perceptions of their immediate reality and thus of disparities between 
their opinions, beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviours.241 The anxiety caused by the 
dissonance between those elements motivates people to bring them into line with each other, 
which they may do by changing their behaviour, their environment, or by seeking new 
information.242 Considerable evidence was marshalled to support the theory, for instance 
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demonstrating that being asked to publicly advocate a position leads to a greater adherence to 
that position because beliefs are brought into line with behaviour in order to avoid 
dissonance.243 This corroborated evidence of a wider trend for individuals to bring their beliefs 
into line with their roles, be they in the work, social, or political context.244 
The theory of cognitive dissonance has been influential in the field of political 
psychology, particularly in relation to voters' candidate preferences. Survey evidence has 
suggested that voters selectively perceive their preferred candidate’s policy positions, a 
phenomenon referred to as projection, to ensure that they match their own.245 This is especially 
the case when they hold a positive affective disposition towards the candidate, when the 
candidate is ambiguous on the policy, and when the policy is important to the voter.246 The 
evidence that voters bring their beliefs, affective dispositions, and actions into balance has 
been used to counter claims that voters learn candidates’ positions from cues such as their 
party.247 
Despite its influence, the theory of cognitive dissonance suffers from causal ambiguity 
with regard to, for instance, the negative relationship that may emerge between perception of 
privilege and political participation. The theory suggests that this could be the result of a 
process in which individuals perceive their low levels of privilege as inappropriate in political 
contexts, and bring their political behaviour into line with those perceptions. Alternatively, 
politically inactive people could justify their behaviour by bringing their beliefs into line with 
it, thus constructing a belief in the exclusionary importance of privilege in political contexts. 
Thus, whilst perception clearly has an important role understanding and behaviour, there is a 
need for a clearer account of how these relationships work. 
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The Self-Perception and Planned Behaviour: 
 Countering cognitive dissonance theory, and providing a clearer causal proposition, is 
the self-perception theory of Daryl J. Bem. In Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs, he 
suggests that the idea of cognitive dissonance holds sway with academics because they spend 
a large part of their lives considering the consistency of their theories.248 In its place he outlines 
an extensive theory of perception that begins with the identification of different levels of belief. 
'Zero-order beliefs' are developed from the senses and 'are the "nonconscious" axioms upon 
which our other beliefs are built'. For example, the belief that our senses do not lie, or that our 
parents do not lie, are zero-order beliefs.249 'First-order beliefs' rely on zero-order ones and are 
based on information that is received from the sources that have been judged to be trustworthy. 
For example, identifying with a political party because one is brought up by parents who 
support it is a first order belief. Beyond first-order beliefs there is a vertical structure of higher-
order beliefs, for example regarding the qualities of a policy proposed by a political party, all 
tracing their roots back to first- and zero-order ones.250 At the same time, Bem suggests that 
there are horizontal links between higher-order beliefs meaning that there can be multiple 
reasons for holding a belief. Crucially, he also posited that the order of a belief can change 
over time so that, for instance, if the reason for trusting a newspaper is forgotten (due to 
habitual readership) then that trust becomes a zero-order belief.251 
Based on the above ideas, Bem suggests that the links between beliefs require that 
they be cognitively consistent but that this does not mean that they must be logical or rational. 
This can be manifested in a number of ways, for instance if inductive generalisations are 
wrong, as with stereotypes. Alternatively, false premises may lead to false beliefs, for instance 
if an unreliable source is trusted. Higher-order beliefs may also be inconsistent despite shared 
bases, for instance if the fundamental belief in freedom leads to a contradiction in beliefs about 
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protecting freedom with law. Finally, reasoning may be subtly illogical, for instance if 
correlation is identified as causation.252 Thus the drive to resolve logical inconsistency may 
not be as strong as previously suggested and the possibility emerges that people can sustain 
imbalance between beliefs and behaviour.253 
If dissonance is not the driver then an alternative explanation for the experimental 
results that support cognitive dissonance theory is required. In that light, Beliefs, Attitudes, and 
Human Affairs marshals the same experimental evidence to support an alternative theory. It 
shows that external cues are used both in forming other’s perceptions of an individual and by 
the individual when forming their self-perceptions. Bem posits that self-perception is taught 
in childhood by parents, who diagnose internal conditions from external cues, for instance 
identifying soreness from bruising. Learning this process of diagnosis from their parents, 
people come to diagnose their own conditions based on external cues as well as internal ones. 
Hence, experiments have shown that when physiological responses are induced with drugs 
similar to adrenalin the resultant mood reflects the cues provided, which were varied to 
indicate anger or happiness. The importance of external cues was also demonstrated by 
experiments showing that obese people rely more on external than internal cues for their eating 
habits. Additionally, and finally, corroboration was provided by the experimental finding that 
attraction to semi-nude pictures altered depending on the pace of heartbeat on a recording, 
thought to be an amplification of the subject’s own heart.254 
In addition to reporting the above, Bem replicated experiments demonstrating that 
individuals change their opinions to match conditioned or paid behaviour that contradicts their 
initial opinions if the conditioning or payment is not too incongruous. Crucially, the 
experiments are also replicated with individuals observing the behaviour in others and building 
their perceptions on that basis, with the same perceptual outcomes. It is argued that individuals 
are not driven to resolve cognitive dissonance in relation to others, but that their perceptions 
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and self-perceptions are based on the same external cues that others may use to perceive 
them.255 This accommodates the importance of context and roles in defining behaviour.256 At 
the same time, the theory provides a link from external structural influences to the internal 
influences that play a part in defining subsequent behaviour. 
 In relation to the current research, self-perception theory suggests that individuals 
utilise the same indicators to perceive their levels of capital as do those around them. Thus, 
individuals are likely both to perceive the extent to which they are privileged and, using 
different cues, the extent to which they are involved in political activity. This suggests that 
those who are less privileged, who are also less likely to participate in political activity, are 
likely to think of themselves as 'not political' or to consider that politics is 'not for them'. This 
is not just a process leading from external cues to perceptions; Bem did not deny that beliefs 
can also influence behaviour. Thus, once the belief that one cannot engage in political activity 
is established it is likely to contribute to and sustain disengagement. This is similar to the 
observation made by Brady, Schlozman, and Verba that motivations may be post-hoc 
rationalisations of behaviour but retain significance because of their capacity to influence 
future behaviour. 
Crucially, the complex relationships between the three forms of capital, and the 
varying prominence of different types within each form, suggests that perceptions of capital 
will not be uniform. Different capital has relevance in different contexts and the significance 
of a certain type or form at a key formative stage of socialisation could influence persistent 
perceptions. In other words, the cues that individuals use to perceive privilege may vary, for 
instance on the basis of differing experiences of socialisation. This sustains the possibility that 
individuals may have perceptions in line with the cues that they base them on but divergence 
between perceptions and current circumstances. A classic example of this is the prioritisation 
of childhood experiences rather than current circumstances when perceiving one's social class. 
In short, there is the possibility of variance in the relationship between privilege, perception 
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of it, and political participation. This also has the potential to explain the different trends in 
participation in implicit and explicit political participation because people may perceive those 
activities, and thus their ability to participate in them, differently. 
 The above process leading from external structure to internal beliefs and then to 
subsequent behaviour fits within the molecular opinion structure proposed by Bem. This posits 
that a given belief is grouped with an attitude and a perception of social support.257 Again this 
proposal only relates to a structure, not to the content of any of its parts. Thus, a person who 
believes that they are not privileged, by Bem's reckoning because they have observed external 
cues indicating as such, will feel a particular way about it and will seek other opinion that is 
supportive of that belief and feeling. This indicates that social groups can be important in 
maintaining beliefs, perceptions, and, as already noted, behaviour. 
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Perceptions of Social Groups: 
 The importance of social groups is emphasised by social identity theory. That theory 
is based on experimental evidence suggesting the formation of group identity, and associated 
positive and negative emotions relating to in- and out-groups, independently of competition 
between groups for scarce resources.258 The process that leads to that group identity begins 
with social categorisation, or 'the process through which separate individuals are clustered into 
groups.'259 Subsequently social comparison is undertaken in which 'characteristic group 
features are interpreted and valued.'260 Finally, social identification leads to seeing one's self 
as part of a given group to the extent that the features of the group become associated with the 
self.261 It is argued that social identification is an affective process, with the complement to 
this being the more cognitive self-categorisation theory.262 That theory posits that 
identification can occur at different levels of abstraction, for instance from the individual to 
the national. It further posits that self-categorisation depends on which other groups are salient, 
for instance influencing whether sex, ethnicity, class, nationality, or another grouping provides 
the basis for categorisation. The process depends not only on which groups are salient but also 
the size of the differences between them, meaning that categorisation is likely to be defined 
against the most different group. Thus, the process of self-categorisation means that patterns 
of assimilation and contrast stem from identification with or against the salient groups at the 
time.263 A particularly salient group identity in the context of the United Kingdom is that of 
class, and the above suggests that the class-based status hierarchy has roots not only in social 
structures but also the process of group categorisation and identification that individuals 
undertake. 
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 The persistence of hierarchies based on groupings such as social class suggests the 
relevance of group status. It has been argued that membership of a low status group, especially 
in contexts where that low status is salient, lowers self-esteem, aspirations, and performance.264 
This can be linked to research suggesting that feelings of insecurity, which may be prompted 
by low status, make one less open to new ideas and settings.265 The power of low status can 
feed into patterns of self-verification, in which people seek information that affirms their 
perceived status, linking to Bem's molecular belief structure in which beliefs are grouped with 
attitudes and social support. This can potentially lead to an ongoing cycle of low self-esteem, 
limited aspirations, and underperformance.266 The significant impact of low group status, and 
perception of that status, is important for the current research. Status is assigned on the basis 
not only of background characteristics but also of the associated levels of capital. This provides 
a direct link from privilege to group status and its associated behavioural implications. 
The proposition that the negative feelings, such as anxiety, associated with low status 
lead to worse performance contradicts the dual-system theory of decision-making that suggests 
the motivating impact of negative affect stemming from behaviour being inappropriate to the 
current setting.267 The important point to note here is the different bases for the negative 
emotions; in the latter instance it is behaviour or beliefs that are at stake but in the former it is 
the status of the individual, which is more fundamental. That is to say, it is rather more 
challenging to struggle with a low status that implies an overarching inferiority, especially if 
that status has been assigned from an early age, than it is to deal with current behaviour being 
inappropriate to a particular setting. This can be linked to Bem's suggestion of zero-, first-, and 
higher-ordered beliefs; in the latter instance it is only higher order beliefs or behaviours that 
are being challenged whereas in the former it is a zero-order belief being reaffirmed. Being in 
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a context in which one's own capacities and worth are identified as low relates not only the 
zero-order belief about one's status but also, potentially, associated first- and higher-order 
beliefs. 
 The importance of low status is the focus of social dominance theory, which identifies 
five different strategies for dealing with it. First, individuals may try defection from a group 
with low status, though this requires that the boundaries between groups are permeable or that 
they are able to disguise themselves. Second, they can be socially creative by redefining the 
grounds upon which groups are compared and selecting those that give their group high status. 
Third, retaining the current grounds that are used to assign status to groups, they can assert 
that their group's current practice is high status. Fourth, they can identify lower groups against 
which they can compare themselves. Fifth and finally, they can choose to compete with higher 
status groups for a better position.268 Interestingly, these strategies echo features of Bourdieu's 
market for cultural capital, in which the classes not only compete for cultural capital but also 
to define which cultural capital has value. Crucially, competition stemming from hierarchies 
can take place outside the cultural domain and it has been posited that aggression stemming 
from marginalisation can lead to political activity.269  
 Beyond culture and politics, the general idea of group competition fits within the 
broader propositions of social dominance theory, which assumes that: 
(1) Human social systems are predisposed to form group-based social hierarchies. 
This social hierarchy consists of at least one Hegemonic group at its top and at 
least one Negative Reference Group at its bottom. . . . 
(2) Males will tend to possess a disproportionate degree of political power. We refer 
to this as the Iron Law of Andrarchy. . . . 
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(3) Most common forms of group conflict and oppression (e.g., racism, sexism, 
nationalism, classism) can be regarded as different manifestations of the same 
predisposition toward group-based social hierarchy. 
(4) The formation of social hierarchy and primordial groups are survival strategies 
adopted by humans.270 
The result of the above assumptions is the assertion that there will always be hierarchies with 
negative reference groups at the bottom, and questions remain about the extent to which 
challenging such inequality will be fruitful.271 Part of the reason for the difficulty of 
challenging inequality is that there are those who defend the existing hierarchies, often 
amongst those who are in higher status groups or enforcement roles. Such people, who are 
disposed towards upholding the hierarchy, are referred to as having a high 'social dominance 
orientation'.272  
 According to social dominance theory, the maintenance of the hierarchy, in part by 
those with a high social dominance orientation, disempowers those with low status and 
restricts their options for action.273 This leads to behavioural asymmetry, in which: 
on the average, the behavioral repertoires of individuals belonging to groups 
at different levels of the social hierarchy will show significant differences, 
differences that have been produced by the dynamics of and which, in turn, 
reinforce and perpetuate the group-based hierarchy system. This behavioural 
asymmetry is induced by socialization patterns, stereotypes, legitimization 
myths . . . , and the operation of systematic terror.274 
Thus, the hierarchy is sustained not only by the actions of those in enforcement roles or with 
high status but also, in part, by the behaviour of those with low status. In fact, social dominance 
theory suggests multiple different ways that behavioural asymmetry may manifest itself in 
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high and low status groups. It may take the form of systematic out-group favouritism or 
deference amongst low status groups or, at the other end of the hierarchy, in-group bias. 
Alternatively, it may take the form of self-handicapping amongst low status groups, resulting 
in the lower performance noted previously. Finally, it may take the form of ideological 
asymmetry, in which the political ideology of a high-status group is more related to in-group 
favouritism than is the political ideology of a low-status group.275 Such behavioural patterns 
are based around perceptions of in- and out-groups that may become entrenched from an early 
age and lead to automatic associations, implying that it can be difficult for individuals to 
change the associated behavioural patterns.276 Those behavioural patterns are complemented 
by the capital profiles outlined in the previous chapter, leading to the situation identified by 
Bourdieu in which those who hold certain forms of capital are able to behave in particular 
ways, for instance by participating in politics. 
 In identifying ways in which unequal systems are maintained social dominance theory 
fits within a broader system justification theory, which posits that there are a range of beliefs 
that can be held to justify unequal systems. It has been argued that social dominance 
orientation functions as one of the main modes of system justifying alongside right-wing 
authoritarianism. Whilst the former is based around group competition, and the resultant right 
of high status groups to retain their earned position in the hierarchy, the latter is much more 
focussed on the threat posed by out-groups, with the in-group taken to be 'normal, morally 
good, [and] decent'.277 It has been observed, based on survey evidence, that social dominance 
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism function as separate spectrums in a similar fashion 
to the left-right and liberal-authoritarian political spectrums, which they may underpin.278 It 
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follows that individuals may be high in social dominance orientation but low in right-wing 
authoritarianism, vice versa, high in both, or high in neither. 
 Being high in either social dominance orientation or right-wing authoritarianism 
means that one holds system justifying beliefs. One of the forms that such beliefs frequently 
take is the 'fundamental attribution error' in which the low status of others is seen to be the 
result of their inherent flaws whilst one's own status is considered to stem from a range of 
external and internal factors. Thus, those adhering to the error assign low status groups 
characteristics such as laziness, lack of work ethic, or lack of money management skills.279 
Such beliefs are associated with the background characteristics of those who hold them but are 
also sustained through their prevalence in society at large.280 As such, it has been argued that: 
those who make external attributions have overcome the fundamental 
attribution error, the dominant ideology of individualism, the dearth of 
coherent philosophical justification for egalitarianism, and a noticeable lack of 
forthright political leadership.281 
Thus, in 'explaining differences in the distribution of social and material goods in terms of 
differences in individual effort, talent, and merit and by holding people responsible for their 
outcomes'282 system justifying beliefs are here considered to exist in opposition to perception 
of privilege, which requires recognition of systemic causes of inequality. This opposition is of 
particular relevance to the current research because system justifying beliefs have been found 
to relate to lower involvement in political activity.283 Such beliefs are not only held by those 
with high status, and it is possible that the extent of disengagement from politics differs 
between individuals of varying statuses. This also suggests that the impact of perception of 
privilege may differ across different status groups, an idea that will be developed subsequently. 
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Perception of Privilege and Causality: 
To summarise the preceding sections, the combination of Bem's self-perception theory 
and theories related to group identity and status suggest an important role for perception of 
privilege in influencing political participation. It has been posited that individuals perceive 
their status in a hierarchy, albeit imperfectly, based on the cues that others may also use to 
assign a status to them. This is particularly important for low status groups that not only face 
structural barriers but, upon perceiving their low status, are also likely to respond with less 
effective behaviour. Even when successfully adopting strategies to overcome low status, for 
instance in the form of competition with other groups, low status groups may not 
fundamentally challenge the hierarchy itself. Since, as is argued in previous chapters, 
background characteristics are an important influence on status and since hierarchies are 
widespread it is likely that perception of status begins at an early age. Despite those early 
origins the perception of status does not necessarily entail perception of the reasons for that 
status. This is a crucial focus for the current research, which is concerned with the perception 
of role of background characteristics in defining status and that perception's impact on political 
participation. 
 Background characteristics also featured prominently in the preceding two chapters, 
which proposed privilege as the process by which those characteristics influence in the capital 
profiles that contribute to unequal outcomes. It is important to reconcile that causal process 
with the implications of the preceding sections of this chapter, which is to say that it is 
important to specify the relationship between structural privilege and perception of privilege. 
Drawing on self-perception theory, both background characteristics and the consequent capital 
profiles are taken to be cues that individuals may draw on when perceiving their statuses. At 
the same time those statuses are bound up with the self-categorisations that individuals 
undertake and thus the groups that they identify with, both of which are therefore also 
influenced by background characteristics and capital profiles. The linked self-perceived 
statuses, self-categorisations, and group self-identifications constitute a set of beliefs that 
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individuals hold about themselves. Adapting the theory of planned behaviour, it is argued that 
those beliefs underpin attitudes that influence the dispositions or, in other words, behavioural 
intentions that ultimately lead to behaviour such as political participation.284 
 The preceding outline of the causal process running from structural privilege through 
perceived privilege to political participation should not be taken to be deterministic. If it were, 
then it would be possible to account for such participation on the basis of background 
characteristics alone, which is demonstrably not the case. Whist a single overarching theory 
of privilege has been presented in this research there is no reason to assume that such a 
conceptualisation is universal in the population. There are multifarious reasons why 
individuals may prioritise particular background characteristics or forms of capital in their 
perceptions of the workings of privilege generally and their own levels of privilege 
specifically. An array of experiences in childhood, at school, or in the workplace can raise the 
salience of particular characteristics or capitals in manners that have a lasting impact on 
perception of privilege. Crucially, those experiences may happen at different points in 
individuals' lives and thus, because of the potential lasting impacts, lead to perceptions that 
become out of line with those individuals' changing circumstances. Thus, if individuals' levels 
of privilege, based on their capital profiles, differ from their perceived levels of privilege, 
based on the cues that they have internalised, then each will contribute in a different way to 
their behaviour. 
 Returning to the three approaches to answering the motivating conundrum outlined in 
the introduction, it may be that rational processes also have a part to play in the decisions that 
lead to behaviour. Crucially, this is likely to be the case only to the extent that reason-based 
decision-making processes are activated by affective responses to inapplicable intuition-based 
behaviour. Intuition-based, or fast, processes are considered here to include the workings of 
perception of privilege outlined above. Individuals' perceptions of their privilege, based on 
salient cues at particular points in their lives, and the beliefs, attitudes, and behavioural intents 
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that stem from them are posited to impact on behaviour without consideration unless affective 
responses indicate the circumstances render the resultant behaviour inappropriate. Thus, and 
to be as specific as possible, the concern here is with the process that runs from background 
characteristics through capital profiles to the perception of privilege that, with its associated 
attitudes and intents, constitute part of the intuition-based decision-making process that 
impacts on political behaviour. 
 This research thus combines both sociological and psychological approaches to 
accounting for political behaviour and, in doing so, argues that they are complementary. 
Indeed, as has been outlined above, the intuition-based decision-making processes that include 
perception of privilege are argued to stem, at least in part, from socialisation processes that 
also affect capital profiles. It may reasonably be argued that the rational choice approach is 
also complementary because reason-based decision-making processes, characterised by 
consideration of the costs and benefits of actions, are activated when the intuition-based 
processes that are shaped by socialisation are found wanting. However, the causal proximity 
of rational processes to any subsequent behaviour renders such explanations less illuminating. 
In other words, if an individual has got to the stage of reasoning that such behaviour is worth 
undertaking they are already very close to undertaking that behaviour. It is thus more 
interesting to consider the social and psychological processes that impact on behaviour before 
rational processes are activated, and indeed which may activate them.  
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Conclusion: 
 This chapter has argued that there is a need to move beyond a focus on structural 
privilege to account for perceived privilege. It has outlined the importance of perception in 
relation to privilege with reference to a range of empirical work. In that light, and having 
considered the uncertain causal implications of cognitive dissonance theory, the chapter has 
argued that Bem's self-perception theory is highly relevant. That theory suggests that 
individuals draw on the external cues that those around them may also use when perceiving 
their levels of privilege and political participation. The resultant perceptions have implications 
for subsequent behaviour. This is of particular importance because those perceptions are bound 
up with relevant self-categorisations, group self-identifications, and group statuses. This 
suggests the relevance of social dominance theory, which accommodates the observation that, 
despite possible strategies to raise status, low status leads to worse outcomes for individuals 
when it is perceived. This is not least because perceptions, self-categorisations, group self-
identifications, and group statuses are internalised as beliefs that, through attitudes, impact on 
behavioural intentions. These processes have been argued to be part of the intuition-based 
decision-making system that is, at times, replaced by the reason-based decision-making system 
that may underpin more rational decision-making. Such rational decision-making, however, is 
beyond the scope of this research because of its causal proximity to the behaviour of interest. 
Thus, it is considered likely that those who perceive their statuses as low or high, and the 
structural reasons for those statuses, will behave in different ways from each other. Further, 
they may hold markedly different behavioural patterns than those who hold system justifying 
beliefs, which hold that inequality is not caused by structural factors. The posited importance 
of perception of privilege stems from the psychological approach to accounting for behaviour, 
which has been argued to complement the sociological approach dealt with in the preceding 
two chapters. Thus, together, structural privilege and perceived privilege are argued to be 
important parts of any answer to the question of why people participate or not in political 
activity. 
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Chapter Four: Data and Analytical Approach 
 
Introduction: 
  The preceding chapters have established the need to consider both structural and 
perceived privilege when explaining differential participation in politics. As has been shown, 
there are good theoretical and empirical reasons to consider both, but that joint focus is also 
reflective of a critical realist standpoint. That is to say that the research is informed by 'an 
integration of a realist ontology (there is a real world that exists independently of our 
perceptions, theories, and constructions), with a constructivist epistemology (our 
understanding of the world is inevitably a construction from our own perspectives and 
standpoint).'285 That approach requires recognition that the current research is informed not 
only by theory and prior empirical observations, but also by the values and previous experience 
of the researcher themselves.286 Further, it requires understanding that the research is making 
observations that are informed by the perspective of the researcher to the extent that, arguably, 
what is ultimately being tested is the relevance and utility of a particular narrative regarding 
privilege, perception, and political participation. Recognition of the interplay between the 
world and interpretations of it accommodates a 'retroductive' approach to research in which 
theory and empirical analysis are developed in interaction.287 
 Such a retroductive approach is applied in the current research to the analysis of data 
collected through an original online survey of a representative, though non-probability, sample 
of British adults. That analysis allows for the testing of hypothesised causal relationships 
between the key independent and dependent variables, which provides the basis for inferences 
about the population. Both the identification and operationalisation of the variables of interest, 
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as well as the hypothesised relationships between them, are informed by the theory outlined 
in the previous chapters. Those chapters provide conceptualisations of the three forms of 
capital, which are taken to be measurable mechanisms through which privilege functions. In 
addition, the preceding chapters provided a conceptualisation of perception of privilege, which 
is argued to intervene in the relationship between capital and political participation. 
Information on the measures of those concepts is provided in this chapter, which also provides 
technical information relating to the survey that was designed and fielded for this research. It 
then compares the sample with the population to establish its representativeness, observing 
that the sample is notably more representative in terms of sex and region of residence than it 
is in relation to age, ethnicity, or religion. After this, the chapter outlines, in some detail, the 
analytical approach that is adopted in the subsequent chapters, which is Structural Equation 
Modelling. That approach allows the simultaneous estimation of latent factors relating to the 
concepts of interest, and the structural relationships between them. It is thus particularly 
suitable for the current research because it allows the measurement of broad concepts like 
cultural capital with multiple indicators and, at the same time, facilitates the testing of the clear 
causal propositions of the research. In providing details of the data and analytical approach, 
this chapter provides the basis for interpreting the results in the subsequent chapters. 
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Sample and Survey Details: 
 A survey was designed to cover the areas specified by the theories outlined above and 
fielded to a sample drawn from YouGov's online panel, which is comprised of more than 
360,000 respondents who have opted-in to answer surveys for the company. Panellists are 
recruited through the YouGov website as well as through advertising on other websites, and 
the company makes extensive efforts to recruit underrepresented groups to the panel. When 
the company fields a survey, requests are sent to panellists who then click on a link and are 
directed to whichever survey is most in need of respondents with their characteristics. That 
directing of respondents is designed to maximise the representativeness of the sample, 
ensuring that the burden placed on the weighting process is not too great. 
The survey was split into two waves to reduce the number of questions that 
respondents were asked in a single sitting, with the hope that their attention would be sustained 
and the quality of their responses maintained. Further, splitting the survey into two waves 
allowed the questions on perception to be temporally separated from the questions on 
activities. This reduced the possibility of respondents' perceptual answers being influenced by 
their answers relating to activities. Thus, the first wave of the survey included sections on 
political activities, group membership and voluntary activity, cultural preferences and 
activities, and social networks. The second wave then contained sections on political opinions, 
perceptions of societal hierarchies and their explanations, and background information such 
as parental occupation, educational level, and religious beliefs. Full versions of the two waves 
of the survey are included in appendices A and B. 
In terms of the key concepts in the research, political participation is measured by 
questions regarding the frequency of undertaking a range of specific political acts. Recruitment 
is measured by the frequency of requests to get involved that respondents received, whilst 
engagement is covered by questions regarding attention and discussion of politics, perceived 
knowledge of the topic, and actual knowledge by the ability to identify the roles of key political 
figures. Internal and external efficacy are then asked about in relation to local, regional and 
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national levels of government. The elements of perception of privilege are covered by 
questions on self-perceived status relative to society at large and personal acquaintances. 
Respondents are then asked to rank their explanations for status differences in society, and for 
their own status. The politically-relevant elements of perception of privilege are measured by 
questions asking respondents to rank the various ways in which politically active people are 
different to them, and then to rate how much more or less privileged such people are than 
themselves and society at large. 
Turning to the other key concepts embodying structural privilege, economic capital is 
measured in terms of household income, wealth, and types of property owned. This means that 
the research focuses on measuring not only how much individuals are paid but also their 
physical assets and investments, savings and debts. Cultural capital is measured with questions 
relating preferences for particular film and music genres, frequency of trips to various cultural 
institutions and engagement in other cultural activities, and skills developed in various 
contexts (e.g. writing formal letters or emails, or delivering presentations at work). Finally, 
social capital is measured in terms of numbers of friends, diversity of social networks in terms 
of sex, ethnicity, and religion, the occupational classes of acquaintances, and the types of help 
(e.g. job advice, financial support, or practical help) that have been received from various 
groups. Many of the questions included in the two waves of the survey were based on those 
asked in previous research. However, because of the focus of the research, the wording or 
format of most questions was changed in order to gain more information where relevant or, if 
the questions were not central, to abbreviate them to save survey space. 
 The various sections of the survey were tested in thirteen cognitive interviews 
conducted with administrative staff in the Department of Government at the University of 
Essex, and with staff from a range of departments at YouGov, none of whom design or field 
surveys as part of their work. Further, the survey was circulated for comments to the team 
specialising in political and social polling at YouGov. Following the cognitive interviews and 
review by specialists the two waves were redrafted and each piloted to 100 respondents from 
the YouGov panel to check for remaining substantive or technical issues. Following final 
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amendments, the first wave of the survey was fielded between Monday 17 March 2014 and 
Tuesday 01 April 2014. The second wave of the survey was then fielded between Monday 07 
April 2014 and Thursday 17 April 2014. 
1,904 respondents started the first wave of the survey and 1,515 of them went on to 
complete both the first and second waves, giving a respectable retention and completion rate 
of 79.6%. A further thirty-five respondents displayed consistent signs of satisficing, or did not 
answer the questions needed for weighting, and were excluded to leave a final sample of 1,480, 
or 77.7% of those who started the first wave. An analysis comparing the starters and 
completers in each wave, and between waves, was undertaken and revealed no substantively 
important differences between those who dropped out of the survey at any stage and those who 
completed both waves. The median completion time for the first wave was just over 18 minutes 
whilst for the second wave it was just under 18 minutes. There were 169 questions included 
in the two waves of the survey, although respondents did not answer all of them due to filtering 
based on their answers. In the resultant dataset questions with multiple substantive topics 
arranged in grids or as separate binary options are split up, which raises the number of variables 
to 900. Of course, it is neither theoretically desirable nor statistically practical to include so 
many variables in the model so the analyses presented in subsequent chapters include only a 
subset of variables that are related to the concepts with which the full model is concerned.288 
When compared to 2011 Census data the sample is representative in terms of sex and 
region but less so in terms of age (in part because YouGov panellists must be aged 18 or over), 
ethnicity, and religion.289 This can be seen in tables 4.1 to 4.5, which show the differences 
between the census data and the sample, both unweighted and weighted. The fact that the 
sample is not representative of the British population has implications for the generalisability 
of any findings that emerge from the data analysis. However, representativeness is a matter of 
degree, so although the sample is less representative of the population than a ‘gold standard’ 
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probability sample it is also more representative than samples from alternative survey fielding 
services such as MTurk. Further, it is the mode of fielding the survey that allowed space to ask 
about the topics of interest in detail and thus enabled the current research to be conducted. It 
is also the case that the less representative nature of non-random online samples may be more 
important when presenting descriptive statistics than it is when examining relationships 
between variables, although this finding has been disputed.290 Considering issues of 
representativeness in relation to the data analysed here, it must be noted that YouGov panellists 
are disproportionately politically active. However, the types of political activity that are 
considered in the analysis are far from widespread in the general population so it may be 
beneficial to have a higher proportion of politically active respondents who are more likely to 
engage in rare activities. Crucially, and as the next chapter demonstrates amply, there is a good 
level of variation in the measures of political participation that constitute the dependent 
variables.291 In addition, there is also sufficient variation in measures of both structural and 
perceived privilege. As such, although the data is not from a probability sample, there is no 
reason to think that the relationships between the independent variables and the dependent 
variable will be different in the sample than in the population at large. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
290 For the two sides of the argument see David Sanders, Harold Clarke, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, 'Does Mode Matter 
for Modeling Political Choice? Evidence From the 2005 British Election Study', Political Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 
2007), pp. 257-285; and Neil Malhotra and Jon A. Krosnick, 'The Effect of Survey Mode and Sampling on Inferences about 
Political Attitudes and Behavior: Comparing the 2000 and 2004 ANES to Internet Surveys with Nonprobability Samples', 
Political Analysis, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Summer, 2007), pp. 286-323. 
291 See Appendix C for information regarding the variation in the indicators included in subsequent analyses. 
Table 4.1. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted 
Sample to the Population in terms of Sex 
 
Sex 
Sample 
2011 Census 
Unweighted Weighted 
Men 48.51% 48.50% 49.14% 
Women 51.49% 51.50% 50.86% 
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Table 4.2. Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted 
Sample to the Population in terms of Age 
 
Age 
Sample 
2011 Census 
Unweighted Weighted 
15-19 0.81% 2.10% 7.60% 
20-24 4.12% 10.03% 8.23% 
25-29 6.42% 6.57% 8.26% 
30-34 9.39% 9.18% 7.94% 
35-39 9.86% 9.71% 7.97% 
40-44 6.55% 5.96% 8.85% 
45-49 8.38% 7.52% 8.92% 
50-54 11.15% 10.01% 7.89% 
55-59 11.76% 10.65% 6.94% 
60-64 11.82% 10.85% 7.30% 
65-69 11.82% 10.13% 5.89% 
70-74 5.34% 4.91% 4.71% 
75-79 1.76% 1.72% 3.88% 
80-84 0.81% 0.66% 2.90% 
85-89 0.00% 0.00% 1.77% 
90 and older 0.00% 0.00% 0.94% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.3.  Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted 
Sample to the Population in terms of Ethnicity 
 
Ethnic Group 
Sample 
2011 Census 
Unweighted Weighted 
White British 89.53% 88.16% 81.46% 
Other White 3.65% 3.86% 5.37% 
White and Black Caribbean 0.20% 0.18% 0.70% 
White and Black African 0.27% 0.39% 0.27% 
White and Asian 0.20% 0.31% 0.56% 
Other Mixed 0.34% 0.41% 0.50% 
Indian 1.15% 1.26% 2.36% 
Pakistani 0.34% 0.39% 1.91% 
Bangladeshi 0.27% 0.61% 0.73% 
Other Asian 0.34% 0.40% 1.40% 
Caribbean 0.54% 0.65% 0.98% 
African 0.54% 0.49% 1.66% 
Other Black 0.00% 0.00% 0.46% 
Chinese 0.61% 0.67% 0.70% 
Arab 0.00% 0.00% 0.39% 
Any other ethnic group 0.61% 0.61% 0.55% 
Refused 1.42% 1.61% 0.00% 
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Table 4.4.  Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted 
Sample to the Population in terms of Religion 
 
 Sample  
Religion Unweighted Weighted 2011 Census 
Christian 45.88% 45.11% 58.81% 
No Religion 47.09% 47.26% 26.13% 
Muslim 1.28% 1.64% 4.53% 
Hindu 0.47% 0.67% 1.36% 
Sikh 0.14% 0.11% 0.70% 
Jewish 0.81% 0.70% 0.44% 
Buddhist 0.61% 0.71% 0.42% 
Other 3.72% 3.80% 0.42% 
Not Stated 0.00% 0.00% 7.18% 
Table 4.5.  Comparison of Unweighted and Weighted 
Sample to the Population in terms of Region of Residence 
 
Region 
Sample 
2011 Census 
Unweighted Weighted 
North East 4.53% 4.52% 4.22% 
North West 11.69% 11.32% 11.48% 
Yorkshire and The Humber 8.78% 8.70% 8.60% 
East Midlands 6.22% 6.65% 7.38% 
West Midlands 9.39% 9.67% 9.12% 
East of England 9.93% 9.60% 9.54% 
London 12.36% 12.85% 13.35% 
South East 13.72% 13.38% 14.08% 
South West 9.46% 9.55% 8.62% 
Wales 5.14% 5.11% 4.98% 
Scotland 8.78% 8.65% 8.62% 
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Analytical Approach: 
 Each of the variables included in the survey data indicates behaviour or opinions that 
can be considered to be manifestations of the broad underlying concepts that this research is 
interested in. So, to take an example relating to the dependent variable, it may be the case that 
respondents who contact elected representatives are acting on an underlying disposition to 
engage with politics by contacting institutions and representatives. As such, those respondents 
might also be expected to be more likely to contact the media or government departments. 
Indeed, previous research has revealed that there are separate underlying tendencies to engage 
in individualised political acts such as signing petitions and boycotting products, contacting 
political acts such as those just mentioned, and collective political acts such as protest and 
direct action.292 Underlying dispositions or tendencies may be referred to as latent factors, and 
each of the concepts representing the stages of the posited causal process can be considered to 
contain such factors. Thus, before considering the structural relationships between the stages 
of the causal process, the shape of the latent factors at each stage must be considered. The next 
chapter analyses such factors and, as such, describes a measurement model, the testing of 
which is the first stage in the approach to statistical analysis that is adopted in this research: 
structural equation modelling. Before proceeding with that analysis it is useful to provide an 
explanation of the approach. 
 Structural equation modelling is a statistical method that allows the simultaneous 
estimation of latent factors with multiple indicators, and the structural paths between those 
latent factors. In other words, underlying concepts with multiple indicators can be identified 
at the same time as relationships between those concepts are tested. This approach is 
appropriate for the current research because the hypothesised model has multiple stages with 
structural paths linking them, each of which can be specified and tested simultaneously with 
structural equation modelling. Further, the survey included multiple measures of key concepts 
                                                     
292 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain, pp. 133-137. 
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so that the latent factors representing those concepts can be identified. This has the advantage 
of allowing the measurement error associated with the variables to be estimated separately 
from the stochastic error, or residual, associated with the latent factors. This means that the 
underlying concepts are estimated more accurately than if single indicators, or constructed 
indices, are used. 
The particular statistical package used in this analysis, Mplus, allows for the testing 
of latent factors in the absence of structural paths, and for the exploration of data to identify 
which variables are indicative of different latent factors. This latter approach is referred to as 
exploratory factor analysis and is differentiated from the confirmatory factor analysis that is 
usually associated with structural equation modelling. The former approach identifies latent 
factors that most closely fit the data by rotating the dimensions that represent the factors until 
they best account for the variance in the data. By contrast, the latter approach allows the 
specification of latent factors in line with theory or previous empirical work and then tests how 
well those factors fit the data. In other words, with confirmatory factor analysis, no attempt is 
made to find the best fitting latent factors, and Mplus provides statistics that indicate how well 
the specified factors fit the data. 
 The distinction between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is indicative of 
the three approaches to structural equation modelling that may be adopted.293 First, the strictly 
confirmatory approach is the most stringent, and allows for the testing of a single specified 
model on the data, with the results indicating whether the model is accepted or rejected. 
Second, the alternative models approach specifies multiple competing models and applies 
them to the same data, with the results allowing the selection of the most empirically 
appropriate model. Third and finally, the model generating approach is the least stringent and 
allows for the specification of an initial tentative model based on existing theory and empirical 
evidence. That model is then tested on the data and, if found to fit poorly, modified and tested 
again. This process can be repeated until a model that fits the data and can be meaningfully 
                                                     
293 Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus: Basic Concepts, Applications, and Programming (New York, 
NY, Routledge, 2012), p. 8. 
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interpreted is identified. Aiding this process is the fact that Mplus produces modification 
indices that suggest measurement and structural loadings that can be added to the model in 
order to improve fit. Each modification must be made separately because additional loadings 
affect the estimation of the overall model, and each modification must also be substantively 
justifiable. This is process is an example of the previously mentioned idea of retroduction, or 
the ‘continuous interplay between theory and empirical testing, in which theory acts as a guide 
to empirical observation, operationalization and testing and in which empirical findings are 
subsequently used to modify, revise and refine theory.’294 
 The current research adopts a model generating approach to testing both the 
measurement and structural elements of the full model. This is because the theory informing 
the model relates to the overarching direction and nature of the structural relationships between 
key elements of the posited causal process, but not to specific relationships between the 
elements of those stages. For instance, whilst it is posited that cultural capital, and especially 
legitimate cultural capital, will be positively related to political participation both directly and 
indirectly, the particular latent factors encompassing cultural capital, and the variables 
indicating them, are not specified. Further, the theory allows for the possibility that some 
cultural capital factors may have different effects from others, or be related to political 
participation via different structural paths. Thus, a model generating approach can 
accommodate respecification of particular measurement and structural loadings in the full 
model whilst, at the same time, allowing for testing the overarching theoretical propositions. 
 This approach informed the development of the measurement model outlined in the 
next chapter, which is contained within the full model that also includes the structural loadings 
that are examined in Chapter Six. In the final model, and in the confirmatory models that 
informed it, variables are treated as reflective indicators of the latent factors. That is to say 
they are thought to be manifestations of underlying constructs rather than to constitute them, 
in which case they would be formative indicators. Many of the latent factors in the 
                                                     
294 Sanders, ‘Behaviouralism’, pp. 61-62. 
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measurement model were theoretically specified, fitted the data well, and included in the full 
model without revision. Additionally, some of the factors were theoretically specified and then 
revised by removing insignificant loadings or by adding loadings suggested by the 
modification indices. Additionally, preceding the final model, some of the factors were 
identified through exploratory factor analysis because they theoretically differ across times 
and contexts, or because they are original concepts that are being tested for the first time in the 
current research.295 An exploratory approach was also adopted because, as will be seen in 
Chapter Six, the theoretically specified hypotheses of the research reflect its focus on the 
structural relationships between the concepts of interest rather than the shape of those concepts 
themselves. Thus, the factors encompassing the types of cultural and social capital, and the 
elements of perception of privilege were developed through exploratory analysis. 
 Assessing the latent factors that are indicated by exploratory analysis in Mplus is much 
the same as in other statistical packages, with a table indicating the factor structure being 
provided.296 By default Mplus uses geomin rotation, which is a form of oblique rotation 
(allowing correlation between factors), to identify the best fitting latent factors. The loadings 
of indicators onto latent factors can then be interpreted in the same way as in any exploratory 
factor analysis, with higher values showing stronger relationships. In addition, Mplus provides 
a number of indices of model fit, depending on the estimator used, to allow assessment of how 
well the factor structure fits the data overall. Those fit indices are important when assessing 
confirmatory factor analyses as well as full structural models so it is worth providing a brief 
description of them. 
 The first indicator of model fit is the Chi-square (χ2) statistic, which may be familiar 
from its application on other areas such as significance testing for crosstabulation of 
categorical variables. However, by contrast with such applications, with confirmatory 
measurement and full structural equation modelling a small and insignificant Chi-square value 
                                                     
295 John Perry, ‘Can we perform EFA before we confirm the model via CFA?’, ResearchGate, Tuesday 20 January 2015, viewed 
at https://www.researchgate.net/post/Can_we_perform_EFA_before_we_confirm_the_model_via_CFA on 24.02.2017. 
296 Institute for Digital Research and Education, ‘Exploratory Factor Analysis: Mplus Annotated Output’, University of California 
Los Angeles, viewed at http://stats.idre.ucla.edu/mplus/output/exploratoryfactor-analysis/ on 24.02.2017. 
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is indicative of good model fit. This is because the goal is to minimise the difference between 
the theoretically specified model and the empirical data, with an insignificant Chi-square value 
indicating no significant difference between the two. However, the statistic is sensitive to small 
differences between the model and the data when there is a large sample.297 This is particularly 
problematic for the current research, which is testing a complex model in which numerous 
small differences may emerge when it is applied to the survey data, and which is being tested 
on a large sample of 1,480 respondents. Thus, the subsequent analyses follow the advice that 
‘[a]lthough the χ2 statistic, by convention, is always reported, decisions regarding adequacy of 
model fit are typically based on alternate indices of fit’.298 
 Alternative indices of fit may be categorised as incremental, absolute, and predictive, 
and the subsequent analyses focus on indices in the first two categories. Mplus provides 
statistics relating to two incremental fit indices, the Comparative Fit Index (CFI) and the 
Tucker-Lewis Fit Index (TLI). In both cases the fit of the specified model, or how well it 
matches the relationships in the data, is compared to the fit of a baseline model in which all 
variables are uncorrelated. The CFI figure runs from zero to one whilst the TLI figure can 
exceed one, but they are generally interpreted in the same way. In both cases figures exceeding 
0.95 are indicative of good fit whilst those exceeding 0.90 indicate adequate fit.299 By contrast, 
the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) is an absolute index of fit in which 
values below 0.05 are indicative of good fit. Unlike CFI and TLI, RMSEA does not compare 
the fit of the specified model against that of an uncorrelated baseline model but simply assesses 
how closely it matches the data. An additional absolute index of fit, the Standardised Root 
Mean Square Residual (SRMR), and two predictive indices, Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(AIC) and Bayes Information Criterion (BIC), are commonly provided by Mplus but are not 
available with the estimator that is used in the analysis presented in the subsequent analyses. 
The choice of estimator is informed by the nature of the data, and specifically the fact that the 
majority of variables are binary or ordinal, having fewer than ten categories and generally six 
                                                     
297 Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus, p. 68. 
298 Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus, p. 69. 
299 Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus, pp. 70-71. 
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or less, and are generally not normally distributed.300 As such, the full model was developed 
and tested using the weighted least squares with mean and variance adjustment (WLSMV) 
estimator, which was specifically designed for ordinal variables and can accommodate non-
normal distributions.301 As noted, this restricts the number of fit indices that are produced by 
Mplus, and therefore the CFI, TLI, and RMSEA are used in conjunction with each other to 
assess model fit.302 
The full model encompassing the posited causal process includes a range of variables 
related to the concepts of interest, many of which are sub-divided into separate binary or 
ordinal indicators relating to specific answer options. So, for instance, the question regarding 
the frequency with which eleven political acts are undertaken was presented to respondents on 
a single screen but is divided into eleven separate ordinal variables in the dataset. Thus, overall, 
the data includes 111 variables, of which four are binary independent background variables 
relating to gender, ethnicity, disability, and relationship status, and are not loaded onto latent 
factors. In addition, there is an interval independent background variable relating to age that 
is also not loaded onto a latent factor. Cases must have data on independent background 
variables so the 21 respondents who did not indicate their ethnicity are excluded from the 
analysis, reducing the number of cases to 1,459. Otherwise, and by default, Mplus uses 
pairwise deletion to deal with missing values so no other cases are excluded from the analysis 
despite the presence of missing values on particular variables.303 There is also a single indicator 
of generalised trust that cannot be loaded onto a factor because there are no additional variables 
measuring the concept, and is thus included in the model on its own. This means that there are 
106 indicators used to estimate the 34 latent factors that embody the forms of capital, 
perception of privilege, political engagement, and political participation. As noted previously, 
                                                     
300 See Appendix C for information regarding the variation in the indicators included in subsequent analyses. 
301 Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling With Mplus, pp. 131-133. 
302 Mplus also provides the Weighted Root Mean Square Residual (WRMR) index of model fit when the WLSMV estimator is 
used but this is an experimental statistic and does not need to be considered; Linda K. Muthén, ‘Model Fit Index WRMR’, Mplus 
Discussion, Thursday 29 May 2014, viewed at http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/9/5096.html?1429189065 on 
09.02.2017. 
303 Linda K. Muthén, ‘WLSMV Missing Data’, Mplus Discussion, Monday 15 September 2014, viewed at 
http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/22/824.html?1467127502 on 09.02.2017. 
107 
 
the results have been weighted using YouGov’s standard demographic weights in order to 
improve the representativeness of the sample. 
 The high number of indicators and latent factors reflect the aim of the model, which 
is to illuminate processes that link background characteristics to different political behaviour. 
This necessarily entails a reduction in parsimony because the model seeks to provide a fuller 
explanation of the mechanisms of structural and perceived privilege. As an illustrative 
example, Chapter Six notes the resilient influence of education on political participation, and 
a parsimonious model drawing a direct link from one to the other could thus be specified. 
However, this would not add to our understanding of why education prompts political activity, 
which the full model indicates is largely because it furnishes individuals with the requisite 
informal cultural capital to engage with the topic. However, the additional understanding 
provided by the inclusion of factors relating to structural and perceived privilege is in tension 
with the limits of the data, which cannot sustain models that are too complex. As such, the 
process of creating the full model entailed striking a balance between improving the 
explanation of differences in political activity by adding factors whilst keeping the model 
simple enough to be fitted to the data. Thus, preceding the specification of the final model, 
numerous models with additional loadings were tested. For example, the first full model 
specified structural links from all the forms of capital to all the elements of perception of 
privilege, and then from all those elements to all aspects of political engagement. That model 
was too complex and did not converge, so it was split into two halves in order to allow the 
identification and removal of nonsignificant loadings. Thus, theoretically specified models 
were tested, and insignificant loadings were removed in order to respecify those models. As 
part of the same process, theoretically sustainable loadings suggested by the modification 
indices were also added. Thus the model outlined in the next two chapters is the result of the 
extensive testing of other models, in line with the model generating approach.304 
                                                     
304 For information on the development of key models see Appendix E. 
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As noted, many of the latent factors load onto the theoretically specified indicators as 
expected, and these factors will be outlined relatively briefly, especially to the extent that they 
are not the core concepts considered by this research. Thus, the focus in the next chapter is on 
cultural and social capital, perception of privilege, and political participation. Nevertheless, it 
is useful to consider the other factors so that their structural relationships can be meaningfully 
interpreted subsequently. All of the results reported are estimated through the confirmatory 
factor analysis that is conducted within the full model, even where the factors were identified 
through preceding exploratory factor analyses. Mplus produces both unstandardised and 
standardised factor loadings, and only the latter (i.e. Betas) are reported (along with their 
significance, as indicated by p-values) in order to allow for the assessment of their relative 
importance.305 Additionally, the factors that emerged from a preceding exploratory factor 
analysis are noted and the reasons for the exploratory analysis are explained. Overall, this 
provides a full model that measures multiple forms of political activity, political engagement, 
the elements of perceived privilege, the three forms of capital including multiple types of 
cultural and social capital, and background characteristics. 
It would be possible to simplify the model by introducing theoretically specified 
higher order factors, which would have those multiple factors as their indicators. Such higher 
order factors might, for instance, underpin all cultural activities or all legitimate cultural 
activities and tastes. The introduction of such factors would have the benefit of reducing the 
number of factors between which structural loadings would need to be specified in Chapter 
Six, which could improve model fit. However, such simplification would suggest homogenous 
effects of distinct types of capital, with the cost of obscuring the relationships between those 
types of capital and other factors of interest. Thus, despite the potential costs in terms of 
empirical fit, the separate factors identified in the next chapter are retained in the model 
without loading them onto higher order factors, so that their separate effects can be observed 
subsequently. Further, as the next chapter shows, there is a clear distinction between activities 
                                                     
305 Linda K. Muthén, ‘Loading coefficients’, Mplus Discussion, Monday 18 December 2006, viewed at 
http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/9/276.html?1481818597 on 09.02.2017. 
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and tastes within each area, and between varying levels of engagement with or preference for 
those areas, suggesting low levels of satisficing, for instance in the form of acquiescence, and 
implying the absence of strong methods factors. This suggests that the observed distinctions 
between types of capital are meaningful and should not be obscured with higher order factors. 
 The relationships between those factors are interpreted, in Chapter Six, in terms of 
causality so it is worth considering what the full model allows us to conclude on that topic in 
relation to the modification indices provided by Mplus. In some cases the causal implications 
of the suggested modifications suggested could be easily dismissed, for example the loading 
of parental occupational class onto current economic capital that would imply the former 
precedes the latter. Similarly, it can be safely assumed that education, which tends to be 
attained relatively early in life, precedes recent cultural participation (excepting the small 
number of full-time students in the sample). However, it may be the case that recent cultural 
activities reflect cultural capital that has been accumulated over a long period of time and that 
such accumulation starts before, and contributes to, educational outcomes. Thus, it would be 
possible to posit alternative causal processes and restructure the model in line with those, for 
instance if Bourdieu’s view that social class underpins both capital and political participation 
were adopted. In that light the results of the model offer support for the theoretically specified 
causal process but do not prove causality. Thus, the fact that structural equation modelling 
allows the estimation of robust latent factors and the testing of relationship between multiple 
stages in a hypothesised causal process does not eliminate the need for interpretation of the 
resulting correlations. Nevertheless, as outlined extensively in previous chapters, there is good 
theoretical reason to think that a range of background characteristics influence capital profiles, 
which influence whether one engages or disengages with politics, through perceptions of one’s 
self and society. 
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Conclusion: 
 This chapter has built on the preceding theoretical chapters to provide information 
regarding the survey that was designed to measure the concepts of interest emerging from 
those chapters. Specifically, it has given an overview of the extensive range of questions 
covering political participation and engagement, perception of privilege, and the three forms 
of capital. It has also provided details of the sample that responded to the survey, which is 
notably more representative in terms of sex and region of residence than it is in relation to age, 
ethnicity, or religion. These issues with representativeness are argued to be less problematic 
because the research is concerned primarily with relationships between the variables of interest 
rather than with describing the distributions of those variables in the population. Further, and 
crucially, the variables all have sufficient levels of variation to allow inclusion in the 
subsequent analyses. Those analyses are undertaken using structural equation modelling, 
which allows for the simultaneous estimation of latent factors underpinning variables of 
interest, and the structural relationships between those factors. That analytical approach is 
deployed in the subsequent two chapters to identify factors relating to the key concepts of 
interest, and to test the proposition that background characteristics affect capital profiles, 
which in turn shape perception of privilege and then political engagement and activity. As 
such, they focus on answering the overarching research question: how do structural and 
perceived privilege impact on individual political participation in the United Kingdom? 
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Chapter Five: The Elements of Capital, Perceptions, and Participation 
 
Measuring Underlying Concepts: 
This chapter focuses on the latent factors representing the concepts of interest in the 
full model, with the relationships between those latent factors reported in the next chapter. As 
outlined previously, the method of analysis used is structural equation modelling, which 
combines factor and path analysis and allows for the simultaneous specification, and testing, 
of factors and the relationships between them. This chapter focuses on the measurement model 
contained within the full model, presenting an overview of the identified factors and the 
indicators that load onto them. Before doing so, however, it provides information comparing 
the variables that load onto the factors to equivalent variables in previous research. 
Unfortunately, comparability is limited due to changes that were made to question wording 
and format in the current research, so there are many differences between the current data and 
previously gathered data, as well as some similarities. Crucially, and as noted previously, the 
focus of the research on relationships between variables means that the key question is whether 
they display adequate variation, which is certainly found to be the case. That variation allows 
for the identification of the underlying factors that are the focus of the chapter, which proceeds 
to outline the factors at each stage in the causal process, working backwards from the 
dependent variables relating to political activity. Thus, in turn, the chapter reports the latent 
factors relating to political engagement, perception of privilege, the forms of capital, and 
demographics and basic beliefs. 
 In outlining the latent factors that underpin the variables in the full model, the 
distinction between individualised, contacting, and collective forms of political activity is 
confirmed. The chapter also confirms the existence of factors relating to perceived political 
engagement, internal and external efficacy, and recruitment. The existence of factors relating 
to the posited elements of perception of privilege, which take the form of self-perceived status, 
privilege-orientated explanations for status differences in society, and privilege-orientated 
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explanations for one’s own status is confirmed. Related factors concerning perception of the 
privilege and difference of those involved in politics are also identified. Additionally, a single 
factor underpinning economic capital is identified whereas multiple factors relating to 
different types of cultural capital emerge. Specifically, attendance at legitimate cultural 
performances is differentiated from visits to legitimate cultural institutions and, crucially, 
consumption-based cultural activities. Distinction is also made between tastes for family-
friendly films, blockbuster movies, and educational or informative films, as well as between 
preferences for bass and sample heavy music and a refined set of legitimate cultural tastes. 
Social capital is found to be represented by separate factors relating to number and diversity 
of friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and help received from family friends 
and close social networks. Finally, the existence of factors relating to parental social class, 
respondents’ education, occupational class, religious activity, left-right position, and social 
authoritarianism is also confirmed. 
Throughout, the chapter also provides information on the distributions of the factors 
which, like those of the variables that load onto them, are found to be rather different from 
each other but unified in displaying decent levels of variation. Thus, although the sample is 
not fully representative of the British population it is far from homogeneous in terms of any 
of the measures that are included in the data. Further, the chapter concludes that the 
confirmation of latent factors specified on the basis of theory and previous empirical work 
suggests the external validity of the results. This allows confidence to be placed in the newly 
identified factors and the structural relationships between them that are considered in the 
subsequent chapter.  
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Indicators and Comparisons: 
Before considering the latent factors that underpin the variables of interest, it is worth 
summarising the key observations that may be made about their distributions and comparing 
them to relevant data from previous research. Reflecting the overall structure of the chapter, 
the dependent variables are taken as the starting point and the preceding causal steps are 
worked through backwards from there. All of these observations are based on charts that are 
available in Appendix C. Political activity is measured with reference to the frequency of 
undertaking eleven specific acts, and is generally widespread but infrequent. Within that 
overall observation low-cost forms that can be undertaken alone are notably more widespread 
than higher costs forms that require interaction with others. 
It is difficult to compare the forms of participation to those asked about in other 
research, for instance Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley’s Citizenship in Britain and the most recent 
Hansard Society Audit of Political Engagement.306 This difficulty stems from three key 
differences between those surveys and the one conducted for the current research. First, for 
reasons of survey space, categories of participation asked about in other research were 
combined or excluded in the current research, sometimes to allow for the inclusion of items 
that had not been asked about previously. Second, the current research focused on acts 
undertaken by respondents ‘in relation to any issue that [they] care about personally’, whereas 
respondents to the other two surveys asked about acts undertaken to ‘influence decisions, laws 
or policies’. The decision to utilise a more inclusive wording in the current research was taken 
because of its adoption of a broad definition of political participation. Specifically as outlined 
in Chapter One, political participation is considered to be any attempt by an individual, in 
interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or conserve an element of society at 
some level, and the survey question wording reflected this. 
                                                     
306 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain, p. 78; Ruth Fox and Joel Blackwell, Audit of Political Engagement 13: The 
2016 Report (Hansard Society, London, 2016), p. 58, viewed at 
https://assets.contentful.com/u1rlvvbs33ri/24aY1mkabGU0uEsoUOekGW/06380afa29a63008e97fb41cdb8dcad0/Publication__
Audit-of-Political-Engagement-13.pdf on 19.04.2017. 
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Table 5.1. Levels of Political Participation in the Current Research 
Compared to Citizenship in Britain and the Audit of Political Engagement 
 
Current Research Citizenship in Britain Audit of Political Engagement 2016 
Act % Act % Act % 
Petition or Online 
Action 
78 Signed a petition 42 
Created or signed an e-petition  18 
Created or signed a paper 
petition 
8 
Contributed to a discussion or 
campaign online 
10 
Boycott Products 60 Boycotted products 31 Boycott certain products 11 
Contact 
Government 
51 
Contacted a public 
official 
25 Contact an elected 
representative 
12 
Contacted a politician 13 
Attend a Public 
Meeting 
50 
Attended a political 
meeting or rally 
5 Attend political meetings 5 
Urge Others to Act 41 N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Contact Media 38 Contacted the media 9 Contact the media 4 
Display Materials 37 
Worn or displayed a 
campaign badge or 
sticker 
22 N/A. N/A. 
Meet a 
Representative 
34 N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Attend a Protest 24 
Taken part in a public 
demonstration 
5 
Take part in a demonstration, 
picket or march 
4 
Organise a Public 
Meeting 
13 N/A. N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Take Direct Action 7 
Participated in illegal 
protest activities 
2 N/A. N/A. 
 
 
Third, the current research asked respondents about the frequency of their activities over the 
last five years, which gave them more scope to include activity than the twelve month period 
asked about in the other two surveys. Again, the wording adopted for the current research was 
intended to capture as much political activity as possible, and it also made sense to ask about 
a longer period of time because the question focused on frequency rather than just whether or 
not acts had been undertaken.307 In light of these differences it is not surprising that notably 
higher rates of political activity are recorded in the current research, as shown in Table 5.1.  
                                                     
307 Additionally, because respondents opt into the YouGov panel it is possible that it includes a disproportionate number of 
politically interested, and thus active, respondents. 
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Table 5.2. Number of Political Acts Undertaken in the 
Current Research Compared to Citizenship in Britain 
 
 
No Acts One Act 
Two to 
Four Acts 
Five to 
Nine Acts 
Ten or 
More Acts 
 
Current Research 
 
 
13% 
 
13% 
 
29% 
 
38% 
 
8% 
Citizenship in 
Britain 
15% 13% 39% 29% 4% 
 
Interestingly, despite these discrepancies, the number of political acts undertaken by 
respondents is rather similar across the current research and Citizenship in Britain, as can be 
seen in Table 5.2. The key difference is that the percentages undertaking two to four or five to 
nine political acts has switched, reflecting the higher prevalence of each activity in the current 
research. 
In terms of political engagement, respondents report middling-to-high attention to and 
discussion of national politics, with lower figures relating to local politics. They also perceive 
their knowledge of politics to be high, and this is backed up by widespread knowledge when 
asked about national political figures. Despite or perhaps because of this knowledge, 
respondents are sceptical about the openness of the political system and their own influence 
within it. They do not remove themselves from that political system, though, in the sense that 
they receive numerous requests to get involved with groups, especially via mass 
communications. As with the variables underpinning the political participation factors, the 
variables relating to political engagement are similar to, but not the same as, questions that 
have been asked in other research. Starting with interesting in politics, unlike the Audit of 
Political Engagement the survey conducted for the current research included a middle answer 
option and asked about both local and national politics. Comparing these results in Table 5.3, 
it seems that if the middle option was not available then the respondents who select it would 
be likely to indicate lower levels of interest. Otherwise, the distributions of answers relating 
to national politics are reasonably similar, and the percentages of respondents who express 
quite a lot or a great deal of interest in national politics are similar to those in the audit who 
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say that they are fairly or very interested. That source did not ask about the frequency with 
which respondents discuss politics so an alternative external comparison point, the British 
Social Attitudes Survey, is presented. As can be seen in Table 5.4, respondents to the current 
research report greater frequency of discussion, which may be attributable to the more specific 
answer options that do not require them to judge what ‘Often’ or ‘Sometimes’ mean. 
 
Table 5.3. Political Interest in the Current Research 
Compared to the Audit of Political Engagement 
 
Current Research Audit of Political Engagement 
2016308 
Level of 
Interest 
Local Politics National Politics Level of Interest Politics 
A great deal 6% 13% Very interested 18% 
Quite a lot 19% 36% Fairly interested 39% 
Some 40% 37% N/A. N/A. 
Hardly any 28% 10% Not very interested 25% 
None at all 7% 4% Not at all interested 18% 
 
 
 
Table 5.4. Political Discussion in the Current Research 
Compared to the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Current Research  British Social Attitudes Survey 2004309 
Frequency of Discussion Local National  Frequency of Discussion Politics 
Every day or almost every day 4% 11%  
Often 9% 
 
A few times a week 
 
9% 19% 
 
Once or twice a week 17% 24%  
Sometimes 37% 
A few times a month 18% 15%  
Once or twice a month 12% 9%  
Rarely 35% 
 
A few times a year 
 
16% 7% 
 
A couple of times a year or less 13% 7%  
 
Never 
 
11% 7% 
 
Never 19% 
 
                                                     
308 Fox and Blackwell, Audit of Political Engagement, p. 59. 
309 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2004 (2006, data collection, UK Data Service. SN: 5329) 
viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F5329&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F5329_V668&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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 In terms of self-assessed political knowledge, the provision of a middle option again 
alters the distribution of answers in the current research compared to the Audit of Political 
Engagement. Unlike political interest, however, Table 5.5 indicates that if the middle option 
were not available then the respondents who select it would be likely to split to the adjacent 
categories in both directions. As it stands, moderate-to-high levels of self-assessed knowledge 
prevail in both datasets. As for political knowledge itself, the questions asking respondents to 
match political figures to their position were replicated from the wave of the British Election 
Study that was fielded at the same time of the survey for the current research. As can be seen 
in Table 5.6, this means that the results are similar, although respondents to the British Election 
Study demonstrated even higher levels of political knowledge than the already high levels in 
the sample for the current research. 
 
Table 5.5. Self-Assessed Knowledge of Politics in the 
Current Research Compared to the Audit of Political Engagement 
 
Current Research  Audit of Political Engagement 2016310 
Knowledge of 
Politics 
Percentage  Knowledge of 
Politics 
Percentage 
A great deal 6%  A great deal 8% 
Quite a lot 35%  A fair amount 47% 
A little bit 45%  N/A. N/A. 
Hardly anything 11%  Not very much 32% 
Nothing 3%  Nothing at all 12% 
 
 
Table 5.6. Political Knowledge in the Current Research 
Compared to the British Election Study 
 
Current Research  British Election Study 2014311 
Political Figure 
Correctly Matched 
with Position  
 
Political Figure 
Correctly Matched 
with Position 
Ed Miliband 90%  Ed Miliband 92% 
Nick Clegg 90%  Nick Clegg 91% 
Theresa May 74%  Theresa May 83% 
John Bercow 74%  John Bercow 78% 
Own MP 71%  Own MP 72% 
Justine Greening 38%  N/A. N/A. 
                                                     
310 Fox and Blackwell, Audit of Political Engagement, p. 60. 
311 British Election Study, ‘Data Playground’, Tuesday 09 December 2014, viewed at http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-
playground/?action=new#page-title on 24.04.2017. 
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 As noted previously, the high levels of interest in, discussion of, and knowledge of 
politics observed in the current research are not matched my equivalent levels of internal or 
external efficacy. Indeed Table 5.7 shows that, compared to the Audit of Political Engagement, 
respondents to the current research appear to be particularly sceptical of the influence of the 
public over policy decisions. Again, however, this may be more to do with the question 
wording, which asked respondents to assess how much influence members of the public have 
over decisions at local, regional, and national level rather than to express a level of agreement 
with the idea that the public can change the running of the UK. Similarly, and again because 
of differing question wording, respondents’ reported internal efficacy is difficult to compare 
to that recorded in the Audit of Political Engagement. This is because the latter focused on the 
general influence of the respondent rather than asking them to compare their influence to that 
of other people, as the current research did. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the majority of 
respondents considered themselves to have equivalent influence to others. Otherwise, and 
reflecting the findings of the Audit of Political Engagement, respondents were notably more 
likely to rate their influence as low than as high. Finally, it is hard to identify equivalent data 
against which to compare the requests to get involved in political activity that respondents 
received. The survey for Citizenship in Britain did ask a question on the topic but only to those 
respondents who had already reported political activity, which explains the much lower levels 
of recruitment indicated in  
 
Table 5.7. External Efficacy in the Current Research 
Compared to the Audit of Political Engagement 
 
Current Research  Audit of Political Engagement 2016312 
Level of Public 
Influence 
Local 
Level 
Regional 
Level 
National 
Level 
 
People Like Me can 
Influence Politics 
UK Level 
A great deal 1% 1% 1%  Strongly agree 6% 
Quite a lot 14% 7% 7%  Tend to agree 29% 
A little bit 41% 37% 27%  Neither agree nor disagree 24% 
Hardly any 33% 42% 42%  Tend to disagree 27% 
None at all 11% 13% 23%  Strongly disagree 12% 
 
                                                     
312 Fox and Blackwell, Audit of Political Engagement, p. 63. 
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Table 5.8. Internal Efficacy in the Current Research 
Compared to the Audit of Political Engagement 
 
Current Research  
Audit of Political Engagement 
2016313 
Influence 
Compared 
to Others 
Local 
Level 
Regional 
Level 
National 
Level 
 Influence 
Local 
Level 
National 
Level 
Much more 1% 0% 1%  A great deal 2% 1% 
Slightly more 7% 3% 3%  
A fair 
amount 
23% 12% 
About the 
same 
55% 56% 55%  N/A. N/A. N/A. 
Slightly less 15% 15% 12%  
Not very 
much 
39% 42% 
Much less 22% 27% 29%  
Nothing at 
all 
34% 43% 
 
 
Table 5.9. Recruitment Requests in the Current Research 
Compared to Citizenship in Britain and Voice and Equality 
 
Current Research  
Citizenship in Britain314 
and Voice and Equality315 
Source of Request 
Percentage  who 
 have Received 
 Source of Request 
Percentage who 
 have Received 
Mass request 70%  N/A. N/A. 
Volunteer 52%  Stranger* 12% 
Friend 49%  Close friend* 5% 
Family member 47%  Family* 1% 
Colleague 28%  On the job† 11% 
Religious 
congregation 
24%  Church† 21% 
Neighbour 23%  N/A. N/A. 
Charity 41%  
Non-political 
organisation† 
5% 
Trade union 14%  
Campaign 
organisation 
13%  
Political party 9%  N/A. N/A. 
 
 
Table 5.9. The survey conducted for Voice and Equality also asked about recruitment but only 
in a limited number of contexts, with those results also presented in Table 5.9. The levels of 
recruitment reported are also notably above those reported in the 2010 British Election Study, 
                                                     
313 Fox and Blackwell, Audit of Political Engagement, pp. 65-66. 
314 *Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain, pp. 81-82; the question was asked only to political participants so the 
figures as a percentage of the whole sample were calculated from that information. 
315 † Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 373. 
120 
 
in which only 18% of respondents had been asked to get involved in politics or community 
affairs in preceding years.316 Overall, the higher levels of recruitment reported in the current 
research are likely to be the result of the question wording, which specified a broad range of 
activities for any cause that could be recruited to, with no time limit for the receipt of requests. 
 Moving one step further back in the causal process to consider perception of privilege, 
respondents tend to perceive their own status as middling-to-high. They also appear to engage 
in a version of the fundamental attribution error when explaining their own status as opposed 
to differences in status more generally. In other words, they are more inclined to acknowledge 
the role of social factors in influencing status in society at large than they are in relation to 
their own status, which is attributed to individual characteristics. This is reflected in their view 
of politically active people as privileged, or the beneficiaries of status that does not necessarily 
stem from their own efforts. This general sense of their privilege, however, is not channelled 
into commonly cited differences between politically active people and the population at large, 
though there is a general sense that they are different in some respect. 
The comparability of the questions covering the core elements of perception of 
privilege to those in other research is again limited, although there is more similarity than was 
the case in the previous section. The question on self-perceived status was based on one in the 
2005 British Election Study that asked respondents whether they were better or worse off than 
the people that they know. By contrast, the question in the current research specifically asks 
about status in comparison to both acquaintances and society in general, and removes the 
middle point from the scale as well as reversing its numerical order. Despite this, and with the 
exception of the surprisingly large number of respondents who place themselves in the highest 
rank, the distribution of answers is similar across the current research and the British Election 
Study. As Table 5.10 shows, the bulk of answers are in the middle categories and centred on 
the value of 5, which functions as an intuitive middle point despite not technically being one. 
                                                     
316 David Sanders and Paul Whiteley. British Election Study, 2010: Campaign Internet Data (2014, data collection, UK Data 
Service. SN:7530), viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F7529&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F7529_V616&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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Table 5.10. Self-Perceived Status in the Current Research 
Compared to the British Election Study 
 
Current Research  British Election Study 2005317 
Rank: 
Highest to 
Lowest 
Compared to 
Acquaintances 
Compared to 
Society 
 
Rank: Highest 
to Lowest 
Compared to 
People You 
Know 
1 18% 19%  10 1% 
2 8% 2%  9 2% 
3 13% 7%  8 9% 
4 17% 14%  7 16% 
5 22% 25%  6 17% 
6 10% 12%  5 26% 
7 6% 9%  4 11% 
8 4% 7%  3 8% 
9 2% 3%  2 4% 
10 1% 2%  1 3% 
    0 3% 
 
 Explanations for differences in statuses in society were asked about extensively in the 
2009 British Social Attitudes Survey, though the questions focussed on ‘getting ahead’ rather 
than achievement of status specifically, as in the current research. The answer options differed 
slightly and format of the questions also changed between the surveys, with the current 
research asking respondents to rank their answers rather than indicate how important they are 
on a Likert-type scale. As Table 5.11 demonstrates, this resulted in quite a different distribution 
of answers relating to the role of background in defining status, with considerably more 
respondents ranking this explanation highly in the current research than indicating its 
importance in the British Social Attitudes Survey. By contrast, whilst inequality based on sex, 
ethnicity, and religion were not indicated to be important by many respondents to that survey, 
even fewer ranked such explanations for status difference highly in the current research. 
Similarly, fewer respondents in the current research ranked hard work highly, although Table 
5.13 shows that it was one of the most prevalent explanations in both datasets. The role of 
ambition is also seen as less important in both datasets, and Table 5.14 shows that endorsement 
                                                     
317 Harold Clarke, David Sanders, Marianne Stewart, and Paul Whiteley, British Election Study, 2005: Face-to-Face Survey (2006, 
data collection, UK Data Service. SN: 5494), viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F5494&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F5494_V888&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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of this explanation for status inequality is again lower in the current research. Thus, it is clear 
that respondents to the current research are more likely to prioritise background over hard 
work and ambition as explanations for status differences, whilst the reverse is the case in the 
British Social Attitudes Survey. As noted previously, respondents to the current research were 
notably more likely to explain their own status with reference to hard work and ambition than 
background, so it may be the case that the ‘getting ahead’ wording in the British Social 
Attitudes Survey prompts respondents to think about themselves. However, there is no 
equivalent question that explicitly asks for respondents’ explanations for their own status, as 
the current research does. In addition, the questions relating to the difference and privilege of 
politically active people are original to the current research so cannot be compared to external 
sources. 
 
 
 
Table 5.11. Background as an Explanation for Status Difference in the 
Current Research Compared to the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Current Research  British Social Attitudes Survey 2009318 
Importance Background  Importance 
Wealthy 
Family 
Well-Educated 
Parents 
Ranked first 39%  Essential 2% 5% 
Ranked 
second 
12%  Very important 12% 26% 
Ranked third 11%  Fairly important 25% 44% 
Selected 7%  Not very 
important 
38% 16% 
Not selected 31%  Not at all 
important 
20% 7% 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
318 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009 (2011, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 6695), 
viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F6695&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F6695_V639&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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Table 5.12. Inequality Based on Sex, Ethnicity, and Religion as Explanations for 
Status Difference in the Current Research Compared to the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Current Research  British Social Attitudes Survey 2009319 
Importance 
Inequality based on 
sex, race, and religion 
 Importance Sex Ethnicity Religion 
Ranked first 5%  Essential 3% 2% 3% 
Ranked second 6%  Very important 6% 6% 6% 
Ranked third 6%  Fairly important 12% 17% 10% 
Selected 10%  Not very 
important 
27% 27% 27% 
Not selected 74%  Not at all 
important 
45% 40% 51% 
 
 
Table 5.13. Hard Work as an Explanation for Status Difference in the 
Current Research Compared to the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Current Research  British Social Attitudes Survey 2009 
Importance Hard Work  Importance Hard Work 
Ranked first 24%  Essential 31% 
Ranked second 17%  Very important 52% 
Ranked third 12%  Fairly important 14% 
Selected 6%  Not very 
important 
2% 
Not selected 41%  Not at all 
important 
1% 
 
 
Table 5.14. Ambition as an Explanation for Status Difference in the 
Current Research Compared to the British Social Attitudes Survey 
 
Current Research  British Social Attitudes Survey 2009 
Importance Ambition  Importance Ambition 
Ranked first 18%  Essential 24% 
Ranked second 24%  Very important 47% 
Ranked third 10%  Fairly important 24% 
Selected 7%  Not very 
important 
3% 
Not selected 42%  Not at all 
important 
0% 
 
 
                                                     
319 National Centre for Social Research, British Social Attitudes Survey, 2009 (2011, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 6695), 
viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F6695&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F6695_V639&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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Preceding perception of privilege are the forms of capital, which are taken to be an 
embodiment of structural privilege. Respondents tend to hold modest levels of economic 
capital but much higher levels of cultural capital. Consumption-orientated cultural activities 
are the most widespread and some elements of legitimate cultural capital are amongst the 
rarest, though others are common. In terms of cultural tastes, respondents enjoy numerous film 
genres but fewer musical genres, and legitimate tastes in radio, food, and film are rare. The 
variables can be compared, in some cases, to those collected in previous research, though the 
questions were again asked in different ways. Starting with cultural activities, the 2001 Arts in 
England Survey and the research for Cultural, Class, Distinction asked respondent whether 
they had engaged in such activities in the last year or, in some cases, whether they ever do so. 
By contrast, the current research asked respondents how often they engage in activities with 
no specified period, so the results are not strictly comparable and this is reflected in Table 
5.15. The current research records similar levels of attendance at ballet, dance, opera, and 
classical performances, and at the cinema, as the Arts in England Survey. The same can be said 
live music gigs if it is assumed that those who attend rock and pop, and jazz, gigs in the latter 
sample are largely separate groups. By contrast, if some overlap is assumed between the 
groups who attend pantomime, musicals, and plays, then there may be a similar prevalence of 
activities in both samples. Attendance at both museums and art galleries is notably more 
prevalent amongst respondents to the current research than the Arts in England Survey. 
Quite the opposite is observed in comparison with the data gathered for Culture, Class, 
Distinction, which found higher levels of attendance at museums, art galleries, classical 
concerts, theatre and musicals, and historical buildings than does the current research. Indeed, 
the higher level of participation extends beyond legitimate activities to also include visits to 
nightclubs, although the figures relating to popular culture are generally closer when 
comparing the current research to Culture, Class, Distinction. Thus, similar levels of 
attendance at live music, and eating out are observed, though more respondents to  
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Table 5.15. Prevalence of Cultural Activities in the Current Research 
Compared to the Arts in England Survey and Culture, Class, Distinction 
 
Current Research  
Arts in England Survey 
2001320 
 
Culture, Class, 
Distinction321 
Activity 
At Least 
Once a Year 
 Activity 
Past 12 
Months 
 Activity Ever 
Bingo 9%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
        
Dance or ballet 
performances 
13% 
 Ballet 2%  N/A. N/A. 
 Other dance 13%  N/A. N/A. 
        
Classical or 
opera 
performances 
18% 
 Classical 10%  
Orchestral or choral 
concerts 
34% 
 Opera or operetta 6%  Opera 17% 
        
Nightclubs 21%  N/A. N/A.  Night clubs 35% 
Playing sport 
with others 
25%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
Stand-up 
comedy 
22%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
Watching live 
sport 
33%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
        
Live music gigs 35% 
 Pop or rock 23%  Rock concerts 31% 
 Jazz 6%  N/A. N/A. 
        
Art galleries 34%  
Exhibition or 
collection of art, 
photography or 
sculpture 
21%  Art galleries 45% 
        
Theatre or 
musical 
performances 
44% 
 Pantomime 15%  N/A. N/A. 
 Musical 25%  Musicals 51% 
 Play or drama 29%  Theatre 57% 
        
Museums 50%  
Museum or art 
gallery 
39%  Museums 63% 
Historic 
buildings 
56%  N/A. N/A.  
Stately homes or 
historic sites 
70% 
Cinema 62%  Cinema 63%  Cinema 48% 
Shopping for 
pleasure 
79%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
Pubs, bars, or 
cafés 
86%  N/A. N/A.  Pub 74% 
Walking for 
pleasure 
84%  N/A. N/A.  N/A. N/A. 
Eating out with 
others 
86%  N/A. N/A.  Eat out 90% 
 
                                                     
320 As reported in: Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, ‘Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England’, 
European Sociological Review, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Feb., 2007), pp. 1-19, p. 5; Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, ‘Social 
Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England’, Poetics, Vol. 35, Nos. 2-3 (Apr.-Jun., 2007), pp. 168-190 
p. 174; and Tak Wing Chan and John H. Goldthorpe, ‘The Social Stratification of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance’, 
Cultural Trends, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Sep., 2005), pp. 193-212, p. 197. 
321 Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, Culture, Class, Distinction, pp 265-273.  
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the current research visit pubs with some frequency. Again, it is worth noting that the questions 
asked were different so the figures should be expected to differ, though it can be concluded 
that the current sample has less of a tendency to engage in legitimate cultural activities than 
observed in Culture, Class, Distinction, but a similar or slightly greater tendency than found 
in the Arts in England Survey. By contrast, respondents to the current research appear to be 
generally similarly disposed towards popular culture as were respondents in both of the 
comparative datasets. 
 Moving onto cultural tastes, the full model focussed primarily on film and music 
preferences, asking respondent which genres they like to watch and listen to. This contrasts 
with the survey conducted for Culture, Class, Distinction, which asked respondents to identify 
their favourite film genres, and the lack of comparability is apparent in Table 5.16. The figures 
in Table 5.17 are more comparable because both surveys asked respondents which musical 
genres they like rather than to identify their favourite, although the current research asked 
respondents to select the genres that they like rather than express the extent to which they like 
them. With the exception of rock and pop, and dance and electronic music, which were phrased 
more broadly in the current research, the genres are more popular in Culture, Class, 
Distinction, and this is especially the case in relation to classical, country and western, world 
music, and Urban including hip hop and R&B.322 Nevertheless, the figures for dance and 
electronic, modern jazz, and metal and punk are similar across both datasets, though there is 
an overall tendency for musical genres to be liked by fewer respondents in the current research. 
Turning to social capital, respondents have modest numbers of close friends, though 
the numbers increase as frequency of contact decreases. The diversity of their acquaintances 
is also modest, though this is less the case in relation to sex than ethnicity or religion due to 
distributions in the population. There is widespread acquaintance with high occupational status 
individuals, which reflects both respondents’ own occupations and the prevalence of  
 
                                                     
322 If the respondents to the current research who listen to either RnB and urban or rap and hip hop, or both, are totalled they 
constitute 23% of the sample, which is notably less than the 30% observed in Culture, Class, Distinction. 
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Table 5.16. Preferences for Film Genres in the 
Current Research Compared to Culture, Class, Distinction 
 
Current Research  Culture, Class, Distinction323 
Genre Like to Watch  Genre Favourite 
Comedy 69%  Comedy 16% 
Drama 64%  N/A. N/A. 
     
Thrillers 61%  
Action or thrillers 27% 
Action 54%  
     
Crime 55%  Crime 4% 
Documentaries 46%  Documentary 7% 
Sci-fi 42%  Science fiction 7% 
Family 41%  N/A. N/A. 
     
Classics 39% 
 Costume dramas 9% 
 War films 3% 
 Westerns 4% 
     
History or Biography 39%  N/A. N/A. 
Romance 34%  Romance 7% 
Fantasy 32%  Fantasy 2% 
Horror 24%  Horror 4% 
Musicals and Dance 
movies 
23% 
 Musicals 5% 
Foreign or Art House 13%  Alternative or arts 2% 
Other 4%  Other 2% 
 
 
Table 5.17. Preferences for Music Genres in the 
Current Research Compared to Culture, Class, Distinction 
 
Current Research  Culture, Class, Distinction324 
Genre Like to 
Listen 
 Genre Like 
Rock and pop 65%  Rock 40% 
Classical and opera 29%  Classical including opera 42% 
Alternative and indie 26%  N/A. N/A. 
Dance and electronica 25%  Electronic 20% 
Country 23%  Country and western 39% 
Folk 22%  N/A. N/A. 
Jazz and blues 22%  Modern jazz 26% 
Soul and funk 21%  N/A. N/A. 
     
RnB and urban 19%  Urban including hip hop and 
R&B 
30% 
Rap and hip hop 15%  
     
Metal and punk 17%  Heavy metal 19% 
World music 12%  World music 23% 
Other 11%  N/A. N/A. 
                                                     
323 Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, Culture, Class, Distinction, p. 139.  
324 Bennett, Savage, Silva, Warde, Gayo-Cal, Wright, Culture, Class, Distinction, p. 78.  
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relatively high status occupations in the population. Last, receipt of help from close social 
networks is more prevalent than from looser ones, though it is not widespread in either case. 
When comparing the variables that load onto the social capital factors to equivalents 
in previous research the problem of question wording is again encountered. Nevertheless, 
questions relating to the first two elements of social capital have been asked previously, and 
Table 5.18 compares the answers relating to number of friends in the current research to those 
in the 2001 General Household Survey. As can be seen, the latter does not differentiate 
between friends depending on the frequency with which they are seen or contacted, and 
restricts the focus to those who live nearby. Nonetheless, focussing on those who are seen or 
contacted monthly, the proportion of respondents who report having six or more friends in the 
current research is very similar to the proportion reporting five or more friends in the General 
Household Survey. The proportion with one or two friends is also similar, but far more people 
in the current research report having three to five friends than report having three or four in 
the General Household Survey. There is then a concomitant difference in the opposite direction 
between those reporting no friends, which may reflect the geographical restriction in the latter 
question. Differences in question wording also have implications for the comparability of the 
variables relating to diversity of friends. This topic was asked about in the 2011 Citizenship 
Survey, which gave respondents four possible answer options rather than a slide rule on which 
to indicate the percentage of their friends from the same ethnicity and religion as themselves. 
Despite this difference in question wording the distributions of answers relating to the ethnicity 
of friends are reasonably similar, though notably more respondents to the current research 
indicate having more than half of their friends from the same ethnicity as their own rather than 
a half and half split. By contrast, in relation to religion, the respondents to the Citizenship 
Survey report more homogenous networks than do the respondents to the current research. 
Still, the patterns across the categories are broadly the same in both datasets, even if the 
percentages in each category differ. The patterns in relation to acquaintance with people in 
various types of work are also similar in the data gathered for the current research when 
compared to the nationally representative dataset  
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Table 5.18. Number of Friends Reported in the 
Current Research Compared to the General Household Survey 
 
Current Research  General Household Survey 2000-2001325 
Friends Seen 
or Contacted 
Daily Weekly Monthly  Close Friends 
Within a 15-20 
Minute Walk 
10 or more 3% 8% 17%  
Five or more 28% 
6 to 9 4% 11% 13%  
3 to 5 20% 30% 29%  Three or four 17% 
1 or 2 45% 37% 29%  One or two 28% 
None 28% 14% 12%  None 27% 
 
 
Table 5.19. Diversity of Friends Reported in the 
Current Research Compared to the Citizenship Survey 
 
Current Research  Citizenship Survey 2010-2011326 
 Ethnicity Religion   Ethnicity Religion 
95%-100% 36% 15%  All the same 35% 29% 
55%-94% 48% 40%  More than half 37% 37% 
45%-54% 8% 26%  About half 15% 19% 
0%-44% 8% 19%  Less than half 12% 15% 
 
 
gathered for the Great British Class Survey. As can be seen in Table 5.20, there is a tendency 
for the types of occupation that are more widely known in the current research data to also be 
more widely known in the Great British Class Survey data. As always, there are differences 
in the question wordings that need to be accounted for and, for reasons of space, the current 
research asked about types of work (including example jobs) rather than specific occupations. 
This accounts for the figures that are higher in the current research because it is more likely 
that respondents will be acquainted with someone from a type of work including multiple jobs 
than from a specific occupation. It also means that where the figures are lower  
                                                     
325 Office for National Statistics. Social Survey Division. General Household Survey, 2000-2001 (2006, data collection, 3rd 
Edition, UK Data Service. SN: 4518), viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F4518&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F4518_V1529&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
326 Department for Communities and Local Government, Ipsos MORI, Citizenship Survey, 2010-2011 (2012, data collection, UK 
Data Service, SN: 7111), viewed at 
http://nesstar.ukdataservice.ac.uk/webview/index.jsp?v=2&study=http%3A%2F%2Fukdataservice.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj%
2FfStudy%2F7111&mode=documentation&submode=variable&variable=http%3A%2F%2Fnesstar.esds.ac.uk%3A80%2Fobj
%2FfVariable%2F7111_V75&top=yes on 23.04.2017. 
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Table 5.20. Social Acquaintance with Occupations in the 
Current Research Compared to the Great British Class Survey 
 
Current Research  Great British Class Survey327 
Job Type 
Know 
Someone 
 Kind of Work 
Know Someone 
Socially 
State professionals 71% 
 Nurse 58% 
 Teacher 63% 
     
Technical occupations 64% 
 Electrician 60% 
 Gardener 44% 
 Farmer 29% 
     
Clerical occupations 54% 
 Secretary 50% 
 Call centre worker 31% 
     
Traditional professions 54% 
 Accountant 49% 
 Solicitor 40% 
 Doctor 39% 
     
Semi-routine service 
occupations 
52% 
 
Sales or shop 
assistant 
63% 
 Catering assistant 32% 
 Receptionist 50% 
     
Unemployed 51%  Never worked 48% 
     
Middle managers 46% 
 Publican 35% 
 Bank manager 23% 
 Office manager 48% 
 Restaurant manager 29% 
     
Semi-routine manual 
occupations 
41% 
 Postal worker 38% 
 Security guard 27% 
 Machine operator 31% 
     
Routine manual 
occupations 
37% 
 Armed forces 41% 
 Cleaner 56% 
     
Routine service 
occupations 
36%  N/A. N/A. 
     
Routine transport 
occupations 
36%  Truck or bus driver 51% 
     
Creative professions 35%  Artist 36% 
     
Technical professions 30% 
 Civil engineer 42% 
 
Scientist or 
researcher 
28% 
     
Senior managers 28% 
 Chief executive 23% 
 Finance manager 26% 
 
                                                     
327 Mike Savage and Fiona Devine, BBC Great British Class Survey, 2011-2013 (2015, data collection, UK Data Service, SN: 
7616), obtained from http://doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-7616-1 on 21.04.2017. 
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in the current research it is clear that respondents are less likely to be acquainted with people 
from that type of work than was observed in the Great British Class Survey. This is the last 
observation that can be made on the basis of comparisons between the current data and other 
data. In particular, the questions regarding the types of help that have been received from 
various groups are original to this research so have no external comparison point. 
All of the preceding distributions are observed amongst respondents who are largely 
below retirement age, split equally between the genders, and a large majority of whom are 
White British. In general, they have attained higher educational levels and occupational classes 
than their parents, are not religiously active, and hold left-wing and authoritarian social views. 
Crucially, the levels of variation allow the relationships between the variables to be analysed 
in the subsequent sections of the chapter, albeit with an analytical approach that adjusts for the 
prevalence of non-normal distributions in the data. 
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Participation in Political Activity: 
 It is instructive to begin the consideration of latent factors underpinning the variables 
of interest by focusing on the relationships between respondents’ reported levels of 
engagement in various political acts. Such activity has previously been found to load onto 
separate latent factors relating to those that are individualised, those that are centred on 
contacting representatives or government bodies, and those that are collective.328 This 
provided the basis for a confirmatory analysis in which the individualised factor was indicated 
by frequency of signing petitions and taking online actions, boycotting products, and 
displaying campaign materials. The contacting factor was then indicated by frequency of 
contacting a representative or government department, contacting the media, and meeting an 
elected representative. Finally, the collective action factor was indicated by frequency of 
attending public meetings, organising public meetings, attending protests or demonstrations, 
taking direct action, and urging others to take action. The analysis revealed the factors to fit 
well, indicating that this distinction between types of political act is persistent in the United 
Kingdom. 
One alteration was made to the previously observed factors because displaying 
materials and urging others to take action loaded weakly onto their respective latent factors. 
Further, the modification indices suggested that the two variables should be swapped in their 
loadings, and this was confirmed by a subsequent analysis. Thus, it appears that respondents 
who undertake individualised activity such as signing petitions and boycotting products are 
also more likely to take it upon themselves to urge others to undertake political activity. By 
contrast, the analysis suggests that it is attendance at protests and public meetings that 
furnishes respondents with materials to display. Despite this swap of indicators the three-factor 
model is found to be shaped in much the same way as previously observed, with individualised  
 
                                                     
328 Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley, Citizenship in Britain, pp. 133-137. 
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Diagram 5.1. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors Representing the Three Types of Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
activity indicated by signing petitions and taking online actions (B = 0.694, p= 0.000), 
boycotting products (B = 0.754, p = 0.000), and urging others to take action (B = 0.861, p = 
0.000). As outlined previously, the first two of those activities are the most widespread 
amongst respondents, and the latter activity is undertaken by a large minority, so it seems that 
the tendency to engage individualised political activity is most widespread. 
The next most popular type of political action is contacting, which is indicated by 
meeting an elected representative (B = 0.823, p = 0.000), contacting an elected representative 
or government body (B = 0.830, p = 0.000), and contacting the media (B = 0.747, p = 0.000). 
Half of respondents undertake the second of those activities, whilst large minorities do each 
of the other two. The third factor is indicated by the activities that tend to be undertaken by 
the fewest respondents, namely displaying materials (B = 0.782, p = 0.000), attending public 
meetings (B = 0.836, p = 0.000), attending protests or demonstrations (B = 0.847, p = 0.000),  
 
Individualised 
Petition & Online 
Boycott 
Urge Others 
Meet Elect. Rep. 
Contact Gov. or Rep. 
Contact Media 
Display Materials 
Attend Public Meeting 
Attend Protest 
Take Direct Action 
Org. Public Meting 
Contacting 
Collective 
.694 
.754 
.861 
.823 
.847 
.834 
.836 
.792 
.782 
.830 
.747 
.516 
.483 
.472 
.756 
.789 
.894 
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Table 5.21. Bivariate Correlations of the Political Participation Factors 
 
 Individualised Contacting Collective 
Individualised 1.000   
Contacting 0.820*** 1.000  
Collective 0.801*** 0.887*** 1.000 
 
taking direct action (B = 0.792, p = 0.000) and organising public meetings (B = 0.834, p = 
0.000). Amongst those, attending a public meeting and displaying materials are widespread 
but the other three indicators are the least popular. So, the tendency to undertake collective 
political activity seems to be the least widespread, though some such activities are preferred 
to others. The results are presented in Diagram 5.1, in which the boxes represent indicator 
variables, ovals represent the latent factors, and the figures above the arrows are the 
standardised loadings. The figures to the left of the latent factors are the residual variances, 
and the arrows linking those indicate their correlation (as standard for the dependent variables 
in a full structural equation model). Indeed, as can be seen in Table 5.21, the bivariate 
correlations between the three political activity factors are very high and significant, it is clear 
that those who participate in one type of political activity are likely to participate in others. 
As noted previously, there is a crucial similarity between the factors that are observed 
to underpin these political acts in the current research and Citizenship in Britain. This 
demonstrates that, whilst the prevalence of political activities observed depends on the 
question that is asked, the association between those activities remains largely the same. That 
stability is notable also because of the decade that has passed between the two research 
projects. The general similarity between the three factors relating to political activities and 
those that have been observed in previous research has positive implications for the external 
validity of the data used in the analysis. Additionally, whilst the number of respondents 
engaging in each political activity is high, the variation in each indicator is sufficient to place 
confidence in the identified factors.329 Further, the factors themselves display sufficient 
                                                     
329 Information on the distributions of all the variables included in the full model is included in Appendix C. 
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variation to allow for analysis, as can be seen in charts 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Whilst the factor 
scores themselves are not interpretable the histograms demonstrate not only that the factors 
vary but also that they are approximately normally distributed. As expected, the contacting 
and collective participation factors are slightly positively skewed, and the higher number of 
respondents with lower factor scores reflects the less prevalent nature of many of the political 
acts that load onto them. Thus, it is meaningful to observe the influences on these factors but, 
before that, it is necessary to outline the shape of the factors that are found to impact on them.  
 
Chart 5.1. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Individualised Political Activity 
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Chart 5.2. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Contacting Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.3. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Collective Political Activity 
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Political Engagement: 
The factors relating to political engagement were specified on the basis of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model and tested using confirmatory factor analysis.330 The first such factor 
indicates perceived engagement with politics and is indicated most strongly by attention paid 
to national politics (B = 0.883, p = 0.000) and frequent discussion of it (B = 0.883, p = 0.000). 
It is also indicated strongly by self-perceived knowledge of politics (B = 0.792, p = 0.000), the 
loading of which was also tested on the subsequently considered political knowledge factor 
but found to be weaker. In addition, views of politics as ‘for you’, and of one’s self as a 
‘political person’, load onto the factor but are excluded from the final model to minimise the 
number of variables. In the same way, the single binary indicator of party identification is not 
included despite loading onto the factor.331 Thus, the factor embodies a general perceived 
engagement with politics that underpins not only one’s declared engagement with the topic 
but also the sense that one is capable of engaging with it. 
The political knowledge factor underpins knowledge of the roles of national political 
figures at the time of the survey, and specifically Nick Clegg (B = 0.901, p = 0.000), Ed 
Miliband (B = 0.867, p = 0.000), John Bercow (B = 0.843, p = 0.000), as well as respondents’ 
own MPs (B = 0.725, p = 0.000). The focus of political knowledge on national politics raises 
the question of whether that political system is seen as efficacious. Only two indicators of the 
efficacy of the political system, in terms of the influence that the population are seen to have 
over, are included in the final model. They relate to the population’s influence at the local (B 
= 0.699, p = 0.000) and national (B = 0.723, p = 0.000) levels, which are underpinned by a 
single external efficacy factor. The indicator of population influence at the regional level was 
found to be too closely related to the national level indicator, and thus was overdetermined by 
the factor and excluded from the model. By contrast, all three of the indicators relating to the 
                                                     
330 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 334-390. 
331 To accurately reflect the Civic Voluntarism Model, party identification should strictly be treated as a separate factor from 
interest in or attention paid to politics, here referred to as perceived engagement with politics. However, because of the need to 
keep the model as simple as possible, and of the observed loading of party identification onto that factor, it is considered acceptable 
to exclude it from the full model. 
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respondents’ own influence at the local (B = 0.887, p = 0.000), regional (B = 0.976, p = 0.000), 
and national (B = 0.863, p = 0.000) levels load onto a single internal efficacy factor. Thus, the 
model includes four factors within the broad area of political engagement identified by the 
Civic Voluntarism Model, relating specifically to perceived engagement, knowledge of 
politics, and internal and external efficacy. All of these elements of political engagement are 
likely to predispose respondents towards participation but they may still need to be asked to 
get involved for that predisposition to be activated, meaning that recruitment must also be 
accounted for. 
Three recruitment factors relating to requests to get involved from close 
acquaintances, generic sources, and groups already involved in were tested in a confirmatory 
model and found to have adequate fit. In the full model the focus is on the first of those factors 
because recruitment is argued to be a manifestation of social capital, and requests from close 
acquaintances most clearly relate to respondents’ social networks. Generic requests, but 
contrast, are just that and their widespread nature suggests that they are less targeted and 
tailored to respondents. Further, the factor relating to recruitment by volunteers from 
organisations that respondents are already involved in is only relevant to the small number 
who meet that criteria. Thus, the factor encompassing recruitment in the final model relates to 
the frequency with which request to get involved in groups are received from family (B = 
0.754, p = 0.000), friends (0.802, p = 0.000), neighbours (B = 0.724, p = 0.000), and members 
of local religious congregations (B = 0.761, p = 0.000). 
The levels of perceived engagement with politics, knowledge of it, external and 
internal efficacy, and recruitment are reflected in the distributions of the factors that are found 
to underpin them.332 Thus, as Chart 5.4 shows, the factor scores for perceived engagement with 
politics are grouped around positive values, and this reflects the high levels of interest in, 
discussion of, and self-perceived knowledge of politics in the sample. Unlike perceived 
political engagement, however, Chart 5.5 shows that the factor scores for political 
                                                     
332 Details of the distributions of the variables that load onto the factors are available in Appendix C. 
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Diagram 5.2. Section of the Full Model Encompassing the 
Five Factors Related to Political Engagement and Recruitment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
knowledge are not normally distributed, displaying obvious negative skew resulting from the 
bulk of respondents having high scores. This reflects the very large number of respondents 
who were able to correctly answer the majority of the political knowledge questions that they 
were asked. The external efficacy factor scores are also centred on positive values, as shown 
in Chart 5.6, whilst the internal efficacy factor clearly demonstrates that respondents tended 
to give the same answer regarding their relative influence at local, regional, and national level, 
hence the clear clustering of factor scores observed in Chart 5.7. Finally, Chart 5.8 shows that 
the bulk factor scores for receipt of recruitment requests are low, with an associated positive 
skew indicating that most respondents receive requests only from a few sources rather than 
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from many. As with the factors relating to political participation, although the factor scores 
are not themselves interpretable it is clear that they vary sufficiently to be included in the 
analysis of influences on political participation, though they are less likely to be normally 
distributed than was the case for political participation. 
 
Chart 5.4. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perceived Political Engagement 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.5. Histogram of the Factor Scores for National Political Knowledge 
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Chart 5.6. Histogram of the Factor Scores for External Efficacy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.7. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Internal Efficacy 
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Chart 5.8. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Receipt of Recruitment Requests 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on the above, it is fair to conclude that respondents are highly engaged with 
politics but sceptical of their ability to influence it. Large majorities pay at least some attention 
to politics, especially at the national level, and discussion of the topic is widespread and 
frequent. Respondents are also moderately confident of their knowledge of politics, and they 
can generally back this up with the ability to correctly identify relevant political figures. These 
qualities, however, do not lead respondents to a positive assessment of the political system’s 
openness to influence by the population in general, nor of their own ability to exert such 
influence, although a majority are no more sceptical about their own influence than that of the 
population at large. The relationships between these elements of political engagement can be 
seen in Table 5.22, which presents the bivariate correlations between each factor. As expected, 
they are largely positively correlated, though the negative relationship between political 
knowledge and receipt of recruitment requests is of interest. The positive relationship of those 
two factors with perceived engagement suggests that those who wish to engage with politics 
do so through networks that recruit them to action or, in a more detached fashion, by paying 
attention to and gaining knowledge of national politics. Beyond this observation, it appears 
that perceived engagement is central to engagement overall, and has the strongest relationship  
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Table 5.22. Bivariate Correlations of the Political Engagement Factors 
 
 Perceived 
Engagement 
Political 
Knowledge 
External 
Efficacy 
Internal 
Efficacy 
Recruitment 
Perceived Engagement 1.000     
Political Knowledge 0.597*** 1.000    
External Efficacy 0.196*** 0.088*333 1.000   
Internal Efficacy 0.297*** 0.110** 0.481*** 1.000  
Recruitment 0.213*** -0.132** 0.149*** 0.081** 1.000 
 
 
with each of the other factors (excepting the unsurprisingly strong relationship between 
internal and external efficacy). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
333 Identification issues were encountered resulting from the presence of only five indicators for two factors when testing the 
bivariate correlation between internal and external efficacy, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five political 
engagement factors were correlated. 
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Perception of Privilege: 
The first element of perception of privilege, self-perceived status, was measured in 
relation to society as a whole and in relation to people who respondents know personally, and 
both were posited to be underpinned by a single factor. Such a factor is confirmed in the full 
model, and displayed in Diagram 5.3 below, suggesting an underlying estimation of status that 
informs how respondents see themselves both in relation to society (B = 0.991, p = 0.000) and 
the people they know personally (B = 0.814, p = 0.000). 334 By contrast the latent factors 
relating to explanations for status differences in society were identified through an exploratory 
analysis. This is because perception of privilege as formulated is being tested for the first time 
in this research and, as such, there were only a limited number of theoretical expectations that 
could inform measurement of the concept. Those expectations were that explanations for 
societal status should be separate from explanations for one’s own status, whilst perception of 
privilege in politics and of the ways in which those involved in politics are different from 
society as a whole would also form separate factors. Further, it was expected that social- and 
individual-based explanations for status are opposed. However, there were no expectations 
regarding how many factors should relate to explanations for status or to political difference 
and privilege, or in some cases the particular indicators that might load onto those factors. 
The exploratory analysis revealed factors in line with the above-specified 
expectations, with separate factors relating to explanations for societal and own status, and to 
perception of the difference and privilege of those involved in politics. Social- and individual-
orientated explanations for status were found to be opposed to each other in their loadings onto 
the two factors relating to status in society and one’s own status. In addition, the exploratory 
analysis revealed the belief that status inequality in society is inevitable to be unrelated to any 
of the identified factors but that inevitability as an explanation one’s own status is underpinned 
by the same factor as social- and individual-orientated explanations. Further, those who 
                                                     
334 Whilst two-indicator factors are not ideal, it is acceptable to utilise them if they have been tested in alternative measurement 
models and found to be robust; see Bengt O. Muthén, ‘2 Indicator Latents’, Mplus Discussion, Thursday 17 December 2009, 
viewed at http://www.statmodel.com/discussion/messages/11/4965.html?1261084141 on 23.04.2017. 
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attribute social status to luck do so both for society and themselves, forming a separate factor. 
That factor is not included in the final model because the research is more concerned with the 
opposition between social- and individual-orientated explanations for status difference. Thus, 
after self-perceived status, the second latent factor relating to perception of privilege included 
in the full model is indicated most strongly by a belief in the importance of background in 
influencing status in society (B = 0.608, p = 0.000), which is opposed to the belief that it is 
hard work that influences such status (B = -0.301, p = 0.000). The weakest loading onto the 
factor is that of belief in the importance of group-based inequality in affecting social status (B 
= 0.156, p = 0.000) but the indicator is retained in the full model because it is theoretically 
important to account for such explicit recognition of the role of social forces in defining status 
when considering perception of privilege. 
In contrast with the above, belief in the importance of group-based inequality in 
defining status is the strongest indicator (B = 0.796, p = 0.000) of the latent factor underpinning 
explanations for one’s own status. The factor is also indicated by a belief that one’s own status 
is inevitable (B = 0.587, p = 0.000), which contrasts with the previous observation that 
inevitability does not load onto any factor relating to explanations for status differences in 
society. The third indicator of the factor is belief in the role of background in influencing one’s 
own status (B = 0.453, p = 0.000), meaning that group-based inequality and background load 
onto the factors relating to explanations for status difference in society and one’s own status. 
Hard work was also found to load onto the latter factor negatively as expected but is a weaker 
indicator than inevitability and was not included in the full model. Thus, latent factors covering 
the three components of perception of privilege are included in the model. Self-perceived 
status is manifested in relation to both society at large and personal acquaintances as expected. 
Social-orientated explanations for status differences in society, which are indicative of 
perceiving structural privilege, are opposed to individual-orientated explanations. The same is 
the case in relation to explanations for one’s own status, although the positive loading of the 
inevitability explanation suggests that the tension may also be between those who perceive an 
internal or external locus of control. 
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Crucially, respondents are notably more likely to identify individual-orientated 
explanations for their own status than they are for status differences in society. This appears 
to reflect the ‘fundamental attribution error’ in which the low status of others is seen to be the 
result of their inherent flaws whilst one's own status is considered to stem from a range of 
external and internal factors.335 Crucially, the relationship appears to have been reversed in 
respondents’ answers to above two questions, which may be because both, to differing degrees, 
primed respondents to think about high rather than low status. Thus, the corollary to thinking 
that external constraints limit one’s own status whilst individual character traits limit the status 
of others is thinking that individual character traits drive one’s achievement of status whilst 
external forces underpin other’s achievement of status. In others words, people are motivated 
to credit their achievements to their own characteristics and their limitations to external factors, 
and to reverse that attribution when accounting for others’ achievements and limitations. These 
three elements of perception of privilege may also relate to how respondents view the relative 
privilege of politicians, and the difference of those who are involved in politics from 
themselves. 
Perception of privilege relating to politics is found to be separate from perception of 
privilege in society at large and in relation to one’s self. A single factor emerged from the 
exploratory analysis that underpins the view that both politicians (B = 0.915, p = 0.000) and 
those who are involved in politics (B = 0.877, p = 0.000) are more privileged than one’s self, 
we well as more privileged than society at large (respectively, B = 0.850 and B = 0.832, whilst 
p = 0.000 in both cases). Such views are widespread amongst respondents, with almost none 
selecting categories indicating the politicians and those involved in politics are  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
335 Knight, ‘In Their Own Words’, pp. 210-213. 
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Diagram 5.3. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors 
Representing the Five Elements of Perception of Privilege 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
less privileged than themselves.336 It is clear that these views are related and that respondents 
have an underlying view of the political world as one of privilege. This could, however, just 
be a manifestation of the sense that those involved in politics are different from one’s self and 
the population at large, which is why such views were measured separately in the survey. The 
exploratory analysis revealed a single factor underpinning all of the ways in which those 
involved in politics are seen as different from the respondent, although the weaker loadings of 
differences centred on ideas, cultural tastes, and social networks suggest that these may form 
                                                     
336 Information on the distributions of all the variables included in the full model is included in Appendix C. 
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a separate factor. Nevertheless, a single latent factor embodying the sense that politics is 
populated by people who are different from one’s self is supported, and its strongest indicators 
are the identification of difference on the basis of education (B = 0.615, p = 0.000), income (B 
= 0.603, p = 0.000), and where they live (B = 0.575, p = 0.000). Thus, views of politically 
active people as different from one’s self are separate from views of them as privileged, and 
this observation is the result of adopting an exploratory approach, which has again produced 
theoretically sound factors.  
 Turning to the distributions of those factors, the uneven distribution of the factor 
scores in Chart 5.9 reflects the tendency for respondents to select the same rank when asked 
about their status in relation to their own acquaintances and in relation to society at large. The 
distribution of the factor scores relation to explanations for status difference in society is much 
more even and notably different from the distribution relating to explanations for own status, 
as can be seen by comparing charts 5.10 and 5.11. The difference between these distributions, 
with the bulk of scores for explanations of own status being low, indicates 
 
 
Chart 5.9. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Self-Perceived Status 
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Chart 5.10. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of Privilege in Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.11. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Perception of Own Privilege 
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Chart 5.12. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.13. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Perception of the Privilege of Politically Active People 
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the lower levels of endorsement of privilege-based explanations for one’s own status than for 
status in society as a whole. Last, the distributions of the factor scores relating to the perception 
of the difference and privilege of politically active people are also notable for their difference, 
and charts 5.12 and 5.13 show that the bulk of scores for difference are low whilst more of the 
scores for privilege are higher. This reflects the fact that respondents are likely to consistently 
rate politicians and politically active people as more privileged than themselves and society, 
and less likely to consistently identify the particular differences of those people. As with the 
previous section, whilst the factor scores cannot be interpreted themselves, it is clear that they 
have sufficient variation to be included in analysis of the influences on political participation, 
and they tend not to be neatly normally distributed. 
 Many of the factors relating to perception of privilege are correlated, and it is 
unsurprising to observe that perception of privilege in society is positively related to perception 
of own privilege as well as the difference and privilege of politically active people. This 
implies that there is a tendency to consistently apply privilege-based explanations in different 
areas, though the strength of correlations leaves plenty of space for respondents to apply 
inconsistent explanations as well. Additionally interesting is the fact that high self-perceived 
status is associated with lower perception of privilege in society as well as of the difference 
and privilege of politically active people. At the same time, it is 
 
Table 5.23. Bivariate Correlations of the Perception of Privilege Factors 
 
 
Perception 
of Privilege 
in Society 
Perception 
of Own 
Privilege 
Self-
Perceived 
Status 
Perception of 
the Difference 
of Politically 
Active People 
Perception of 
the Privilege 
of Politically 
Active People 
Perception of Privilege 
in Society 
1.000     
Perception of Own 
Privilege 
 
0.229*** 1.000    
Self-Perceived Status 
 
-0.256*** 0.128*** 1.000   
Perception of the 
Difference of the 
Politically Active 
0.376*** 0.024 -0.356*** 1.000  
Perception of the Privilege 
of the Politically Active 
0.374*** -0.071** -0.416*** 0.496*** 1.000 
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positively associated with perception of one’s own privilege so high status individuals are apt 
to recognise the role of societal influences on their status but less likely to do so in relation to 
society itself. Finally, and unsurprisingly, those who view politically active people as different 
are also likely to view them as privileged, and it may be that the latter is a particular form of 
the former. 
To summarise, the self-perceived status factor encompasses measures relating to both 
acquaintances and society at large, with both indicators suggesting middling to high self-
perceived status. Social explanations for status in society tend to be opposed to individual 
explanation, and this holds for explanations for own status as well. The distributions of the 
two factors, though, reflect the fact that social explanations are more likely to be applied in 
relation to society than the self. This observation suggests a logical concomitant to the 
‘fundamental attribution error’ that relates to explanations for low status and has been observed 
in previous research. Turning to perception of privilege in politics, a single factor underpins 
respondents’ sense that they are less privileged than politicians and those who are involved in 
politics, and their perception of similar relationships between those groups and society at large. 
Further, whilst no particular difference between the population and politically active people 
appears to be emblematic, a single factor underpinning perceived differences is observed. The 
impact of these factors on political participation remains to be seen, but before turning to that 
it is necessary to consider the factors relating to the other key elements of the model: the forms 
of capital. 
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The Forms of Capital: 
Economic capital is posited to be measured by household income, assets, and property 
ownership. All three indicators are indeed found to be underpinned by a single latent factor 
with similarly strong and significant loadings associated with each (household income B = 
0.682, number of types of property owned B = 0.671, assets B = 0.641, and p = 0.000 in all 
three cases).337 As noted previously, it is posited that economic capital impacts on political 
participation only in terms of its volume, meaning that it can be measured relatively simply 
with a single latent factor. By contrast, cultural capital and social capital are posited to be 
important not only in terms of volume but also type and, as such, each concept is measured by 
multiple factors. The first factor is work-based civic skills, which is the element of cultural 
capital that is closest to economic capital and was specified on the basis of the Civic 
Voluntarism Model.338 The loadings of the indicators confirm the relevance of the concept in 
the United Kingdom twenty years after it was measured by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady in 
the United States. The factor is indicated most strongly by the frequency of organising or 
chairing decision-making meetings at work (B = 0.898, p = 0.000), and then by attendance at 
such meetings (B = 0.871, p = 0.000) and giving presentations (B = 0.862, p = 0.000). 
Turning to the core of Distinction, Bourdieu’s conception of cultural capital 
encompasses, but is not limited to, musical tastes, artistic preferences, choice of literature, 
home decoration, trips to the theatre and cinema, food preferences and body shape, clothing 
and appearance, favoured sports, use of language and speech patterns, and choice of 
newspaper.339 In that light, the survey included an extensive battery of questions relating to 
cultural activities and tastes. Beyond outlining the various activities and tastes that can 
constitute cultural capital, though, Bourdieu argued that there is ongoing competition to attain 
and define its value, so the particular types that are considered legitimate may vary across 
                                                     
337 Pfeffer and Hällsten, ‘Mobility Regimes and Parental Wealth’. 
338 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 304-334. 
339 Bourdieu, Distinction: pp. 19-21, p. 28, pp. 32-34, p. 43, pp. 54-60, pp. 185-196, pp. 201-206, pp. 217, , p. 226, p. 255, p. 270, 
pp. 274-278, pp. 288-290, pp. 298-301, pp. 324-325, pp. 334-336, pp. 346-351, pp. 355-357, pp. 391-393, pp. 413-414, pp. 444-
449. 
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times and contexts.340 Indeed, as outlined previously, recent work considering the distribution 
of cultural capital in the United Kingdom identified a rather different picture than that painted 
by Distinction in relation to France in the second half of the twentieth century.341 As such, and 
reflecting Bourdieu’s use of multiple correspondence analysis to map the distribution of 
capitals, the current research established the latent factors underpinning cultural capital 
through exploratory factor analysis.342 
The initial exploratory factor analyses relating to cultural capital contained eighty 
variables relating to frequency of cultural activities outside the home, preferred eateries, 
preferred cuisines, frequency of home-based cultural activities, favoured musical genres, and 
favoured film genres. Part of the purpose of conducting exploratory analysis is to reduce the 
number of variables included in the final model and, as such, multiple analyses were run with 
the weakest indicators being removed after each. Over the course of this process two 
competing trends emerged in relation to the frequency of cultural activities outside the home. 
The first identified a single factor underpinning attendance at classical and opera, theatre, and 
dance performances, as well as visits to museums, galleries, and historic buildings. The second 
identified two separate factors relating to attendance at performances, and visits to institutions. 
All of the activities may be seen as legitimate in the Bourdieusian sense, meaning that they are 
commonly held up as enriching and valuable forms of cultural participation. Thus, the 
competing trends identified in the exploratory factor analyses suggest both that there is an 
underlying tendency to engage with legitimate types of cultural capital but that such 
engagement may be undertaken in different ways. 
In light of the above, the decision was taken to retain separate factors relating to the 
two distinct forms of legitimate cultural capital in the final model so that their effects on 
political participation can be examined separately. As such, the first factor relates to cultural 
performances and is indicated by frequency of attendance at classical or opera concerts (B = 
                                                     
340 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328, p. 134, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 176-177, p. 196, p. 218, p. 220, p. 231, p. 246, p. 
273, p. 311, p. 395, pp. 450-451. 
341 Bennett et al., Culture, Class, Distinction, p. 254, p. 22, p. 132, p. 149. 
342 Bourdieu, Distinction, pp. 339-342. 
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0.862, p = 0.000), theatre shows or musicals (B = 0.817, p = 0.000), and ballet or dance 
performances (B = 0.806, p = 0.000). The second factor then relates to cultural institutions and 
is indicated by frequency of visits to museums (B = 0.886, p = 0.000), art galleries (B = 0.899, 
p = 0.000), and historic buildings (B = 0.836, p = 0.000). In addition, a third factor relating to 
consumption-orientated activities was consistently identified in the exploratory models and is 
indicated by the frequency of eating out with friends (B = 0.894, p = 0.000), going to the pub 
(B = 0.723, p = 0.000) and, weakly, shopping for pleasure (B = 0.301, p = 0.000). The three 
factors relating to cultural activities, along with their indicators are shown in Diagram 5.4. 
Referring back to the descriptive statistics, two of the three indicators of the first factor 
(classical and opera, and ballet and dance performances) are amongst the least participated in, 
whilst all three of the indicators of the second factor are participated in quite widely, and all 
three of the indicators of the third factor are amongst the most widespread activities. Thus, 
whilst the first and second factors relate to different types of legitimate cultural capital, the 
third factor encompasses more popular cultural activities. 
 
 
Diagram 5.4. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors 
Relating to the Three Types of Cultural Activity 
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Moving from activities to tastes, which are displayed in Diagram 5.5 below, three 
robust factors relating to preferences for film genres were revealed by the exploratory factor 
analyses and are thus included in the final model. The first of those factors relates to family-
friendly genres and is indicated by watching of family films (B = 0.743, p = 0.000), musical 
and dance movies (B = 0.646, p = 0.000), and romance films (B = 0.875, p = 0.000). The 
second factor relates to blockbuster films and is indicated by the viewing of releases in the 
action (B = 0.712, p = 0.000), fantasy (B = 0.848, p = 0.000, and science fiction (B = 0.911, p 
= 0.000) genres. Finally, the third factor relates to genres that are often considered to be 
educational, informative, or otherwise enriching, in the form of the classics (B = 0.642, p = 
0.000), documentaries (B = 0.659, p = 0.000), and historical or biographical films (B = 0.937, 
p = 0.000). In contrast with activities outside the home, where the three factors were 
distinguished both by qualitative differences between the activities that they underpinned and 
by differences in their popularity, the factors relating to film preferences are differentiated 
primarily in terms of the types of genre that they relate to rather than their popularity (all of 
the genres included are watched by between 54.3% and 33.8% of respondents). Nonetheless, 
the factor relating to classic, documentary, and historical or biographical films can be marked 
out as legitimate in the sense that, as noted, they are often considered to be educational, 
informative, or otherwise enriching. 
Only one factor relating to musical tastes proved to be robust to the removal of the 
variables with weaker loadings during the exploratory analyses. That factor relates to musical 
genres that commonly feature sampling, electronic effects, and strong basslines, in the form 
of rap and hip hop (B = 0.946, p = 0.000), RnB and urban (B = 0.843, p = 0.000), and dance 
and electronica (B = 0.678, p = 0.000). This factor stands in stark contrast to the final factor 
relating to cultural tastes in the full model, which was specified theoretically rather than 
emerging from the exploratory analyses. This was necessary because the large number of 
indicators of cultural tastes (177 in total) meant that, in order to avoid model identification 
problems, they were initially explored in blocks relating to different areas. The strongest 
factors from those models were then tested in models encompassing tastes in  
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Diagram 5.5. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors 
Relating to Five Sets of Cultural Tastes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
different areas. This means that some variables were not tested in the same models as each 
other because they were weak indicators of factors that were subsequently included in 
combined models. Thus, it is a possible that some of these indicators are underpinned by 
factors that did not emerge from the analysis due to limits on the number of variables that can 
be included in a single model. In that light, a final latent factor indicated by tastes that are 
considered especially legitimate was specified and confirmed in the full model. The factor is 
indicated by eating at wine bars and bistros (B = 0.457, p = 0.000), watching foreign and 
arthouse films (B = 0.491, p = 0.000), and listening to BBC Radio 3 (B = 0.589, p = 0.000), 
all of which are undertaken by a small minority of respondents (between 22.8% and 6%). This 
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factor was included to ensure that there is a clear test of relationship between legitimate 
cultural tastes and perceptions and political participation when the structural loadings are 
considered. 
The identification of a factor relating to legitimate cultural tastes in food, radio, and 
film breaks with the general observation that cultural tastes are grouped in areas relating to 
activities, film, and music. These observed distinctions between particular areas of cultural 
taste and activity were not anticipated and have been identified because of the decision to 
adopt an exploratory approach. Indeed, confirmatory factor analysis would have been a rather 
blunt tool for identifying factors in an area with only broad theoretical expectations. Whilst 
Bourdieu’s work may have suggested a factor centred on legitimate cultural capital, it would 
not have distinguished attendance at cultural performances from visits to cultural institutions, 
nor would it have suggested a consumption-orientated factor. Nevertheless, the observed 
distinctions do reflect the theory in the sense that they tend to identify more and less legitimate 
cultural activities and tastes, albeit in unanticipated ways. Further, the distinctions also make 
sense because in addition to people who, for instance, enjoy particular genres of films there 
are also be people who generally do not enjoy watching films. Thus, differentiation between 
both particular preferences within a cultural area and between areas of taste and activity are to 
be expected, and this helps to explain the observed cultural factors. As such, these results are 
a good example of retroduction; Bourdieu’s theory informed the choice of questions to ask 
and the broad expectation that cultural activities and tastes are related, but empirical analysis 
indicated the particular relationships that exist. 
 Charts 5.14 to 5.16 present the distributions of the factor scores relating to cultural 
activities, and the similarity of the two legitimate factors is notable. Both are approximately 
normally distributed and centred on higher scores, which reflects the fact that most respondents 
undertake at least some of those activities at least some of the time, whilst few respondents 
engage in all of them frequently or none of them ever. This contrasts with the distribution of 
the factors scores relating to consumption-orientated cultural activities, which is wider, lower, 
and are largely positive, reflecting the fact that a higher number of respondents engage in more 
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of those activities with greater frequently. Moving on from activities, Chart 5.17 shows that 
the factor scores associated with legitimate tastes are tightly and normally distributed around 
zero, which distinguishes them from the factor scores relating to other tastes displayed in charts 
5.18 to 5.21. The distribution of the educational and informative films factor is wider and 
lower, and the bulk of scores are positive. The distributions of the factor scores relating to 
family-friendly and blockbuster films have multiple peaks, which suggests strong grouping of 
answers, whilst the bass and sample heavy music factor has a low and wide distribution with 
scores that are largely negative, reflecting the low prevalence of such tastes in the sample. As 
with the factors observed in previous sections, only some of the factor scores distributions 
associated with cultural capital are normal but they all display sufficient variation to be 
included in the analysis of influence on political participation.   
Before proceeding to consider social capital it is also useful to consider the 
associations between the eight cultural capital factors. The bivariate correlations between those 
factors can be seen in Table 5.24 and there are two trends that appear to be in competition. 
First, legitimate cultural capital is generally not opposed to other forms of cultural capital, with 
legitimate tastes positively and significantly associated with most other cultural tastes. 
Legitimate activities are also positively and significantly associated with consumption-based 
activities, and visits to legitimate venues are not significantly related to family friendly and 
blockbuster films, or bass and sample heavy music. Thus, those who hold legitimate cultural 
capital display some tendency to cultural omnivorousness, in line with previous findings in 
this area.343 By contrast, the second trend indicates that there is a limit to that omnivorousness, 
and the associations between legitimate and other forms of capital are notably weaker than 
those within legitimate capital. Further, there is a clear opposition between attendance at 
legitimate performances and preferences for blockbuster films, and bass and sample heavy 
music. Those who hold legitimate cultural capital, then, also possess some other forms of 
capital whilst tending to reject others. 
                                                     
343 Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in England’, p. 7; Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘Social 
Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England’, p. 182; and Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘The Social Stratification 
of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance’, p. 199. 
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Chart 5.14. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Visits to Legitimate Cultural Venues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.15. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances 
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Chart 5.16. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Consumption-Based Cultural Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.17. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Legitimate Cultural Tastes 
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Chart 5.18. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Preferences for Educational and Information Films 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.19. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Preferences for Family-Friendly Films 
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Chart 5.20. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Preferences for Blockbuster Movies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.21. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Preferences for Bass and Sample Heavy Music 
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The factors underpinning social capital were identified in a similar fashion to those 
underpinning cultural capital, with two of the five factors relating to the concept being 
identified through confirmatory models whilst the remaining three emerged from exploratory 
analyses. Beginning with those that were defined theoretically, and as can be seen in Diagram 
5.6 below, the first factor relates to number of friends and is posited to underpin the indicators 
of how many friends are seen with three levels of frequency. Number of friends contacted 
weekly is found to have the strongest loading onto the specified factor (B = 0.870, p = 0.000), 
followed by friends seen monthly (B = 0.809, p = 0.000) and then friends seen daily (B = 
0.550, p = 0.000). Thus, there is an underlying tendency influencing how many friends 
respondents have, whether they are seen or contacted frequently or infrequently. 
The posited latent factor representing diversity of friends is found to be strongly 
indicated by the percentage of friends with different ethnicities from the respondent’s own (B 
= 0.596, p = 0.000) and less strongly by the percentage of friends with different religious 
beliefs from the respondent’s own (0.513, p = 0.000).344 This gap between the loadings may 
suggest that there are differing geographical distributions of ethnic and religious groups, which 
mean that respondents who are disposed to have diverse friends are more or less likely to meet 
people with different ethnicities or religions depending on where they live. Additionally, the 
indicator relating to diversity of friends in terms of sex, recoded so that respondents with half 
of their friends from the same sex as themselves were assigned the highest value whilst those 
with all their friends from one gender were assigned the lowest values, is found to have the 
weakest loading onto the factor (B = 0.342, p = 0.000). That weakness is likely to reflect the 
equal split and even geographical distribution of genders in the population when compared to 
ethnic and religious groups. Nonetheless, it is interesting to observe that respondents who have 
friends from other ethnic groups than themselves also have friends with different religions, 
and a more even split of friends in terms of gender. 
                                                     
344 The variables relating to ethnicity and religious beliefs were inverted so that high values indicated high diversity rather than 
high numbers of friends from the same group as one’s self.  
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 In positing that the forms of capital are structured by class, Bourdieu suggests social 
capital should reflect social position, and thus that individuals know others who have similar 
occupations to their own.345 However, Bourdieu also argued that there is ongoing competition 
between classes to gain capital and establish the value of the capital that they hold.346 So, as 
noted, the combinations of capital that individuals hold across times and contexts should be 
expected to vary. This suggests that, whilst it might be expected that those with higher 
occupational status acquaintances and those with lower occupational status acquaintances 
form separate groups, the precise nature and number of those groups cannot be specified 
theoretically. 
In light of the above, and again mirroring Bourdieu’s own use of multiple 
correspondence analysis to map the distribution of capitals in the population, the factors 
underpinning the occupational statuses of respondents’ acquaintances were established 
through exploratory factor analysis.347 The analysis revealed a clear distinction between 
acquaintance with people in professional and higher managerial occupations, and acquaintance 
with people in other occupations. Of particular interest is whether acquaintance with high 
status individuals is related to political participation, so only the former factor and its strongest 
indicators are included in the full model, which also has the benefit of minimising the already 
large number of variables and factors. This means that acquaintance with people in technical 
professions (B = 0.698, p = 0.000), traditional professions (B = 0.646, p = 0.000), and senior 
management positions (B = 0.612, p = 0.000) are included in the model as indicators of a 
general tendency to know people in high status occupations. 
 The strength of social relationships in terms of the things that can be expected of 
acquaintances is also important, and respondents were asked about thirteen types of help that 
they might have received from five different groups of people. There are a number of 
contending expectations that might be held about the loading of the answers onto latent factors. 
First, it may be that help received is underpinned by latent factors relating to the types of help, 
                                                     
345 Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, pp. 241-258. 
346 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328. 
347 Bourdieu, Distinction, pp. 339-342.  
167 
 
meaning that respondents who have received a particular type of help from one source are also 
likely to have received it from other sources. Second, it may be that help received is shaped 
primarily by the groups who offer it, so that respondents who receive one type of help from a 
given group are also more likely to receive other types of help from that group. Third, it may 
be that different forms of help are received from different groups so that, for instance, 
respondents rely on family for childcare and financial help, friends for crisis support and help 
with moving house, and family friends for help with applying for work and provision of 
references. 
 
 
Diagram 5.6. Section of the Full Model Encompassing Factors 
Relating to the Five Types of Social Capital 
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The above alternative possibilities, and associated uncertainty regarding how factors 
should be specified, mean that the latent factors relating to help received were also established 
with exploratory factor analysis. The analysis revealed a clear tendency, with some exceptions, 
for help to be received on a group by group basis rather than by type. Within that tendency 
there are also some types of help that are most strongly associated with each group, but the 
overall picture is one in which reliance on a group for one type of help is related to reliance on 
that group for other types of help as well. With this in mind, a simpler confirmatory model 
positing two factors relating to help received from family friends and help received from 
partners, family, and friends was tested. This model was found to have adequate fit and allows 
for the distinction between the effect of help received from loose and close networks whilst 
minimising the number of factors and indicators to be included in the full model. Problems 
with empty cells were encountered in relation to the binary indicators of help received that had 
the strongest loadings in the confirmatory models and, as such, some alternative indicators are 
included in the final model. Thus, the latent factor relating to help received from family friends 
is most strongly indicated by the receipt of help with writing a C.V. (B = 0.598, p = 0.000), 
then by having received a loan in an emergency (B = 0.442), and finally by having had a good 
word put in with a potential employer on one’s behalf (B = 0.387, p = 0.000). The indicators 
of help received from close social networks relate to career advice received from a partner (B 
= 0.796, p = 0.000), family contacting potential employers on one’s behalf (B = 0.527, p = 
0.000), and friends contacting potential employers on one’s behalf (B = 0.461, p = 0.000). The 
final model, then, includes five factors relating to social capital, and specifically to the number 
of friends, the diversity of friends, acquaintance with people who have high occupational 
status, help received from family friends (loose social networks), and help received from 
family, friends, and partners (close social networks). As with cultural capital the particular 
shape that they take, for instance the differentiation between help from close and loose social 
networks, is the results of the exploratory approach, which has nonetheless produced 
theoretically sensible factors. Thus, they account for, the extent of social networks, their nature 
in terms of who is known, and the strength of the relationships with those people. 
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  As always, the distributions of the factors are important. Starting with the number of 
friends that respondents report having, Chart 5.22 shows that the distribution of factors scores 
is relatively low and wide. Chart 5.23 then shows a markedly different distribution for the 
factor representing diversity of friends, with the prevalence of negative scores reflecting the 
fact that a small number of respondents report having diverse networks on all three measures 
(sex, ethnicity, and religion). More respondents report acquaintance with individuals in high 
status occupations and this is reflected in Chart 5.24, which shows an approximately normal 
distribution of factor scores that tend to be positive. This is, in turn, different from the 
distributions of the factors representing help received from close and loose social network, 
which are shown in charts 5.25 and 5.26. These indicate that both distributions are tend 
towards negative values, reflecting the low number of respondents who report receiving a great 
deal of help from their social networks. Overall, and as observed in the previous sections, these 
factors display ample variation to be included in the analysis of the influences on political 
participation and, again, are only sometimes normally distributed. 
 With the distributions of the factors outlined a final consideration is the associations 
between them, and Table 5.25 presents the bivariate correlations of the social capital factors. 
These show that number of friends appears to be a central factor, and is positively and 
significantly associated with all of the others except help from loose networks. Indeed, the 
latter factor is only correlated with receipt of help from close networks and, similarly, diversity 
of friends is only correlated with number of friends. Thus, having more friends is associated 
with also having a more diverse social network, knowing more people with high occupational 
status, and receiving help from friends and family. The latter two factors are also correlated, 
indicating that those who inhabit high status networks are also more likely to receive help from 
those with whom they are most closely acquainted. 
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Chart 5.22. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Number of Friends 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.23. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Diversity of Friends 
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Chart 5.24. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Acquaintance with High Status Individuals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5.25. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Help Received from Close Social Networks 
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Chart 5.26. Histogram of the Factor Scores for 
Help Received from Loose Social Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.25. Bivariate Correlations of the Social Capital Factors 
 
 
Number of 
Friends 
Diversity 
of Friends 
High Status 
Acquaintances 
Help from 
Close 
Networks 
Help from  
Loose 
Networks 
Number of Friends 1.000     
Diversity of Friends 0.093** 1.000    
High Status Acquaintances 0.317*** 0.070 1.000   
Help from Close Networks 0.237*** 0.061348 0.239*** 1.000  
Help from Loose Networks 0.137 0.172349 -0.005 0.369*** 1.000 
 
 
To summarise in relation to all three forms of capital, the distributions of the factors 
underpinning them vary not only between forms but also between types within those forms. 
Most respondents have modest or middling amounts of economic capital, and this is reflected 
                                                     
348 Identification issues were encountered resulting from the different distributions and values of the factor scores, based on the 
contrast between the interval and binary variables that load onto them, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five social 
capital factors were correlated. 
349 Identification issues were encountered resulting from the different distributions and values of the factor scores, based on the 
contrast between the interval and binary variables that load onto them, so the cited figure is from a model in which all five social 
capital factors were correlated. 
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in the distribution of the factor scores.350 Cultural capital is widespread, though notably more 
respondents engage in consumption-based cultural activities and visits to cultural venues than 
in trips to see performances, and the factor score distributions reflect this distinction. Further, 
respondents clearly distinguish between the types of film that they watch, and the factors 
relating to educational, family, and blockbuster films have notably different distributions. This 
is also the case in relation to the factors encompassing bass and sample heavy music, and 
legitimate tastes. The relationships between the factors suggest a level of omnivorousness, 
with respondents happy to maintain both legitimate and other cultural capital. However, there 
is a limit to that omnivorousness, as indicated by the opposition between attendance at 
legitimate performance, blockbuster movies and bass and sample heavy music. Turning to 
social capital, distinct factors relating to number and diversity of friends, with notably different 
distributions, are observed as expected. The distribution of the factor relating to high status 
acquaintances respondents indicates the preponderance of such social connections whilst, by 
contrast, the factor distributions associated with help received from close and loose social 
networks indicate that such help is not widespread. The social capital factors are more 
consistently positively associated than are those relating to cultural capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
350 See Appendix D for the charts showing the distributions of factors not presented in the chapter. 
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Background, Demographics, and Basic Beliefs: 
The indicators of gender, ethnicity, disability, and relationship status are included in 
the model directly so the first latent factor relating to background is parental social class. This 
concept is indicated by both parental education and occupation, with the strongest indicator of 
being father’s education (B = 0.804, p = 0.000), followed by mother’s education (B = 0.731, 
p = 0.000). Parental occupational status is a weaker but still significant indicator of parental 
social class, with father’s occupational status (B = 0.472, p = 0.000) being stronger than 
mother’s occupational status (B = 0.338, p = 0.000). Moving from background characteristics 
to behaviour that is likely to emerge during early and formative years, religious activity is 
indicated by religious volunteering (B = 0.964, p = 0.000), donating (B = 0.941, p = 0.000), 
and service attendance (B = 0.884, p = 0.000). 
Like religious beliefs, respondents’ ideological dispositions are considered to be what 
Bem referred to as first- or second-order beliefs.351 That is to say that they are defined relatively 
early in life, and probably a reflection of the ideas expressed by parents during the respondents’ 
childhood years. Whether those ideas were accepted or rejected, the consequent ideological 
dispositions of respondents are likely to have solidified during their formative years. It is 
possible that these dispositions influence the perception of privilege that is one of the focuses 
of the current research, so it is important to measure them. The results confirm the expectation 
that left-right position and social authoritarianism are separate, and the former is most strongly 
indicated by the belief that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor (B = 0.833, p 
= 0.000). The belief that big business takes advantage of ordinary people (B = 0.720, p = 0.000) 
and the belief that management will always try to take advantage of employees (B = 0.719, p 
= 0.000) are also strong indicators of the position. In the indicators higher values indicate 
agreement with left-wing statement, so high factor scores in this case indicate a left-wing 
ideological position. By contrast, the widespread agreement with authoritarian social 
                                                     
351 Bem, Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs, pp. 6-7, pp. 10-11. 
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statements means that high factor scores in this case are indicative of an underlying socially 
authoritarian position. The indicators of this factor are support for stiffer sentences for 
criminals (B = 0.776, p = 0.000) and the use of the death penalty in some circumstances (B = 
0.774, p = 0.000), whilst support for schools teaching children to respect authority is a weaker 
but still significant indicator (B = 0.423, p = 0.000) of the factor. 
 The bulk of formal education also takes place during formative years and is thus 
attained relatively early in people’s lives, meaning that it is considered at the beginning of the 
model. Both age of leaving education (B = 0.507, p = 0.000) and educational level (B = 0.500, 
p = 0.000) have moderate and significant loadings onto the education factor. Relatedly, 
occupational status is indicated by social grade (B = 0.636, p = 0.000), type of work (B = 
0.619), and responsibilities at work (B = 0.276, p = 0.000). To summarise, the expected latent 
factors encompassing respondents’ background characteristics, demographics, and basic 
beliefs are confirmed by the analysis. Namely, in addition to the single indicators of age, sex, 
ethnicity, disability, and relationship status, there are factors relating to parental social class, 
religious activity, left-wing views and social authoritarianism, education, and occupational 
status. 
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Old and New Factors: 
The variables that load onto the factors outlined in the model have limited 
comparability with external data. However, the factors that underpin them reflect factors that 
have been observed in previous research, or conform to expectations stemming from previous 
research and theory. Summarising the shape of the factors that have been identified through 
confirmatory and exploratory analysis, the dependent concept is measured by three latent 
factors that encompass the individualised, collective, and contacting forms of participation 
observed in previous research. Individualised political participation is the most widespread 
form, followed by the contacting and collective forms, and they are all significantly and 
positively correlated. Political engagement is measured by four factors covering perceived 
engagement, knowledge of national politics, and external efficacy and internal efficacy, with 
the final factor encompassing recruitment to political and civil society groups by close social 
networks. Respondents tend to perceive themselves as politically engaged and to hold high 
levels of knowledge of politics but this does not translate into high levels of either internal or 
external efficacy, whilst recruitment from close social networks is moderately common. The 
engagement factors tend to be positively correlated, with the notable exception of political 
knowledge and recruitment, which suggests that politically engaged individuals tend to 
channel their energies into one or the other. 
Perception of privilege is found, as posited, to be measured separately by factors 
relating to self-perceived status, explanations for status differences in society, and 
explanations for one’s own status. Respondents tend to perceive their own status as middling-
to-high, and perceptions of the importance of individual-orientated explanations for status are 
higher in relation to the self than society at large. Separate factors relate to the perception that 
those who are involved in politics are more privileged than one’s self and society, and that 
they are different, with the former more widespread than the latter. The factors relating to 
perception of privilege tend to be positively correlated but there are initial signs of the 
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‘fundamental attribution error’ in the opposite effects of self-perceived status on explanations 
for status difference in society and for one’s own status. 
There are low-to-moderate levels of economic capital amongst respondents, and the 
concept is also indicated by a single factor underpinning income, assets, and property 
ownership. Cultural capital is measured by nine factors, the first four of which cover the 
frequency of activities relating to work-based civic skills, attendance at cultural performances, 
visits to cultural institutions, and consumption-orientated pastimes. Civic skills are widespread 
but infrequently exercised by respondents, whilst attendance at cultural performances is 
generally less widespread and frequent than visits to cultural institutions and consumption-
orientated activities. The next four factors relate to cultural tastes, and specifically to 
tendencies to watch family–friendly films, blockbusters, and educational or informative films, 
and the tendency to listen to bass and sample heavy music. Most of the film genres are watched 
by large minorities of respondents, whilst the preference for bass and sample heavy music is 
held by a smaller minority. The final factor encompasses legitimate cultural tastes in terms of 
film, radio, and dining, which are amongst the least widespread types of cultural capital. The 
correlations between the cultural capital factors are generally positive, and indicate a limited 
level of omnivorousness that does not overcome the opposition between attendance at 
legitimate cultural performances and preferences for blockbuster movies and bass and sample 
heavy music. 
Social capital is measured by five factors relating to number of friends, diversity of 
friends, acquaintance with high status individuals, and receipt of help from family friends and 
close social networks. Respondents tend to have moderate numbers of friends and low-to-
moderate levels of diversity in their friendship groups. At the same time, considerable numbers 
of respondents are acquainted with high status individuals, but few have received help from 
family friends or close social networks. These factors are more consistently positively 
correlated than their cultural capital counterparts, and none of them are in opposition to each 
other. 
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Background characteristics that are generally measured by single indicators, though 
there is a single factor relating to parental social class that underpins their occupational statuses 
and educational levels. A single factor also underpins religious activity, which is taken to 
reflect the importance of religion in respondents’ lives. Further factors underpin left-right 
position and authoritarian social views, and respondents tend to hold left- rather than right-
wing and authoritarian rather than liberal social views. Respondents also tend to have higher 
levels of education and, relatedly, to occupy higher occupational status positions, with each of 
those concepts measured by a separate factor.  The factors from parental social class to 
economic capital, and from political engagement to participation, were tested with 
confirmatory analysis and generally found to match theoretical expectations as well as 
previous empirical work. The remaining factors relate to the core concepts of cultural and 
social capital, and perception of privilege. They were identified through exploratory analysis 
in line with Bourdieu’s analytical approach, and because the broad theoretical expectations 
relating to these concepts did not specify the particular shape of factors or, necessarily, all of 
the indicators that should load onto them. 
The emerging factors are in line with broad theoretical expectations but also reveal 
patterns that were not expected, such as the separation of cultural capital relating to 
performances and visits to institutions, the particular film and musical tastes observed, and the 
differentiation of help received on the basis of the groups from which it is received rather than 
by type. Thus, the measurement component of the full model confirms the form of commonly 
measured concepts relating to background and political engagement and participation, whilst 
at the same time offering new insight into the associations between types of cultural and social 
capital, and supporting the posited components of perception of privilege. The volume and 
types of capital held are posited to be a key means by which background characteristics are 
transformed into different behaviour, in this case relating to political participation. The 
perceptual components of the model are then posited to mediate this effect, so that it is not 
only the capital that individuals hold but also how they see themselves and their place in 
society that affects their political participation. The fact that many of the identified factors are 
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similar to those observed in previous research, or conform to expectations stemming from 
theory or past research, suggests their reliability and external validity. Notably, there are 
decent levels of variation in the factors, and the factor score distributions themselves are rather 
varied in form. This means that the structural relationships between the factor scores can be 
meaningfully analysed. It is to that task, and thus the testing of causal hypotheses of this 
research, that the next chapter turns. 
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Chapter Six: The Impact of Capital and Perceptions on Political Participation 
 
From Hypotheses to Relationships: 
 Having outlined the factors underpinning the variables representing the concepts of 
interest, this chapter analyses the relationships between them. This analysis is conducted in 
pursuit of an answer to the overarching research question: how do structural and perceived 
privilege impact on individual political participation in the United Kingdom? A model will be 
tested that embodies a proposed causal process leading from background characteristics to 
capital profiles and then through perception of privilege to political engagement and thence 
behaviour. In the hypothesised model, each of the stages in that causal process is multifaceted, 
with different background characteristics impacting on the capital profiles that are the 
manifestation of the workings of structural privilege. Each form of capital then impacts on 
perceptions in its own right, and those perceptions are multifaceted and interrelated. 
Perceptions then impact on psychological engagement with, and the beliefs about, politics that 
immediately precede recruitment to and participation in political activity. 
 The exploratory analysis of the factors underpinning the types of cultural and social 
capital in the previous chapter was in line with Bourdieu’s own use of multiple correspondence 
analysis, which mapped how the forms and types of capital were related to each other. This 
chapter departs from that approach by positing causal links, whereas Bourdieu would consider 
both capital and political activity to be manifestations of class position.352 As outlined 
previously, however, this research considers the forms of capital to stem from a range of 
background characteristics rather than just class, and to function as a means by which those 
background characteristics become associated with different behaviour. This raises the 
possibility that people with the same class background may have quite distinct capital profiles 
due to other influences in their lives, in line with previous research findings.353 Those capital 
                                                     
352 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 104. 
353 Bennett et al., Class, Culture, Distinction, p. 214, pp. 234-235. 
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profiles, a manifestation of structural privilege, may then promote engagement with the 
political arena, or disengagement from it. This will be at least in part due to how the political 
arena is perceived, which is posited to relate to the capital one holds. The proposal of the 
centrality of Bourdieu’s forms of capital within a causal process that expands the Civic 
Voluntarism Model is the first key contribution of this research. The second is its proposal of 
the mediation of the effect of structural privilege by perceived privilege. Such perception is 
related, at its core, to society and the self but it also includes elements relating to politics 
specifically. The inclusion of these multiple elements allow the model to consider how 
understandings and beliefs about the world and one’s place within it play a part in transforming 
structural influences into different behaviour relating to politics. 
 Despite the multiple elements of each stage of the causal process, and the large number 
of potential relationships between them, the theories that underpin the model produce a number 
of clear hypotheses. The chapter begins by specifying those hypotheses and linking them to 
the previously outlined theory. This is followed by the analysis of the structural relationships 
between the factors, which allows for the majority of the hypotheses to be tested. The 
applicability of the full model is considered in relation to the three forms of political 
participation identified in the last chapter; individualised, contacting, and collective. 
Specifically, the chapter begins by identifying the factors that directly influence those forms 
of political activity, and then works backwards through the model from there, considering the 
influences on political engagement, perception of privilege and, last, the forms of capital. Each 
of those sections is considering one part of the overarching model, which is analysed in 
sections to aid analysis. However, the separate consideration of the causal steps in the model 
does not allow complete interpretation of the effects of each key factor. As such, after 
considering the sections of the full model, the chapter turns to consider the total effects of each 
factor, whether direct or indirect, on the political activity factors. The chapter then addresses 
the proposed highly interactive nature of the elements of perception of privilege by presenting 
a separate interaction analysis of the effects of those elements. Having reviewed the structure 
of the full model, the total effects of the factors, and the supplemental interaction analysis, the 
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chapter concludes by noting the strong, direct, and positive effect of cultural capital, and 
especially legitimate cultural capital, on political activity. This appears to be the main route 
via which education impacts on political participation, and the identification of the importance 
of cultural capital is the first main finding of the research. 
The second main finding is that consistent perception of privilege keeps more forms 
of political activity open to people than adherence to the fundamental attribution error that is 
commonly associated with system justifying beliefs. Thus, seeing others and one’s self as 
influenced by privilege enables participation in both self-motivated and socially-orientated 
political activity, whilst seeing others as the beneficiaries of privilege that has not helped one’s 
self turns people away from the latter type of political participation. This effect is 
complemented by stronger influence of social capital on socially-orientated participation, with 
diverse, loose, but strong networks promoting that kind of activity. These findings generally 
support the causal hypotheses outlined below, although there are unanticipated direct effects 
in the model. Nevertheless, the overall picture is one in which background characteristics 
impact on capital profiles, embodying structural privilege, that then shape political 
engagement and activity directly and via perception of privilege. 
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Specifying Effects and Causal Paths: 
Given that the posited causal process has multiple stages and multiple factors at each 
stage there are a large number of hypotheses that could be specified. However, this research is 
primarily concerned with the impact of structural privilege, embodied in the forms of capital, 
and the elements of perception of privilege on political participation. As such, the focus of the 
specified hypotheses is on those relationships, and the first stems from Bourdieu’s widely 
tested claim that volume of capital reflects social position and influences behavioural 
repertoires.354 Applying that idea in the context of the current research, we should expect to 
see volume of capital enabling a greater range of behaviour, and thus that it should be 
positively related to political participation: 
 Hypothesis 1: The volume of economic, social, and cultural capital is positively 
related to political participation. 
 Of course, Bourdieu also argues that there is competition, particularly in the cultural 
domain, over what constitutes legitimate capital.355 It is assumed that economic capital (i.e. 
income and wealth) is exempt from this observation in the sense that it is only its volume, 
rather than its type, that is important in defining social position. By contrast, differences 
between the types of social and, especially, cultural capital are of great importance because 
type is related to value. Thus, it is supposed that legitimate cultural capital is of higher value 
than other cultural capital, and thus enables one to engage in a wider range of contexts and 
activities, including politically: 
 Hypothesis 2: Legitimate cultural capital is more strongly related to political 
participation than are other forms of cultural capital. 
                                                     
354 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 199, pp. 91-92; Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: Music in 
England’, pp. 1-19; Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘Social Stratification and Cultural Consumption: The visual arts in England’, pp. 168-
190; and Chan and Goldthorpe, ‘The Social Stratification of Theatre, Dance, and Cinema Attendance’, pp. 193-212; Bennett et 
al., Culture, Class, Distinction. 
355 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 93, p. 250, pp. 327-328, p. 134, p. 147, p. 149, pp. 176-177, p. 196, p. 218, p. 220, p. 231, p. 246, p. 
273, p. 311, p. 395, pp. 450-451. 
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Turning to social capital, and again drawing on Bourdieu, connections with higher 
status individuals are assumed to be of higher value than are connections with lower status 
individuals.356 Further, the strength of social connections is important; there is more value in 
knowing someone from whom one can request help and assistance than in knowing someone 
only to exchange pleasantries with. These observations imply that knowing higher status 
individuals, and being able to ask for help or assistance from acquaintances, raises one’s 
capacity to engage in a range of behaviour, including political participation: 
 Hypothesis 3a: Being acquainted with high status individuals is positively related to 
political participation; 
 Hypothesis 3b: Receipt of help from acquaintances is positively related to political 
participation. 
 Moving beyond structural privilege to account for the impact of perceived privilege, 
the first concept of interest is self-perceived status. Drawing on self-perception theory it is 
assumed that assessment of one’s own status is based on indicators that could also be used by 
others to make a similar external appraisal.357 However, because the indicators that are used 
by each individual will differ, the effects of self-perceived status will vary across individuals. 
Nevertheless, in reflecting meaningful indicators of status at some point in life, self-perceived 
status is considered to reflect elements of status in the structural hierarchy. If this is so, and 
bearing in mind the observation that high status is associated with better performance in a 
range of contexts,358 we should expect that perceiving one’s own status as high enables one to 
engage in a broader repertoire of behaviour, including in relation to politics: 
 Hypothesis 4a: Self-perceived status is positively related to political participation. 
 The two further components of perception of privilege relate to explanations for the 
statuses that people attain, in the first instance in society at large. The interest here is in the 
extent to which individuals endorse explanations for status inequality in society that are 
                                                     
356 Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’, pp. 241-258. 
357 Bem, Attitudes, and Human Affairs, pp. 48-53. 
358 Wilkinson and Pickett, The Spirit Level, pp. 36-39; O'Brien and Major, 'Group Status and Feelings of Personal Entitlement', 
pp. 427-439, pp. 429-430; Turner and Reynolds, 'Self-Categorization Theory', p. 410; Hardin, Cheung, Magee, Noel, and 
Yoshimura, ‘Interpersonal Foundations or Ideological Thinking’, pp. 132-159, pp. 136-137. 
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predicated on some idea of privilege, which are posited to exclude other explanations based 
on ideas such as hard work or chance. To the extent that individuals adhere to such privilege-
orientated explanations it is possible to suppose competing plausible effects on political 
participation. It may be that a belief in the power of background and structural inequality to 
shape people’s lives, in identifying an external locus of control, is demotivating and leads to a 
conclusion along the lines of ‘what difference can I make?’ Alternatively, perceiving that such 
a system produces inequality may prompt individuals to challenge or endorse it depending on 
their normative position regarding its legitimacy. In other words, identifying some external 
system that has important implications for social outcomes may prompt a desire to exercise 
some influence over that system and its associated power. This possibility fits with the 
proposed opposition of perception of privilege to system justifying beliefs, which has been 
shown to be related to lower levels of political participation.359 As such, it is considered more 
likely that perception of the role of privilege in society is linked to higher levels of political 
participation: 
 Hypothesis 4b: Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society is 
positively related to political participation. 
 Of course, the explanations that individuals provide for differential status attainment 
in society may differ from the explanations that they apply to their own status. Thus, the third 
component of perception of privilege centres on the extent to which individuals apply 
explanations related to privilege to their own status. Again, the identification of an external 
reason for one’s own status may be demotivating, or alternatively may prompt action to 
challenge or defend the systems that influenced it. As with perception of privilege in society, 
the latter possibility is considered more likely because it fits with the opposition between 
perception of privilege and system justifying beliefs. So, all other things being equal: 
 Hypothesis 4c: Perception of the role of privilege in defining status in one’s own life 
is positively related to political participation. 
                                                     
359 Hafer and Choma, 'Belief in a Just World, Perceived Fairness, and Justification of the Status Quo', pp. 107-119, p. 109. 
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Moving one step closer to political participation itself, people may also perceive the 
role of privilege in the political domain. Such domain-specific perceptions are considered 
subsequent to more general and personal perceptions of the role of structural privilege in 
society and one’s own life but, clearly, they may be an important influence on political 
participation. Further to the above ideas, it is likely that viewing those who are involved in 
politics as different from and more privileged than one’s self will reduce the sense that politics 
is a domain in which one can function: 
 Hypothesis 5a: Perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics from 
one’s self is negatively related to political participation; 
 Hypothesis 5b: Perception of the privilege of those who are involved in politics is 
negatively related to political participation. 
Beyond their main effects, the elements of perception of privilege are expected to be 
related to one another and, crucially, to be interactive in their effects on political participation. 
Most importantly, explanations for one’s own status relate to the self so it is likely that they 
interact with self-perceived status. It may be the case that, counter to the prevailing main effect, 
those with particularly low self-perceived status have a sense of grievance resulting from the 
recognition that their status is a result of structural privilege, whilst those with high self-
perceived status have no such sense of grievance.360 Thus, the positive effect of perceiving the 
role of privilege in one’s own life would be expected to be stronger amongst low status than 
those with high status. Alternatively, perception of the role of privilege in one’s life could 
interact with self-perceived status to impact on the sense that one has the right, and is qualified, 
to participate in politics. This would suggest that low status will weaken the positive effect of 
perceiving the role of privilege in one’s own life. 
Going one step further, and extending the logic, perception of privilege in one’s life 
may exaggerate the existing effects of low and high self-perceived status. Thus, those who 
perceive their status as low would have their already low political participation further reduced 
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188 
 
by viewing society’s deck as being stacked against them. By contrast, those who perceive their 
status as high are likely to have their high political participation exaggerated by an 
understanding that society is set up to benefit them. In light of the previously hypothesised 
negative impact of low self-perceived status on the capacity to participate in politics, it is 
considered likely that the further challenge presented to the self by an understanding that one’s 
position is externally defined will exaggerate rather than moderate that effect. Similarly, it is 
considered likely that the participatory dividend of high self-perceived status will be magnified 
by the understanding the society works in one’s favour, rather than dampened by it. 
 Hypothesis 6a: Perception of the role of privilege in one’s own life interacts with self-
perceived status to exaggerate the low and high participatory tendencies amongst those with 
low and high self-perceived status. 
 By contrast, the above explanations are not expected to apply to the much less personal 
explanations for status differences in society at large. Thus, with explanations for one’s own 
status from explanations for society at large separated from each other it is not expected that 
the effect of the latter will be affected by one’s self-perceived status: 
 Hypothesis 6b: Perception of the role of privilege in society does not interact with 
self-perceived status in its effect on political participation.  
 The above is the only relationship between elements of the perception of privilege that 
is expected not to be interactive and the direction of the effect of perception of own privilege 
is expected to be opposite depending on perception of societal privilege. Respondents with 
high perception of societal privilege but low perception of their own privilege manifest the 
fundamental attribution error and have the sense that social structure benefits others but has 
not helped them, which is expected to be alienating.361 Respondents who perceive the role of 
privilege in both society and their own lives have consistent social structure-based 
explanations for status, avoid the fundamental attribution error, and have reason to want to 
influence that structure. Respondents with low perception of privilege in society and their own 
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lives apply consistent non-social structure based explanations for status that neither strongly 
promote nor undermine participation. Last, respondents who consider their status to be the 
result of social-structure but do not apply this explanation to society at large are expected to 
participate more than those subscribing to the fundamental attribution error, and the lines 
should cross. Thus, for those with high perception of privilege in society, perception of own 
privilege has a positive effect, whilst for those with low perception of privilege in society it 
has a negative effect: 
Hypothesis 6c: Perception of the role of privilege in one’s own life interacts with 
perception of the role of privilege in society to have a positive effect where the latter is high 
but a negative effect where it is low. 
 Moving onto perceptions relating to those who are politically active, the negative 
effects of both the perception that they are different and that they are privileged are expected 
to be weaker for those with high status. This is because those with low status are considered 
likely to perceive a greater threat from the difference or privilege of politically active people 
and thus disengage from politics to a greater extent, with higher status insuring against this: 
 Hypothesis 6d: Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active 
people interact with self-perceived status to have stronger effects amongst those with low 
status. 
 By contrast to the above, the negative effect of perceiving the difference and privilege 
of politically active people is expected to be stronger for those with high perception of the role 
of privilege in society. This is because the perceived difference is likely not to be considered 
a quirk of character but rather a result of social structure that has benefited some, such as the 
politically active, but not others: 
 Hypothesis 6e: Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active 
people interact with perception of the role of privilege in society to have stronger effects 
amongst those who explain status in society on the basis of social structure. 
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Similarly, recognising the role of social structure in one’s own status may imply the 
application of such explanations to the difference and privilege of those who are politically 
active, making them a social other rather than merely individually different: 
Hypothesis 6f: Perception of both the difference and privilege of politically active 
people interact with perception of the role of privilege one’s own life to have stronger effects 
amongst those who explain their status on the basis of social structure. 
 Finally, the effects of perceiving the difference and privilege of politically active 
people are expected to interact positively because seeing both a general gap between one’s self 
and politically active people, and also one based on privilege should exaggerate the negative 
effect of each: 
Hypothesis 6g: Perception of the difference of politically active people impacts 
positively with perception of the privilege of politically active people to increase its negative 
effect. 
 For the sake of ease of interpretation, the hypothesised interaction relationships are 
represented in charts 6.1 to 6.7 below. Charts 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 illustrate the hypothesised 
interactions between perception of the difference of politically active people and the other 
more fundamental elements of perception of privilege. However, those hypotheses apply 
equally to the interactions between perception of the privilege of politically active people and 
the other elements of perception of privilege, so the charts can be read as such. 
The order in which the above hypotheses are presented reflects the overarching causal 
process running from background characteristics through capital profiles and perception of 
privilege to political participation. That causal process suggests that whilst it is possible to 
observe the relationships between each of the variables of interest and political participation, 
those relationships will function through other concepts. Thus, a causal order is expected to be 
observed in the model testing the impact of the above concepts on political participation: 
 Hypothesis 7a: Levels of capital impact on political participation primarily via 
perception of privilege rather than directly; 
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Chart 6.1. Hypothesised Interaction 
between Perceptions of Own Status 
and Societal Privilege 
Chart 6.2. Hypothesised Interaction 
between Perceptions of Own Status 
and Own Privilege 
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Chart 6.5. Hypothesised Interaction 
between Perceptions of Societal Privilege 
and the Difference of Politically Active 
People 
Chart 6.6. Hypothesised Interaction 
between Perceptions of Own Privilege and 
the 
Difference of Politically Active People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.7. Hypothesised Interaction between 
Perceptions of the Difference and the 
Privilege of Politically Active People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 7b: Perception of privilege impacts on political participation primarily 
via political engagement rather than directly. 
 Together, the above eighteen hypotheses outline not only the expected impact of each 
concept of interest on political participation, but also the causal paths by which those effects 
are expected to travel. As noted when outlining the analytical approach in the previous chapter, 
the need to consider not only effects but also causal paths informed the choice of structural 
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equation modelling as the means by which to test the above hypotheses. The result of adopting 
this approach is a large model that includes factors representing each of the steps in the causal 
process. Each of those factors has multiple indicators, as well as structural loadings onto other 
factors in the model. As such, and as can be seen in Diagram 6.1 (which presents only the 
structural loadings in the model, excluding the measurement loadings for ease of presentation), 
the model is large and contains multiple loadings linking factors within and across the causal 
steps. Thus, for ease of interpretation, it is sensible to consider the model section by section 
rather than in its entirety, and this is the approach that is adopted in the following sections of 
the chapter. The next section will consider the direct effects on the dependent factors relating 
to individualised, contacting, and collective activity, which is to say their direct structural 
loadings onto preceding factors in the model. The subsequent sections will then apply the same 
approach, working backwards through the full model, considering the direct effects on political 
engagement, perception of privilege, and the forms of capital.  Each of those sections, it must 
be remembered, is presenting part of the full model rather than a separate analysis. So, factors 
that appear as independent in one section are the same factors that are dependent in another 
section. All of these links can be seen in Diagram 6.1 overleaf, and it can be seen that the 
standardised loadings in the full model are identical to those presented in the subsequent 
sections of the chapter, which consider it in causal steps working back from the dependent 
political participation factors. 
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Direct Effects on Political Participation: 
The first thing to consider before proceeding to interpret the loadings in the full model 
is the extent to which it fits the data. The Chi-square statistic of 10511.302 is very large and 
highly significant (p = 0.000) but, as noted in Chapter Four, this reflects the complexity of the 
model and the size of the sample, which magnifies each of the minor discrepancies between 
the hypothesised model and the observed relationships in the data. Thus, it is more useful to 
refer to the CFI (0.903) and TLI (0.900) statistics, which indicate that the model has adequate 
fit, whilst the RMSEA (0.023) figure suggests good fit. Combined, they indicate that the model 
fits the data to an acceptable degree, so it is reasonable to interpret the results. Before turning 
to the factors that influence political participation it is worth noting that the model does a good 
job of accounting for the variation in the three dependent factors. The adjusted R2 figure for 
individualised political participation is 0.471, whilst it is 0.505 for contacting political activity, 
and 0.516 for collective activity.362 Thus, the model accounts for around half of the variation 
in all forms of political activity, taking into account the large number of factors that precede 
them in the model. These results have been cross-validated by splitting the sample into random 
halves, fitting the model to the first half of the data (CFI = 0.904, TLI = 0.901, RMSE = 0.023, 
individualised activities adjusted R2 =  0.435, contacting activities adjusted R2 = 0.422, 
collective activities adjusted R2 = 0.400) and then applying the parameter estimates from that 
model to the second half of the data, which results in a model with approximately equivalent 
fit (CFI = 0.898, TLI = 0.905, RMSEA = 0.021,  individualised activities adjusted R2 =  0.538, 
contacting activities adjusted R2 = 0.552, collective activities adjusted R2 = 0.572).363 With the 
fit of the model validated it is reasonable for the chapter to proceed with consideration of the 
factors that impact on political participation. 
                                                     
362 These figures do not differ greatly from the unadjusted R2 numbers, which are 0.484, 0.517, and 0.528 respectively. Thus the 
good job that the model does in accounting for the variation in the dependent factors does not appear to be a consequence of the 
large number of preceding factors that are included. 
363 Model fit results for the cross-validated models, compared with the full model, are available in Appendix F. 
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Diagram 6.1. Full Structural Equation Model 
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Table 6.1. Glossary of Factor and Indicator Names in the Full Model 
 
Name Description 
Age Interval indicator of age 
Autho.  Factor encompassing authoritarian social views 
Block. F. Factor encompassing preferences for blockbuster films 
Civ. Ski. Factor encompassing work-based civic skills 
Close Factor encompassing help received from close social networks 
Collect. Factor encompassing collective political activities 
Consum. Factor encompassing consumption-orientated cultural activities 
Contact. Factor encompassing contacting political activities 
Disabil. Binary indicator of disability having a large daily impact 
Divers. Factor encompassing diversity of friends 
Econ. Factor encompassing economic capital 
Edu F. Factor encompassing preferences for educational films 
Educ. Factor encompassing education 
Ext. Effic. Factor encompassing external efficacy 
Fam. F. Factor encompassing preferences for family-friendly films 
Female Binary indicator of female gender 
Friends Factor encompassing number of friends 
High Stat. Factor encompassing acquaintance with people in high status occupations 
Ind. Priv. Factor encompassing perception of own privilege  
Indiv. Factor encompassing individualised political activities 
Int. Effic. Factor encompassing internal efficacy 
Left W. Factor encompassing left-wing views 
Legit. Factor encompassing legitimate cultural tastes 
Loose Factor encompassing help received from loose social networks 
Occup. Factor encompassing occupational status 
P. Class Factor encompassing parental social class 
Perc. Eng. Factor encompassing perceived engagement with politics 
Perform. Factor encompassing attendance at legitimate cultural performances 
Pol. Diff. Factor encompassing perception of the difference of politically active people 
Pol. Kno. Factor encompassing national political knowledge 
Pol. Pri. Factor encompassing perception of the privilege of politically active people 
Recruit. Factor encompassing recruitment requests received 
Relate. Binary indicator of relationship status 
Relig. Factor encompassing religious activities 
Sample M. Factor encompassing preferences for bass and sample heavy music 
Soc. Priv. Factor encompassing perception of privilege in society 
Status Factor encompassing self-perceived privilege 
Trust. Interval indicator of generalised trust  
Visits Factor encompassing visits to legitimate cultural institutions 
Whi. Bri. Binary indicator of White British ethnicity 
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 Recruitment by close social networks impacts positively on the three types of political 
activity, and its effect is the strongest or second strongest in all cases. It has a notably stronger 
effect on collective activity (B = 0.506, p = 0.000) than on contacting (B = 0.465, p = 0.000) 
and especially individualised (B = 0.306, p = 0.000) activity, which reflects the extent to which 
social interaction is involved in each of those types of activity. In other words, it takes large 
amounts of coordination, involving numerous requests and reminders, to arrange collective 
political activities and, to a lesser extent, campaigns centred on contacting relevant political 
figures or bodies. By contrast, whilst individualised activity can clearly be prompted by 
requests from close acquaintances, it is also possible to undertake such activity without the 
need for input from others. This is reflected by the fact that individualised activity is influenced 
more strongly, and again positively, by perceived engagement with politics (B = 0.326, p = 
0.000) than by recruitment requests from close social networks. Perceived engagement then 
has the second strongest effect (B = 0.297, p = 0.000) on contacting activity but is not 
significantly related to collective political activity. Thus, the importance positive effects of 
recruitment and political interest identified by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, are replicated in 
this model.364 Further, there is an inverse relationship between the importance of recruitment 
and perceived engagement in influencing political participation depending on the extent to 
which the activity is social. In other words, as the form of activity entails greater interaction 
and coordination with others recruitment becomes more important than self-motivation as 
embodied in a perceived engagement with politics. 
 Crossing this boundary between more and less socially embedded political activity is 
the strong and positive effect of visits to cultural institutions on collective (B = 0.304, p = 
0.000) and individualised (B = 0.236, p = 0.000) political activity. This is the first structural 
loading with direct relevance to the hypotheses and, in support of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 
2 but contra Hypothesis 7a, suggests that cultural capital has an important direct effect on 
political participation. This does not function through recruitment so it is not because holding 
                                                     
364 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 389. 
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that type of cultural capital indicates qualification to participate to potential recruiters in close 
social networks. Intriguingly, it also does not function through perceptions or the efficacy 
component of engagement, so it does not apparently give people a sense that they are qualified 
to participate. Two possible explanations relating to a participatory disposition and insulation 
against social discomfort may help understand this effect. The first of those explanations 
suggests that some people are disposed to be generally active and thus to undertake visits to 
cultural institutions as well as political activity, perhaps because they have more energy or 
time, were socialised to actively engage with a range of contexts from a young age, or have 
psychological characteristics leading them to seek active engagement with those contexts. 
Although the famed ‘big five’ psychological characteristics were not measured in the 
survey for reasons of space, the active disposition explanation is undermined by the fact that 
only one form of cultural activity is closely related to political activity.365 Were people to have 
a general active disposition then we would expect to see similar direct effects of attendance at 
cultural performances and engagement in consumption-orientated activities. Instead, it is only 
engagement with cultural institutions such as museums, art galleries, and historic buildings 
that is closely related to individualised and collective political activity. This suggests the 
sustainability of the second explanation, centred on the idea that individuals with particular 
types of cultural capital are insulated from the discomfort of not conforming to the norms of a 
particular social context. In other words, having the cultural capital associated with visiting 
legitimate cultural institutions reduces the likelihood that one will encounter cues that one does 
not ‘belong’ in the political context. This idea is supported by the factor’s stronger relationship 
with collective participation, which is engaged in socially, than individualised participation. 
Crucially, not encountering cues that prompt social discomfort would not necessarily be 
expected to work through perception of privilege or sense of efficacy because it is an implicit 
rather than explicit affirmation that one can function in a range of contexts including the 
political one. So, the sense that one does not fit into the context is more likely to be activated 
                                                     
365 Alan S. Gerber, Gregory A. Huber, David Doherty, Conor M. Dowling, and Chang E. Ha, ‘Personality and Political Attitudes: 
Relationships across Issue Domains and Political Contexts’, American Political Science Review, Vol. 104, No. 1 (Feb., 2010), 
pp. 111-133. 
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for those without the requisite capital profiles and thus to make them less likely to participate, 
though it does not appear to manifest in perception of privilege. Of course, without variables 
measuring how comfortable people feel in different contexts, including political ones, this 
explanation remains speculative. 
The sense that the political system can be influenced by one’s self has a stronger 
relationship with contacting activity (B = 0.234, p = 0.000) than with collective (B = 0.180, p 
= 0.000) or individualised (B = 0.105, p = 0.000) participation. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
internal efficacy is an important positive influence on all three forms of participation, as was 
observed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady.366 Relatedly, the perception that those who are 
involved in politics are different from one’s self is the final factor that influences 
individualised political participation (B = 0.205, p = 0.000). The effect is stronger than that of 
internal efficacy, and its positive nature runs counter to Hypothesis 5a. This suggests that, 
taking into account all of the other factors in the model, perception of the difference of 
politically engaged people prompts participation, perhaps due to a sense of grievance. The idea 
that this effect is due to grievance is supported by the fact that it drives individualised political 
activity that do not entail engagement with the very people who are seen as different. In other 
words, all else being equal, a sense of difference from politically active people appears to drive 
those who wish to engage with politics to do so as outsiders. This is the last direct effect on 
political activity, and complements the previously observed effects of internal efficacy, visits 
to cultural institutions, perceived engagement with politics and, most strongly, recruitment by 
close social networks. These effects are all shown in Diagram 6.2, which shows the section of 
the full model encompassing the direct effects on the three dependent factors. The ovals 
represent factors but the indicators that load onto them are removed for simplicity. Thus all of 
the arrows indicate structural rather than measurement loadings, with the associated figures 
being standardised. As in the previous chapter, the figures to the right of the dependent factors 
are the residual variances, and the arrows that link them indicate their correlations. Together, 
                                                     
366 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, p. 389. 
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these results affirm Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s observation that political engagement and 
recruitment are crucial promoters of participation. At the same time, they indicate the 
importance of cultural capital and perceptions in facilitating and motivating that participation. 
These initial findings are supported further by the results indicating the influences on the 
factors that impact directly on participatory activity, the most important of which is 
recruitment. 
 
 
Diagram 6.2. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors with Direct Effects on the Forms of Political Activity 
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Direct Effects on Recruitment and Engagement: 
Recruitment to political groups is most strongly influenced by perceived engagement 
with politics (B = 0.573, p = 0.000), suggesting that requests to get involved are targeted at 
those who are known to be politically minded by members of their close social networks. By 
contrast with this strong positive effect, there is an almost equally strong negative effect of 
political knowledge (B = -0.506, p = 0.000). This result should be interpreted in the context of 
all the other factors that are included in the model, and it can be seen that social and, through 
political interest, cultural factors are what prompt recruitment requests. By contrast, national 
political knowledge is held by those who do not see themselves a privileged but observe a high 
level of privilege in politics, and it thus appears to be a refuge for politically interested people 
who are disengaged from recruitment networks. Alternatively, perhaps focusing one’s energy 
on knowing about the national political arena detaches one somewhat from the close social 
networks through which recruitment percolates, and in which knowledge of key political 
figures may be unimportant. The negative effect of political knowledge on recruitment is 
counteracted by the positive effects of diversity of friends (B = 0.409, p = 0.000) and religious 
activity (B = 0.397, p = 0.000). So, having friends from different ethnicities, religions, and 
genders may indicate membership of more social networks, and networks with more diverse 
interests, resulting in more requests to get involved in a range of different activities, including 
political ones. The effect of religious activity affirms Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s finding 
that religious involvement leads to recruitment to political causes, though in a different country 
at a different time.367 Thus, a combination of perceived engagement, diverse acquaintances, 
and religious activity promote recruitment to political activity, whilst high levels of knowledge 
of politics depress it. 
A further explanation for the negative effect of political knowledge on recruitment 
presents itself when the factors that influence the former are considered. Perceived political 
                                                     
367 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality, pp. 432-437. 
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engagement is strongly associated with higher levels of knowledge (B = 0.608, p = 0.000) 
whilst perception that those who are involved in politics are privileged is also positively related 
to it (B = 0.141, p = 0.000). At the same time, perception of the role of privilege in influencing 
one’s own status is negatively associated with political knowledge (B = -0.291, p = 0.000). 
Thus, the people who are most knowledgeable about politics tend to perceive themselves as 
politically engaged but see those who get involved as the beneficiaries of privilege that they, 
themselves, have not had access too. The strong positive influence of perceived engagement 
on both knowledge and recruitment, and the negative relationship between the latter two 
concepts, suggests that those who are disposed towards politics tend to channel their 
engagement into knowledge or engagement with social networks that recruit political activity, 
but not both. Crucially, part of the reason for focusing on knowledge rather than social 
engagement is the view that one is less privileged than those who are involved in politics, and 
indeed that one’s own status is not due to privilege. This suggests a sense that one is less able 
to engage with political networks despite one’s interest in the topic. 
The most important influence on internal efficacy is external efficacy (B = 0.446, p = 
0.000), and a sense that the political system is open to influence by citizens tends to increase 
the sense that one can exercise influence in that system (relative to others). Authoritarian social 
views have a negative effect on internal efficacy (B = -0.184, p = 0.000), which may be because 
two of the three authoritarian social views indicate opposition with current practice 
(specifically, the belief in the appropriateness of the death penalty in some cases, and in the 
need for stricter sentencing), perhaps prompting a sense of being overlooked by the political 
system. By contrast, legitimate cultural tastes have a positive effect on internal efficacy (B = 
0.173, p = 0.000) that is almost as strong as the negative effect of authoritarian social views. 
Thus, enjoying things such as listening to BBC Radio 3, eating at bistros, and watching foreign 
and art-house films increases the sense that one can exercise influence in the current political 
system. Indeed, this effect is also observed in relation to external efficacy (B = 0.175, p = 
0.000), so legitimate cultural tastes impact on internal efficacy both directly and indirectly. 
This suggests that those who hold forms of cultural capital that are generally designated as 
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legitimate are able to sustain a sense that societal systems work for them and thus that they are 
able to engage with them. This is strongly linked to Bourdieu’s observation that part of what 
facilitates engagement with politics is the sense of entitlement to do so that flows from one’s 
social position.368 That sense is undermined, by the perception that those who are politically 
involved are more privileged than one’s self and society (B = -0.322, p = 0.000). Given the 
direct and positive effect of internal efficacy on all three forms of political participation these 
effects are only one or two steps removed from the dependent factors. Thus, they provide 
further evidence that legitimate cultural capital supports political participation, and the first 
evidence that perception of the privilege of those who are involved in politics depresses such 
activity. As such, they support Hypothesis 1, Hypothesis 2, and Hypothesis 7b. 
A further affirmation of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 is provided in the strong 
positive influence of legitimate cultural tastes on perceived political engagement (B = 0.558, 
p = 0.000).  In fact, cultural capital is by far the most important influence on perceived 
engagement, with preferences for bass and sample heavy music (B = -0.315, p = 0.000) and 
family films (B = -0.131, p = 0.000) having negative effects whilst a preference for educational 
and informative films (B = 0.179, p = 0.000) has a positive effect. Together, these relationships 
offer a partial endorsement of Hypothesis 1 in the sense that the volume of cultural capital is 
a positive influence on a key determinant of political activity. However, that positive effect is 
limited to legitimate cultural capital whilst other types are negatively associated with perceived 
engagement with politics. This suggests that Hypothesis 2 should have suggested that the 
positive influence of legitimate cultural capital stands in contrast to the negative influence of 
other types. The importance of the association between cultural capital and perceived political 
engagement is further underlined by the fact that the former accounts for four of the five 
significant influences on the latter. The remaining influence is perception of the role of 
privilege in defining status in society at large (B = 0.234, p = 0.000). The positive nature of 
the relationship supports Hypothesis 4a and suggests that perception of the role of privilege in 
                                                     
368 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 419, pp. 413-414, pp. 343-344. 
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society is, indeed, opposed to system justifying beliefs in their negative effect on political 
participation, though the effect is indirect. These results are all shown in Diagram 6.3 below, 
which presents the relevant section of the full model. 
 
 
Diagram 6.3. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors with Direct Effects on Political Engagement and Recruitment 
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Direct Effects on Perception of Privilege: 
The perception that privilege plays a part in defining status differences in society has 
strong positive effects on the perception that those who are involved in politics are more 
privileged than one’s self and society at large (B = 0.568, p = 0.000), and that they are different 
from one’s self (B = 0.557, p = 0.000). This supports the idea that general explanations for 
status differences in society are central to individuals and thus influence their perceptions of 
the social positions of specific groups such as politicians. Authoritarian social views are also 
found to be positively related to perceptions of the privilege (B = 0.170, p = 0.000) and 
difference (B = 0.341, p = 0.000) of those who are involved in politics. This effect is countered 
by that of self-perceived status on perception of the difference of those who are politically 
involved (B = -0.158, p = 0.000), which indicates that those who believe their status to be high 
tend to consider themselves less different from politically involved people. This effect does 
not apply to perception of the privilege of politically active people, which is influenced instead 
by help received by loose social networks (B -0.326, p = 0.000). Being part of a social network 
in which family friends can provide important forms of help and support may reduce the sense 
that other groups are more privileged than one’s self, and certainly does so in relation those 
who are politically active. 
The preceding has shown privilege-based explanations for status difference in society 
to be an important influence on perceptions of those who are politically active and on 
perception of own engagement with politics. The most important factor that influences such 
explanations for status difference in society is left-right position (B = 0.663, p = 0.000) and 
the positive relationship indicates that it is left-wing views that promote those explanations. 
This effect stands in opposition to that of self-perceived status (B = -0.396, p = 0.000), and 
those who view their own status as high are less likely than others to attribute status difference 
in society to privilege. There is also a role for both cultural and social capital in promoting 
perception of privilege in society, with a preference for blockbuster films (B = 0.249, p = 
0.000) and higher numbers of friends (B = 0.175, p = 0.000) both associated with that 
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perception. The first of those relationships indicates that a taste for elements of popular culture 
heightens the sense that there are privileged-based divides in societal status, and thus provides 
evidence in support of Hypothesis 7a. This is also the case in relation to the impact of number 
of friends, and the positive effect reflects the observation that expansive but close social 
networks tend to be an important part of less privileged communities.369 Overall, then, the 
people who are most likely to attribute status difference in society to privilege are left-wing, 
view themselves as low status, and enjoy elements of popular culture whilst having expansive 
social networks. These factors are distinct from those that impact on individuals’ explanations 
for their own status in society, and perception of privilege in society is not significantly related 
to perception of privilege in one’s own life. 
The endorsement of privileged-based explanations for one’s own status is related to 
only two factors, the first of which is receipt of help from family friends (B = 0.433, p = 0.000). 
Thus, the ability to rely on help from loose social networks at key junctures in one’s life 
promotes recognition of the influence of social factors on status attainment. This is important 
because one of the key indicators of social status, occupational status, is negatively related to 
recognition of the role of privilege in influencing one’s status (B = -0.352, p = 0.000). This 
again suggests the relevance of the fundamental attribution error, with those who have attained 
high status endorsing individual rather than social explanations for their status. The larger 
effect of help from family friends than occupational status implies that people who attain high 
status but do so with the help of loose social networks are, on balance, more likely to recognise 
the role of privilege in explaining their status. This effect is complemented by a similar one 
relating to the final component of perception of privilege, self-perceived status. 
Receipt of help from family friends is the strongest influence on self-perceived status 
(B = 0.521, p = 0.000) and promotes a greater sense of high status than the more prevalent 
metric of social status, economic capital (B = 0.318, p = 0.000). Indeed, another element of 
social capital in the form of help received from close social networks also has a stronger effect 
                                                     
369 Phil Cohen, ‘Subcultural conflict and working-class community’, in Hall, Culture, Media, Language, pp. 78-87; Power and 
Willmot, 'Social Capital Within the Neighbourhood'. 
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on self-perceived status (B = -0.382, p = 0.000) than economic capital, albeit a negative one. 
This presents a situation in which the effect of help received on self-perceived status is 
contingent on who that help is received from. If your relatives know people who can relied on 
to provide help at key junctures then one’s own status tends to be seen as higher, whereas 
reliance on family, friends, and partners for such help depresses the sense that one has high 
status. The latter form of help is received significantly more by people who are acquainted 
with high status individuals, as will be detailed below, and the negative effect on self-perceived 
status suggests that receipt of help from friends and family within high status networks is 
treated as indicative of relatively low status by those who have received it. Additionally, 
turning to cultural capital, a preference for educational and informative films depresses one’s 
self-perceived status (B = -0.269, p = 0.000), and it may be the case that information about a 
range of topics promotes understanding of the full range of social status and lowers one’s sense 
of status within that range. Nevertheless, it is clearly social capital, and specifically, the 
strength and nature of one’s social networks, that most importantly define one’s sense of status, 
with economic capital also being more important that cultural capital. Again, this provides 
evidence of support of Hypothesis 7a, with the effects of the forms of capital on political 
participation passing through perception of privilege, at least in part. The above outlined 
results are all displayed in Diagram 6.4 below, which again shows the relevant section of the 
full model. 
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Diagram 6.4. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors with Direct Effects on the Perception of Privilege 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Econ. Cap. 
Loose Help 
Educ. Films 
Left-Right 
Status 
Priv. in Soc. 
Own Priv. 
Pol. Diff. 
Pol. Priv. 
Blockbusters 
No. of Friends 
Occu. Status 
Soc. Autho. 
Close Help 
.663 
.249 
.275 
-.326 
-.269 
.341 .170 
-.352 
.521 
.318 
-.382 
.730 
.443 
.462 
.433 
-.158 
-.396 
.568 
.281 
.580 .557 
209 
 
 
 
Direct Effects on Capital: 
Social capital largely has its roots in occupational status, education, and background 
characteristics, though the influence of these factors runs through some forms of social capital 
to others. That said, age is a strong direct influence on receipt of help from both family friends 
and close social networks, and reduces the level of help received in both instances 
(respectively, B = -0.415 and B = - 0.534, whilst p = 0.000 in both cases). This suggests that 
older people have either been less reliant on such help in recent years and thus report lower 
levels, which is a lifecycle effect, or that help received from such groups was less important at 
key junctures in their lives than it is or has been for younger people, which is a generational 
effect. In addition, as noted previously, acquaintance with people in high status occupations 
has a positive influence on receipt of help from close social networks (B = 0.367, p = 0.000), 
so people are more likely to receive help from friends and family if they inhabit high status 
social networks. For help received from wider social networks, namely family friends, it is not 
the status of those wo are known but the cultural context that one inhabits that is important. 
Specifically, this is the only point in the model where a significant effect of attendance at 
legitimate cultural performances (B = 0.533, p = 0.000) is observed. 
Acquaintance with high status individuals is positively influenced by education (B = 
0.589, p = 0.000) and economic capital (B = 0.309, p = 0.000). These effects mean suggest 
that acquaintance with people who hold high occupational statuses stems from the social 
milieu associated with higher levels of education and by the economic capacity to sustain those 
networks, rather than from having a similar occupational status to them. However, 
occupational status is important in its effect on diversity of friends, which is strong and 
negative (B = -0.513, p = 0.000), and may speak of the continued disproportionate 
representation of white men in high status occupations. However, the positive effect of work-
based civic skills (B = 0.475, p = 0.000), which are themselves positively influenced by 
occupational status (B = 0.452, p = 0.000), attenuates this direct effect. This suggests that there 
are certain kinds of high status jobs that entail the use of transferable soft skills, and it is this 
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sub-set of jobs that is associated with greater diversity of friends despite the overall negative 
effect of high occupational status. These effects are all stronger than the negative impact of 
being White British on diversity of friends (B = -0.417, p = 0.000), though it is still strong. 
Thus, unsurprisingly, those who are in the majority ethnic group in the country are less likely 
to have friends from minority ethnic groups than vice versa, and also less likely to have diverse 
friends in terms of religion and sex. Counter to this tendency, educational settings may be 
populated with people from diverse backgrounds and enable people to make acquaintances 
outside their usual social networks, leading education to be positively related to diversity of 
friends (B = 0.196, p = 0.002). 
Finally, in terms of social capital, number of friends is also positively, but weakly, 
influenced by education (B = 0.098, p = 0.012), which is likely to be for similar reasons to 
those just outlined. Much stronger is the positive effect of consumption-orientated cultural 
activities (B = 0.314, p = 0.000), which implies that this widespread form of cultural capital is 
important in sustaining larger social networks. Indeed, one of the indicators of the factor 
specifies that the activity (eating out) is undertaken with others, whilst the other two are usually 
(visiting pubs) or often (shopping for pleasure) associated with socialising. Thus consumption-
orientated cultural capital is both popular and social in nature. Religious activity is also social 
and is thus positively related to number of friends (B = 0.234, p = 0.000), implying the presence 
of religious friendship groups from which the higher number of recruitment requests 
associated with religious activity may stem. The direct effects on social capital are displayed 
in Diagram 6.5, which shows the relevant section of the full model. 
Moving on to cultural capital, by far the most important influence is education, which 
has a positive effect on work-based civic skills (B = 0.280, p = 0.000) alongside the previously 
mentioned impact of occupational status, which is itself heavily influenced by education (B = 
0.587, p = 0.000). Higher levels of education are associated with a preference for educational 
and informative films (B = 0.294, p = 0.000) and very strongly with legitimate cultural tastes 
(B = 0.832, p = 0.000), as well as with visits to legitimate cultural institutions (B = 0.792, p = 
0.000) and attendance at legitimate cultural performances (B = 0.753, p = 0.000). Age and 
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gender are also important influences on cultural tastes, though not on the frequency of cultural 
activities. Age is positively related to a preference for educational and informative films (B = 
0.240, p = 0.000) but negatively related to tastes for blockbuster films (B = -0.216, p = 0.000) 
and especially bass and sample heavy music (B = -0.628, p = 0.00). As observed in relation to 
the impact of age on help received from close and loose social networks, these may be akin to 
either generational or lifecycle effects. So, it may be that older people avoid modern 
blockbuster films and bass and sample heavy music because they 
 
Diagram 6.5. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors with Direct Effects on Social Capital 
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are unfamiliar, which would be a generational effect. Alternatively, it may be that older people 
prefer calming rather than loud or explosive forms of entertainment, meaning that their 
rejection of the preceding cultural forms would be a lifecycle effect. Similarly, women’s 
preference for family-friendly films (B = 0.456, p = 0.000) over blockbuster movies (B = -
0.228, p = 0.000) may indicate tastes stemming from socialisation, akin to a generational 
effect. Alternatively, they may reflect the need to watch certain types of film when caring for 
children, a task that still falls disproportionately to women, which is close to being a lifecycle 
effect. 
An additional influence on cultural tastes is left-wing views, which are positively 
associated with bass and sample heavy music (B = 0.157, p = 0.000). Thus, it is not only the 
case that cultural capital aids participation in politics but also that political views can influence 
the types of culture that one consumes. Extending this point, it may be the case that such 
musical tastes express an affiliation with a particular young and left-wing political subculture. 
Such a subculture is distinct from the widespread consumption-orientated activities that 
constitute the final element of cultural capital, and that are positively related to acquaintance 
with high status individuals (B = 0.493, p = 0.000). The previously observed influence of such 
cultural activities on number of friends suggests an important nexus between particular types 
of social and cultural capital in which acquaintance with high status people prompts the 
consumption-orientated activities that sustain larger social networks. That nexus is influenced 
indirectly by education through its positive influence on acquaintance with high status 
individuals, and this emphasises the overall importance of education in influencing cultural 
capital. It is especially important in imbuing people with legitimate forms of cultural capital, 
in terms of their tastes and activities, whilst tastes that are not elevated to the status of 
legitimate tend to have their roots in background characteristics rather than education. The 
influences on cultural capital can be seen in Diagram 6.6, which presents the relevant section 
of the full model. 
Education is thus a means by which capital can be transmitted, not only in the sense 
that it teaches and accredits knowledge and skills but also because such knowledge and skills 
213 
 
 
enable the attainment of other forms of capital. The formalised element of education opens 
career paths that deliver greater economic capital and access to wider, more diverse, and higher 
status social networks. At the same time, both formally and informally, education imbues 
people with the knowledge and skills to inhabit those social networks and, crucially, to 
accumulate the legitimate cultural capital that facilitates engagement with further contexts. Of 
particular interest is the ability to participate in political contexts, which the results presented 
thus far have shown to be contingent not only on education but also the other forms of capital 
that it can translate into. This may help explain why rising levels of 
 
Diagram 6.6. Section of the Full Model Encompassing 
Factors with Direct Effects on Cultural Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education 
Female 
High Status 
Educ. Films 
Family Films 
Legit. Perform. 
Blockbusters 
Consumption 
Legit. Visits 
Legit. Tastes 
Age 
Left-Right 
Sample Music 
.240 
-.628 
.753 
.792 
.294 
-.216 
.493 
.308 
.862 
.564 
-.228 
.832 
.792 
.898 
.157 
.456 
.373 
.433 
.757 
214 
 
 
education have not delivered the expected participatory dividend. So, the frequently observed 
role of education in enabling political engagement and activity is confirmed at the same time 
as it is revealed to be an incomplete explanation. Education facilitates participation through its 
impact on other forms of capital, and thus acts only as the first part of a mechanism that 
recreates structural privilege. Crucially, perception of privilege also partially mediates the 
effect of structural privilege on political participation, demonstrating the need to account not 
only for the capital available to individuals but also how they perceive themselves and society. 
Summarising the results presented thus far, recruitment is important in activating all 
three types political participation, but less so in relation to the contacting and individualised 
activity that may be undertaken independently of others. In turn, those forms are more 
dependent on whether the individual perceives themselves to be engaged with politics, which 
is not important for collective participation. These findings, along with the positive effect of 
internal efficacy on all three forms of participation, affirm Verba, Schlozman, and Brady’s 
findings. The Civic Voluntarism Model, however, does not tell the whole story, as the direct, 
strong, and positive effect of legitimate cultural capital on individualised and collective 
political activity demonstrates. Legitimate cultural capital also plays a key role in shaping the 
engagement factors that influence participation, impacting positively on internal efficacy, 
external efficacy, and perceived engagement with politics. The latter factor is almost entirely 
defined by the cultural capital that one possesses, with the strong positive effect of legitimate 
tastes opposed by the negative effects of cultural tastes that are not elevated to a position of 
legitimacy. 
The engagement factors are also influenced by perception of privilege, with such 
explanations for status differences in society contributing to perceived political engagement. 
Further, perception of the privilege of those involved in politics reduces external efficacy but, 
along with the perception that one’s own status is not the result of privilege, promotes political 
knowledge. The negative relationship between political knowledge and recruitment indicates 
that perception of privilege in politics channels those who perceive themselves as politically 
engaged towards knowledge rather than links with social networks that recruit to political 
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activity. This tendency is also reflected in the promotion of individualised political activity by 
perception of the difference of those who are involved in politics, which indicates that those 
who see themselves as politically engaged but also different from politically active people seek 
forms of activity that do not require contact with those people. Thus, elements of cultural 
capital and perception of privilege impact directly on political activity and indirectly via their 
impact on the political engagement. These relationships offer partial evidence relating to the 
hypotheses outlined at the beginning of the chapter. However, in order to fully confirm or 
dismiss those hypotheses it is necessary to consider the total effects of each of the key factors 
in the model on the forms of political activity, as well as the interactions between some of 
them. Fortunately, Mplus allows the calculation of both the direct and indirect effects of each 
factor in a model on the dependent factors, and it is to these results that the chapter now turns. 
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Total Effects, Interactions, and Support for Hypotheses: 
The total effects of the key variables in the full model are presented below in relation 
to individualised, contacting, and collective activity in tables 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4. All three tables 
have ranked the factors by the size of their total effects, whether direct or indirect. The factor 
with the strongest total effect on both contacting and collective political activity is recruitment 
requests (respectively, B = 0.465 and B = 0.506, and p = 0.000 in both cases), and it is the 
third most important influence on individualised activity (B = 0.306, p = 0.000), with all of 
those effects being direct. The effects of education are entirely indirect but it is the most 
important influence on individualised activity (B = 0.440, p = 0.000), the second most 
important influence on collective activity (B = 0.479, p = 0.000), and the third most important 
influence on contacting activity (B = 0.392, p = 0.000). Perceived political engagement 
completes the top three factors influencing both individualised (B = 0.407, p = 0.000) and 
contacting (B = 0.421, p = 0.000) activity, with the effects being direct. The third most 
important influence on collective political activity is the direct effect of visits to legitimate 
cultural institutions (B = 0.304, p = 0.000), which is also the fifth most important factor for 
individualised activity (B = 0.236, p = 0.000). That direct effect is complemented by the 
indirect effect of legitimate cultural tastes on individualised activity (B = 0.254, p = 0.000), 
and those tastes are also the fourth most important influence on contacting activity (B = 0.294, 
p = 0.000). The negative indirect effect of political knowledge is the fifth strongest for 
contacting activity (B = -0.235, p = 0.000), and fourth for collective activity (B = -0.256, p = 
0.000), whilst diversity of friends is the fifth most important influence on the latter form of 
activity (B = 0.207, p = 0.000).  
The strong effect of cultural capital places it alongside established factors such as 
education, recruitment, and perceived engagement as one of the most important influences on 
political activity. Cultural factors make up two of the top five influences on individualised 
activity, and are also amongst the top five influences on contacting and collective activity. The 
effects of the elements of cultural capital on the forms of participation are shown in  
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Table 6.2. Total Effects of Key Factors on Individualised Political Activity 
 
Factor 
Total 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Significance 
Indirect 
Significance 
Education 0.440 0.440 0.000 0.000 
Perceived Political Engagement 0.407 0.081 0.000 0.000 
Recruitment 0.306 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Legitimate Cultural Tastes 0.254 0.254 0.000 0.000 
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.236 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors 0.205 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Perception of Privilege in Society 0.188 0.188 0.000 0.000 
National Political Knowledge -0.155 -0.155 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music -0.128 -0.128 0.000 0.000 
Diversity of Friends 0.125 0.125 0.000 0.000 
Self-Perceived Status -0.107 -0.107 0.000 0.000 
External Efficacy 0.105 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Preference for Educational and Informative Films 0.102 0.102 0.000 0.000 
Occupational Status -0.101 -0.101 0.000 0.000 
Economic Capital -0.061 -0.061 0.000 0.000 
Work-Based Civic Skills 0.059 0.059 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Blockbuster Movies 0.047 0.047 0.000 0.000 
Perception of Own Privilege 0.045 0.045 0.000 0.000 
Partner, Friends, and Family Support 0.041 0.041 0.000 0.000 
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors -0.037 -0.037 0.000 0.000 
Number of Friends 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.000 
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.000 
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities 0.010 0.010 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Family-Friendly Films -0.053 -0.053 0.003 0.003 
External Efficacy 0.047 0.047 0.003 0.003 
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances -0.013 -0.013 0.083 0.083 
Family Friend Support -0.024 -0.024 0.090 0.090 
 
 
charts 6.8, 6.9, and 6.10, which include the 95% confidence intervals around the Beta 
estimates. The charts utilise the same scale to aid comparison and clearly demonstrate the 
importance of certain types of legitimate cultural capital, with either legitimate tastes or trips 
to legitimate venues being the most important cultural factor in all cases. Further, they are the 
two most important cultural influences on both individualised and collective political activity, 
so only contacting activity has a different factor in its top two most important cultural 
influences in the form of the negative effect of bass and sample heavy music. Generally, 
however, the effects of both legitimate tastes and visits to legitimate venues are notably 
stronger than those of other cultural factors. Indeed, the generally weak effects of attendance 
at legitimate performances and moderate effects of preferences for educational 
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Table 6.3. Total Effects of Key Factors on Contacting Political Activity 
 
Factor 
Total 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Significance 
Indirect 
Significance 
Recruitment 0.465 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Perceived Political Engagement 0.421 0.124 0.000 0.000 
Education 0.392 0.392 0.000 0.000 
Legitimate Cultural Tastes 0.294 0.294 0.000 0.000 
National Political Knowledge -0.235 -0.235 0.000 0.000 
Internal Efficacy 0.234 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Diversity of Friends 0.190 0.190 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music -0.132 -0.132 0.000 0.000 
External Efficacy 0.104 0.104 0.000 0.000 
Work-Based Civic Skills 0.090 0.090 0.000 0.000 
Occupational Status -0.090 -0.090 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Educational and Informative Films 0.082 0.082 0.000 0.000 
Perception of Own Privilege 0.068 0.068 0.000 0.000 
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors -0.067 -0.067 0.000 0.000 
Perception of Privilege in Society 0.060 0.060 0.003 0.003 
Preference for Family-Friendly Films -0.055 -0.055 0.003 0.003 
Family Friend Support 0.039 0.039 0.005 0.005 
Self-Perceived Status -0.024 -0.024 0.005 0.005 
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances 0.021 0.021 0.009 0.009 
Preference for Blockbuster Movies 0.015 0.015 0.009 0.009 
Partner, Friends, and Family Support 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.011 
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.012 
Number of Friends 0.011 0.011 0.017 0.017 
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities 0.003 0.003 0.021 0.021 
Economic Capital -0.012 -0.012 0.055 0.055 
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors 0.000 0.000 N/A. N/A. 
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.000 0.000 N/A. N/A. 
 
 
films demonstrate that all types of legitimate cultural capital are not equal in their capacity to 
facilitate political activity. This observation also applies to other types of cultural capital, with 
the negative effects of preferences for bass and sample heavy music consistently stronger than 
the negative effects of preferences for family-friendly films. Those effects are, in turn, notably 
stronger than the positive effects of preferences for blockbuster films and the consistently weak 
effects of consumption-based cultural activities. Thus, in addition to demonstrating the 
importance of cultural capital, especially in its legitimate form, this analysis also shows that 
the particular type of cultural capital matters in terms of capacity to facilitate political activity. 
Moving from cultural to social capital, the total effects tables show the positive effects 
of being acquainted with high status individuals on individualised and contacting 
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Table 6.4. Total Effects of Key Factors on Collective Political Activity 
 
Factor 
Total 
Effect 
Indirect 
Effect 
Total 
Significance 
Indirect 
Significance 
Recruitment 0.506 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Education 0.479 0.479 0.000 0.000 
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.304 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
National Political Knowledge -0.256 -0.256 0.000 0.000 
Diversity of Friends 0.207 0.207 0.000 0.000 
Internal Efficacy 0.180 0.000 0.000 N/A. 
Perceived Political Engagement 0.134 0.134 0.000 0.000 
Legitimate Cultural Tastes 0.120 0.120 0.000 0.000 
Work-Based Civic Skills 0.098 0.098 0.000 0.000 
Occupational Status -0.085 -0.085 0.000 0.000 
External Efficacy 0.080 0.080 0.000 0.000 
Perception of Own Privilege 0.074 0.074 0.000 0.000 
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors -0.062 -0.062 0.000 0.000 
Family Friend Support 0.053 0.053 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music -0.042 -0.042 0.000 0.000 
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances 0.028 0.028 0.000 0.000 
Preference for Educational and Informative Films 0.024 0.024 0.001 0.001 
Preference for Family-Friendly Films -0.018 -0.018 0.005 0.005 
Economic Capital 0.003 0.003 0.316 0.316 
Self-Perceived Status 0.001 0.001 0.727 0.727 
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances 0.000 0.000 0.727 0.727 
Perception of Privilege in Society -0.004 -0.004 0.728 0.728 
Partner, Friends, and Family Support -0.001 -0.001 0.728 0.728 
Number of Friends -0.001 -0.001 0.729 0.729 
Preference for Blockbuster Movies -0.001 -0.001 0.729 0.729 
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities 0.000 0.000 0.729 0.729 
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors 0.000 0.000 N/A. N/A. 
 
 
political activity, offering partial support for Hypothesis 3a. They also show that help from 
close social networks promotes self-motivated political activity, whilst help from looser social 
networks promotes socially-orientated political activity, which supports Hypothesis 3b. In line 
with Hypothesis 7a these effects run through elements of perception of privilege, and suggest 
a distinction between more and less socially orientated forms of political participation. Indeed, 
it is clear that collective activity is the most contingent on social connections, with diversity 
of friends amongst its most important influences alongside group recruitment. By contrast, 
individualised activity is the least contingent on social connections and is instead more 
strongly influenced by perceived engagement. Thus, if political activity is arranged along a 
continuum according to how much interaction with others it entails then  
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Chart 6.8. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Individualised Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.9. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Contacting Political Activity 
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Chart 6.10. Total Effects of the Types of Cultural Capital on Collective Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
there is an inverse relationship between the importance of social factors and self-motivation 
as the continuum is travelled along. This continuum is also important in understanding the 
impact of perception of privilege, which is a more important influence on individualised 
activity than on contacting or collective activities. This is particularly so in relation to self-
perceived status, perception of the role of privilege in defining status in society, and perception 
of the difference of those who are involved in politics, all of which have a much larger effects 
on individualised activity than on contacting or collective activities. This can be seen in charts 
6.11, 6.12, and 6.14, which along with charts 6.13 and 6.15 clearly demonstrate the importance 
of perception of privilege in influencing the type of participation that is engaged in. The charts 
have the same scale to aid comparison and each one shows the effect, with 95% confidence 
intervals, of a different component of perception of privilege on the three forms of political 
activity, and the importance of differentiating social from non-social activity is apparent. 
Self-perceived status has a strong negative effect on individualised activity, less so on 
contacting activity, and has no significant effect on collective activity. Thus, those who 
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consider their status to be high are notably disinclined to undertake non-social activity but not 
social activity. This is mirrored by the effect of perceiving the role of privilege in defining 
status in society, which is strongly positively related to individualised activity, less so to 
contacting activity, and not significantly to collective activity. Thus, whereas high self- 
 
Chart 6.11. Total Effects of Self-Perceived 
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Chart 6.12. Total Effects of Perception 
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Types of Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 6.13. Total Effects of Perception of 
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Chart 6.14. Total Effects of Perception of 
the Difference of Politically Active People 
on the Types of Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CollectiveContacting
Individualised
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Collective Contacting
Individualised
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Collective
Contacting
Individualised
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Collective
Contacting
Individualised
-0.15 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
223 
 
 
 
Chart 6.15. Total Effects of Perception of the Privilege of 
Politically Active People on the Types of Political Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
perceived status channels people away from non-social political activity, high perception of 
the role of privilege in society channels people towards such activities. This is also the case 
with perception of the difference of politically active people, which has a strong positive effect 
on individualised activity but no significant effect on contacting or collective activities. 
Similar patterns are also observed in relation to perception of the role of one’s own privilege, 
which has a stronger positive effect on social than non-social forms of participation, and 
perception of the privilege of politically active people, which has a slightly stronger negative 
effect on social than non-social activities, with those effects in line with Hypothesis 5b. These 
latter two patterns, however, are not significant in terms of the difference between the size of 
the effects. So, self-perceived status, perception of privilege in society, and perception of the 
difference of politically active people are more important than perception of own privilege or 
perception of the privilege of politically active people in influencing the social or non-social 
nature of political activity that people undertake.370 
 Beyond their total effects, the elements of perception of privilege were hypothesised 
to be highly interactive in their effect on political participation. To address those hypotheses, 
a supplemental analysis was conducted in which the factor scores from the full structural 
                                                     
370 The total effects of cultural capital and perception of privilege are similar to those observed when the political participation 
factors are loaded directly onto them in bivariate regressions, as shown in Appendix I.  
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equation model were saved and used in a path analysis including interaction terms, which was 
conducted using Stata. This method of analysis was chosen because the additional complexity 
of adding interaction terms to the full model caused identification problems. As such, 
conducting a path analysis using saved factor scores is considered a close enough reproduction 
of the full model for the results to allow reasonable conclusions to be made about the 
hypothesised effects of the interactions.371 In line with Hypothesis 7b the effects of perception 
of privilege, and the interactions related to its elements, were expected to pass through the 
political engagement factors. However, the full structural equation model demonstrated that 
individualised political activity loads directly onto perception of the difference of politically 
active people, so the effects of the interaction terms associated with that relationship were also 
tested. Indeed, the results of the full model were used to identify possible paths for the effects 
of interaction terms, which were only tested where a main effect of one of the elements of 
perception of privilege was observed. In that light, the effects of interactions relating to the 
following main effects were tested: 
1. The previously mentioned positive main effect of perception of the difference of 
politically active people on individualised political activity; 
2. The negative main effect of perception of the privilege of politically active people on 
external efficacy; 
3. The positive main effect of perception of the privilege of politically active people on 
national political knowledge; 
4. The negative main effect of perception of the role of privilege in one’s own life on 
national political knowledge; 
5. The positive main effect of perception of the role of privilege in society on perceived 
political engagement. 
 There were four interaction terms associated with each of the above main effects (i.e. 
the interactions between the elements of perception of privilege in question and the four other 
                                                     
371 In order to save the factor scores it was necessary to remove the loading of general trust onto education so that it became an 
independent indicator, which will have slightly altered the estimates. Further, Mplus did not report encountering an error but 
saved values of 999 for all factor scores in 27 cases, which were removed from the interaction analysis. 
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elements of perception of privilege), and they were introduced into the path analysis in groups 
based on the factors that they were expected to impact on. Of the twenty interactions that were 
tested four were found to have significant effects and were thus retained in the final version of 
the path analysis. The relevant results are presented in tables 6.5, 6.6, and 6.7, each of which 
presents one section of the overarching path analysis. The results demonstrate that the 
interaction of perception of privilege in society and of the difference of politically active 
people has a negative effect on individualised political activity, which runs counter to a number 
of hypotheses. The effect is direct rather than via political engagement factors, counter to 
Hypothesis 7b, whilst the positive main effect of perception of the difference of politically 
active people runs counter to Hypothesis 5a. The effect of the interaction with perception of 
the role of social structure in defining status in society runs counter to Hypothesis 6e. This 
means that the positive effect of perceiving politically active people as different is weaker for 
those who strongly perceive a role for social structure in defining status in society. 
Concomitantly, the effect of perception of the difference of politically active people is 
particularly strong amongst those who do not perceive a role for social structure in defining 
status in society. This suggests that such people do not perceive the difference, and perhaps 
distance, of politically active people as the manifestation of broader social structure, and this 
particularly motivates them to channel their political energies into individualised activity. This 
may be because they attribute social outcomes to 
 
Table 6.5. Effects of Perception Interactions on Individualised Political Activity 
 
Factor Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Significance Beta 
Perceived Political Engagement 0.318 0.016 0.000 0.389 
Recruitment 0.348 0.018 0.000 0.345 
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.142 0.014 0.000 0.198 
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors 0.271 0.034 0.000 0.187 
Internal Efficacy 0.078 0.014 0.000 0.099 
Perception Interaction: 
Privilege in Society * 
Difference of Politically Active People -0.185 0.057 0.001 -0.098 
Perception Interaction: 
Privilege of Politically Active People * 
Difference of Politically Active People 0.082 0.036 0.022 0.056 
Constant 0.083 0.018 0.000 . 
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Table 6.6. Effects of Perception Interactions on National Political Knowledge 
 
Factor 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Significance Beta 
Perceived Political Engagement 0.463 0.010 0.000 0.706 
Perception of Own Privilege -0.332 0.017 0.000 -0.313 
Perception of the Privilege of the Politically 
Active 0.121 0.014 0.000 0.208 
Perception Interaction: 
Own Privilege * 
Privilege of Politically Active People 0.082 0.018 0.000 0.107 
Constant 0.452 0.014 0.000 . 
 
 
 
Table 6.7. Effects of Perception Interactions on 
Perception of the Difference of Politically Active People 
 
Factor 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Significance Beta 
Perception of Privilege in Society 0.554 0.012 0.000 0.694 
Social Authoritarianism 0.257 0.008 0.000 0.378 
Self-Perceived Status -0.068 0.007 0.000 -0.142 
Perception Interaction: 
Privilege in Society * 
Status 0.027 0.010 0.007 0.034 
Constant -0.007 0.008 0.368 . 
 
 
individual behaviour and thus choose to engage in politics as such, or because they perceive 
politically active people as ‘a bit weird’ (i.e. different because of individual traits rather than 
social structure), and thus prefer to engage in politics without dealing with them. 
The interaction of perceiving the difference and the privilege of politically active 
people has a positive effect on individualised political activity, in line with Hypothesis 6g, 
although as noted this relates to a main effect that runs counter to Hypothesis 5a. This means 
that the positive effect of perceiving the difference of politically active people is stronger 
amongst those who also perceive politically active people to be more privileged than 
themselves. Thus, directing one’s political energies towards individualised activity is 
associated more strongly with those who not only see politically active people as different but 
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also consider privilege to be a component of that difference. Moving one step back in the 
posited causal process, the interaction between perception of the role of privilege in one’s own 
life and perception of the privilege of politically active people has a positive effect on national 
political knowledge. This effect is in line with Hypothesis 6f, but relates to a negative main 
effect of perception of own privilege that breaks with Hypothesis 4c. This means that the 
negative effect of attributing one’s own status to social structure is stronger for those who 
perceive politically active people to be more privileged than themselves. Thus, people who 
both recognise the role of social structure in their own life and identify its positive effects in 
the lives of politically active people tend to hold less knowledge about national politics, 
perhaps because it is considered to be a preserve of those with privilege. 
The last interaction term that was found to have a significant effect does not relate to 
any of the hypotheses, which focus on the effects of perception of privilege on political 
activity. This interaction was tested in light of the observed structural paths between the 
elements of perception of privilege in the full model. In particular, the direct effects of self-
perceived status on perception of privilege in society and perception of the difference of 
politically active people, and of perception of privilege in society on perception of the privilege 
and difference of politically active people, suggested the possible relevance of associated 
interaction terms. However, only one such term was found to be significant in the relationships 
between the elements of perception of privilege, indicating that the interaction between 
perception of privilege in society and self-perceived status has a positive effect on perception 
of the difference of politically active people. This finding indicates that the positive effect of 
perceiving privilege in society on perceiving the difference of politically active people is 
stronger amongst those who perceive their own status as high. This may be due to recognition 
that social structure creates a gap between themselves and politically active people that is all 
the more important, and thus emphasised, because it still exists despite their own high status. 
Thus, most of the hypotheses relating to interactions are not supported but, overall, the 
majority of the hypotheses specified at the outset of the chapter are at least partially supported, 
as Table 6.8 summarises. 
228 
 
 
Table 6.8. Summary of Support for Hypotheses 
 
Hypothesis Result 
 
H1: The volume of economic, social, and cultural 
capital is positively related to political participation. 
 
 
Partially supported: The hypothesis holds for 
elements of social and cultural capital. 
H2: Legitimate cultural capital is more strongly 
related to political participation than are other forms 
of cultural capital. 
 
Supported: Elements of legitimate cultural 
capital are amongst the strongest influences 
on all three forms of political activity. 
H3a: Being acquainted with high status individuals 
is positively related to political participation. 
 
 
Partially supported: The hypothesis holds in 
relation to individualised and contacting 
activity, but not collective activity. 
H3b: Receipt of help from acquaintances is 
positively related to political participation. 
 
 
 
Supported: Help from close social networks 
promotes self-motivated political activity, 
whilst help from looser social networks 
promotes socially-orientated political 
activity. 
H4a: Self-perceived status is positively related to 
political participation. 
 
 
Rejected: Self-perceived status is a negative 
influence on individualised and contacting 
activity, and is unrelated to collective 
activity. 
H4b: Perception of the role of privilege in defining 
status in society is positively related to political 
participation. 
 
Partially supported: The hypothesis holds in 
relation to individualised and contacting 
activity, but not collective activity. 
H4c: Perception of the role of privilege in defining 
status in one’s own life is positively related to 
political participation. 
 
Supported: Perception of the role of privilege 
one’s own life is a positive influence on all 
forms of political activity. 
H5a: Perception of the difference of those who are 
involved in politics from one’s self is negatively 
related to political participation. 
 
 
Rejected: Perception of the difference of 
politically active people is unrelated to 
contacting and collective activity, and a 
positive influence on individualised activity. 
H5b: Perception of the privilege of those who are 
involved in politics is negatively related to political 
participation. 
 
Supported: Perception of the privilege of 
politically active people is a negative 
influence on all forms of political activity. 
H6a: Perception of the role of privilege in one’s own 
life interacts with self-perceived status to exaggerate 
the low and high participatory tendencies amongst 
those with low and high self-perceived status. 
 
Rejected: No significant effects observed on 
activity or engagement factors. 
H6b: Perception of the role of privilege in society 
does not interact with self-perceived status in its 
effect on political participation. 
 
Supported: No significant effects observed 
on activity or engagement factors. 
H6c: Perception of the role of privilege in one’s own 
life interacts with perception of the role of privilege 
in society to have a positive effect where the latter is 
high but a negative effect where it is low. 
 
Rejected: No significant effects observed on 
activity or engagement factors. 
H6d: Perception of both the difference and privilege 
of politically active people interact with self-
perceived status to have stronger effects amongst 
those with low status. 
 
Rejected: No significant effects observed on 
activity or engagement factors. 
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Table 6.8. Summary of Support for Hypotheses (Continued) 
 
Hypothesis Result 
 
H6e: Perception of both the difference and privilege 
of politically active people interact with perception 
of the role of privilege in society to have stronger 
effects amongst those who explain status in society 
on the basis of social structure. 
 
 
Rejected: The interaction of perception of 
privilege in society and of the difference of 
politically active people reduces the positive 
effect of the latter on individualised political 
activity. 
H6f: Perception of both the difference and privilege 
of politically active people interact with perception 
of the role of privilege one’s own life to have 
stronger effects amongst those who explain their 
status on the basis of social structure. 
 
Rejected: The interaction of perception of 
own privilege and of the privilege of 
politically active people strengthens the 
negative effect of the latter on national 
political knowledge. 
H6g: Perception of the difference of politically 
active people impacts positively with perception of 
the privilege of politically active people to increase 
its negative effect. 
 
Rejected: The interaction of perception of the 
difference and privilege of politically active 
people strengthens the positive effect of the 
latter on individualised political activity. 
H7a: Levels of capital impact on political 
participation primarily via perception of privilege 
rather than directly. 
 
Partially supported: Some elements of 
capital impact on political activity and 
engagement via perceptions whilst others do 
so directly. 
H7b: Perception of privilege impacts on political 
participation primarily via political engagement 
rather than directly. 
Partially supported: Some elements of 
perception of privilege impact on political 
activity via engagement whilst others do so 
directly. 
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The Power of Culture and the Fundamental Attribution Error: 
 The first major conclusion that emerges from the above results is that cultural capital 
is of great importance in facilitating political activity. Further, and in line with Bourdieu’s 
theories, it is particularly legitimate cultural capital that furnishes people with the capacity to 
undertake political activity, whilst other forms have weaker or, in some cases, negative 
relationships with participation. Specifically, the frequency of visits to cultural institutions 
such as museums, galleries, and historic buildings is positively related to individualised and 
collective political activity, and is amongst the strongest direct influences on those forms of 
participation. Such cultural activities are widespread but infrequently engaged in whilst 
legitimate cultural tastes encompassing wine bars and bistros, arthouse and foreign films, and 
BBC Radio 3 listenership are considerably less widespread. Such tastes are strongly and 
positively, though indirectly, related to all three forms of political activity. As such, they stand 
in stark contrast to tastes for family films and especially bass and sample heavy music, which 
are associated with lower levels of political activity. These effects function primarily through 
perceived engagement with politics, which promotes political activity and is largely influenced 
by cultural capital. 
 The direct and indirect effects of cultural capital are notably stronger than those of the 
factors relating to social capital. Only diversity of friends, in terms of ethnicity, religion, and 
sex, approaches cultural capital in the size of its effect on political activity. Other types of 
social capital have significant but small effects on participation, and do not approach the 
cultural factors described above in terms of their influence. Economic capital has no significant 
relationship with collective activity, and weak negative relationships with collective and 
individualised activity. Thus, once the cultural factors that are commonly associated with 
higher economic capital are included in the model, it appears that the energy expended to gain 
income and wealth leaves less capacity to engage with politics. The relatively weak effects of 
social and economic capital suggest that cultural capital is the main mechanism by which 
education has its positive influence on political engagement and participation. It is certainly 
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the case that education is the main influence on cultural capital, and specifically, it furnishes 
people with legitimate cultural capital whilst other types tend to have their roots in background 
characteristics. Education itself is influenced by parental social class, gender, and ethnicity, 
supporting the departure from Bourdieu’s view that capital and social position are determined 
entirely by class. Thus, the results support something akin to the posited causal model, in 
which background characteristics impact on stocks of capital via education, and those stocks 
go on to influence political participation. The fact that cultural capital plays such an important 
part in this mechanism is the first major finding of this research. 
 Economic and social capital both have larger roles in influencing perception of 
privilege, which is also influenced by basic beliefs and, to a lesser extent, cultural capital. The 
stronger influence of social and economic capital is important because perception of privilege 
goes on to impact on political participation in a particularly interesting way. Whilst legitimate 
cultural capital seems to promote engagement with and participation in political activity 
regardless of the type, perception of privilege pushes people towards some forms of activity 
more than others. The distinction between those forms is their social or non-social nature, and 
they can be arranged along a spectrum with individualised activity at one end, collective at the 
other, and contacting in the middle. With this in mind, a common pattern emerges in relation 
to the elements of perception of privilege. Specifically, self-perceived status is strongly 
negatively associated with individualised activity, less so with contacting, and not with 
collective activity. Perception of privilege in society most strongly promotes individualised 
activity, then contacting activity, and is not significantly related to collective activity. By 
contrast, perception of privilege in one’s own life most strongly promotes collective activity, 
then contacting, and finally individualised activity. Similarly, though with a less clear pattern, 
perception of privilege in the political arena puts people off individualised activity less than it 
puts them off contacting and collective activity. Finally, perception of the difference of 
politically active people promotes individualised political activity but neither of the two other 
forms. 
232 
 
 
The common pattern in the above is that people who perceive the privilege or 
difference of others in society and politics are more inclined towards political activities 
requiring less interaction. Further, people who perceive the role of privilege in their own lives, 
in terms of either their status or their explanations for it, are more inclined towards political 
activities that require interaction, or at least less disinclined towards them. Thus, the people 
who are most disengaged from socially-orientated political activities are those who see other 
people as the beneficiaries of privilege that they do not perceive to have played a part in their 
own lives. Whilst this may indicate that such respondents have not benefited from privilege 
despite seeing it in society, it could also be a manifestation of the fundamental attribution error 
in which others’ perceived successes are attributed to social factors and their perceived failures 
to personal influences whilst the opposite is true for the self. This constitutes a limited 
perception of privilege, with a fuller form recognising the role of privilege both in society and 
one’s life. Crucially, the results of the full model indicate that this consistent approach leads 
to less differentiation between self-motivated and socially-orientated forms of political 
participation, and keeps open more types of activity. By contrast, exhibiting the fundamental 
attribution error, which is commonly associated with the system justifying beliefs that are 
opposed to perception of privilege, turns one away from socially-orientated activity but not 
from political participation in general. This is the second major finding of this research. 
 The above main findings are complemented by additional findings relating to the 
hypotheses, and the results of the full model confirm a general trend for capital to be positively 
related to participation, with the exception of the minimal negative effects of the economic 
form once other factors are accounted for. As hypothesised, acquaintance with high status 
individuals and receipt of help from close and loose social networks are generally positively 
related to political activity. Interestingly, help from loose social networks opposes the 
fundamental attribution error in its effect, more strongly promoting socially-orientated activity 
and slightly turning respondents away from individualised activity. Thus the preference for 
political activity that involves interaction with others is based both on whether one sees others 
as notably more privileged than oneself, and on the strength of one’s loose social networks. 
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Diversity of friends also has a similar effect, leading to a picture of strong but loose and diverse 
social networks promoting socially-orientated political activity. 
Finally, the causal propositions of the hypothesised model are broadly supported, with 
background characteristics and basic beliefs generally preceding capital, which influences 
perceptions that contribute to political engagement and thus participation. However, the causal 
effects are not that simple, and there are direct links from social and cultural capital to both 
political engagement and participation, skirting the effects of perception of privilege. Such 
perceptions appear to be more of a channel for social and economic capital than cultural 
capital, which is reflected in the previously mentioned complementary effects of social capital 
and perception of privilege on shaping the particular types of participation that are engaged in. 
The strong direct and indirect effects of capital, generally positive in nature, on participation 
support its identification as a key mechanism through which structural privilege leads to 
differing political behaviour. At the same time, the impact of perception of privilege alongside 
those effects indicates that it plays a crucial role on where people channel their political 
energies, and specifically, whether they are willing to engage with others in their efforts to 
change or conserve elements of the society around them. 
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Conclusion: Culture Enables and Perception Channels 
 
 The research undertaken for this thesis began at a time when the government of the 
United Kingdom was described by some as a ‘cabinet of toffs’.372 Such commentary was a 
manifestation of the initial intuition of this research that participation in politics might be 
shaped not only by structural privilege but also by the appearance, and thus perception, of 
privilege in politics. Extending that intuition beyond the upper echelons of national 
government provides a possible explanation for differences in the extent and types of political 
participation undertaken by the population. As such, it offers a new answer to one of the key 
motivating conundrums of political behaviour research: why do people participate or not in 
political activity? Indeed, the research question that this thesis addresses is a specific 
manifestation of that conundrum: how do structural and perceived privilege impact on 
individual political participation in the United Kingdom? 
 The thesis utilises a broad definition of political participation encompassing any 
attempt by an individual, in interaction with an institution or organisation, to change or 
conserve an element of society at some level. In trying to explain why some people undertake 
activity more than others, the Civic Voluntarism Model was taken as the starting point.373 This 
is an established sociological model of political behaviour but is argued to be incomplete in 
its account of structural privilege, and to overlook people’s perceptions of privilege. To 
address this, Bourdieu’s forms of capital are argued to more fully encompass the mechanisms 
of structural privilege by which background characteristics can be translated into different 
behavioural repertoires, and thus promote or depress activities such as political 
participation.374 In reconciling these two approaches the thesis departs from Bourdieu’s causal 
approach generally, and from his class determinism specifically. Crucially, it also departs from 
                                                     
372 Joey Millar, ‘Patrick McLoughlin appointed as Chairman of Conservative Party’, The Daily Express, Thursday 14 Jul 2016, 
viewed at: http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/689443/patrick-mcloughlin-chairman-conservative-party on 27.04.2017. 
373 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, Voice and Equality. 
374 Bourdieu, ‘The Forms of Capital’. 
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both approaches by arguing that they fail to accommodate the important role of perceptions in 
shaping behaviour. As such, it considers the basic perceptions, or lower order beliefs, that 
people hold about status, and their explanations for it. Such perception of privilege is posited 
to be an important intervening stage between the capital that people hold and their political 
activities. As such, the thesis proposes a causal process leading from background 
characteristics through capital profiles to perception of privilege and thence political 
engagement and participation. 
 To test this model, an original survey including extensive batteries of questions 
relating to capital, perceptions, and participation was designed and fielded online to a non-
probability sample of British adults. Although there are some similarities, the distributions of 
the variables in the resultant data are generally not comparable with those in data from previous 
research. This is because the questions asked were altered to reflect the focus of the research 
or, indeed, created from scratch. Crucially, and whilst the sample is not fully representative, 
there is considerable variation in most of the variables included in the analysis, so it is 
appropriate to analyse the relationships between them. The analytical approach adopted, 
structural equation modelling, allows the identification of underlying tendencies, both in terms 
of capital held and perceptions, as well as of structural relationships between them, which can 
be interpreted causally.  
 The underlying tendencies, or factors, that emerge from the analysis are as expected 
on the basis of past research and theory. Specifically, the individualised, contacting, and 
collective forms of political activity that were previously observed in Citizenship in Britain 
are replicated in the current research, whilst the political engagement and recruitment elements 
of the Civic Voluntarism Model are also identified.375 Distinct political perceptions are 
observed in the form of beliefs that politically active people are different and privileged. 
Further, the posited core elements of perception of privilege are confirmed in the shape of self-
perceived status, explanations for that status, and explanations for status differences in society. 
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Finally, Bourdieu’s proposal of the difference between the three forms of capital and between 
types within them is supported, which is particularly important in relation to the distinction 
between legitimate cultural capital and other types.376 
 Beyond observing of the posited factors, the results generally support the causal 
hypotheses of the research. Specifically, the full model that is tested and found to fit the data 
supports the proposition that political participation is most importantly defined by engagement 
and recruitment, which are influenced by both perceptions and capital. Capital also influences 
perceptions as expected, whilst relationships are also observed between types and forms of 
capital as Bourdieu’s theory and research would suggest. Finally, capital itself is shaped by a 
range of background characteristics and basic beliefs, breaking with Bourdieu’s proposition 
that capital profiles are defined by class position alone. This confirms the findings of Culture, 
Class, Distinction, and supports the idea that capital acts as a means by which privilege 
generally, rather than just class, expresses itself.377 
The focus of when analysing the full model is cultural capital because it has been 
covered less extensively that social capital and economic capital in the past. Thus, the first 
main contribution of this thesis is the observation of the remarkably strong positive effects of 
legitimate cultural capital on political participation. Thus, the distinction between types of 
cultural capital is crucial, and both the strength and direction of their effects vary. Specifically, 
legitimate cultural tastes such as watching arthouse and foreign films, eating at bistros, and 
listening to BBC Radio 3 are amongst the strongest positive influences on individualised and 
contacting activities. At the same time, visits to legitimate cultural institutions such as 
museums, art galleries, and historic buildings are strongly associated with individualised and 
collective participation. These effects dwarf those of attendance at performances such as opera, 
ballet, and plays so it appears that not all legitimate cultural capital is important for facilitating 
political activity. 
                                                     
376 Bourdieu, Distinction, p. 1, p. 16, pp. 359-360. 
377 Bennett et al., Culture, Class, Distinction, p. 18, p. 27. 
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The effects of other types of cultural capital are generally positive, with two notable 
exceptions. Preferences for family-friendly films and for bass and sample heavy music are 
consistently negative, so certain types of cultural capital are associated with disengagement 
from all three types of political activity. These effects and those of legitimate tastes are 
observed to impact on participation via political engagement, which indicates that there is a 
particular cultural milieu in which paying attention to politics and discussing it is the norm. 
The fact that such cultural tastes are directly related to political engagement runs counter to 
the expectation that perception of privilege should intervene in the relationship. This is even 
more apparent in relation to visits to legitimate cultural institutions, which impacts directly on 
individualised and collective participation. Rather than pointing to a generally active 
disposition, which would suggest stronger links with other cultural activities as well, this 
suggests that individuals who hold such capital are insulated from the discomfort of not 
conforming to the cultural norms in political contexts. Such discomfort would not necessarily 
need to manifest itself through explanations for status difference or even through the sense of 
one’s status, which can be assessed on the basis of numerous other indicators outside the 
political context. Thus, those who do not conform to the prevailing cultural practices of a given 
context, in this case a political one, can simply disengage from it without necessarily changing 
their perceptions of themselves, society, or even the context itself. Again, this explanation for 
the surprisingly direct effects of legitimate cultural capital on political engagement and 
activity, suggest a cultural milieu in which politics is the ‘done thing’. 
In addition to being more direct than expected, the effects of cultural capital are 
notably stronger than those of either social or economic capital, which have been the subject 
of a great deal of past research. Social capital does have a positive effect on political 
participation as expected, and the notable effect of diversity of friends suggests the particular 
importance of Putnam’s bridging capital.378 By contrast, the inclusion of other factors renders 
the effect of economic capital on contacting and collective activity insignificant, whilst its 
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effect on individualised activity is weak and negative. Further, the effects of cultural capital 
are notably larger than those of work-based civic skills, though they retain the positive effect 
observed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady. More dramatically, free time is found not to have 
a significant effect on political participation once other factors are accounted for and is thus 
excluded from the full model.379 This suggests that the effects of time observed in Voice and 
Equality may, in part, have encompassed the capacity to accumulate and exercise cultural 
capital that facilitates such participation. The importance of cultural factors in improving the 
Civic Voluntarism Model is of particular note because they are further removed from politics 
than the engagement and recruitment components of that model. To observe that those who 
pay attention to politics, hold information on it, and are asked to get involved also participate 
more is important but unsurprising. Equally important but more surprising, however, is the 
observation that people who visit art galleries frequently, enjoy eating in bistros, and listen to 
BBC Radio 3 are more apt to engage with politics and undertake activities related to it. 
 The legitimate elements of cultural capital are heavily influenced by education and 
thus appear to be the main mechanism through which it has its effect on political participation. 
This presents a possible answer to the conundrum of rising levels of education not necessarily 
being associated with increasing political participation. In other words, the positive effects of 
education flow not only from its formal elements, and the associated qualifications, but also 
from its capacity to furnish people with informal but legitimate cultural capital. To the extent 
that opportunities for engagement with such culture are not equal in all educational settings 
we should not expect to see an increased prevalence of educational qualifications prompt a 
uniform rise in levels of legitimate cultural capital. This suggests that two people who are 
equally qualified will not have equivalent capital profiles and will thus not participate in 
politics to the same extent or in the same ways. The fact that education itself is only influenced 
to a limited degree by class background, and that cultural capital is influenced by other 
background characteristics such as age and sex, again implies the need to depart from 
                                                     
379 An equivalent model in which time was loaded onto occupational status (B = 0.114, p = 0.001), female gender (B = -0.083, p 
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240 
 
 
Bourdieu’s class determinism. This suggests that one’s habitus is not merely a manifestation 
of class status but of one’s cultural milieu more generally, and that part of that environment is 
the prevalence of norms that promote engagement with and participation in politics. This 
supports the proposition that capital functions as a mechanism of structural privilege, and that 
its uneven distribution between groups enables the participation of some, but not others, in 
politics. 
 Two of the core elements of perception of privilege are also found to have positive 
effects on political participation, and thus to function in opposition to system justifying beliefs 
as expected.380 Specifically, holding privilege-based explanation for one’s own status and for 
status in society more generally both promote participation in the political domain. The 
application of privilege-based explanations for status indicates recognition of the importance 
of social influences on individual outcomes, and this provides a motive for efforts to change 
or conserve those social influences through politics. In other words, if individual outcomes are 
primarily the result of individual characteristics then there is perhaps less reason to attempt to 
shape society, especially collectively, and one is better off focussing on one’s own outcomes. 
Opposing these effects, and contrary to expectations, self-perceived status has a negative effect 
on political participation. Thus, to the extent that perceiving one’s status as high promotes a 
sense of capacity, and perhaps entitlement, it is not directed towards politics. This is explicable 
with reference to the negative effects of self-perceived status on privilege-based explanations 
for status in society, and on perception of the difference of politically active people. Whilst 
not hypothesised, those effects imply that seeing one’s self as having high status provides a 
motive to attribute status to individual effort rather than social influences, even if in relation 
to society rather than one’s self. Further, to the extent that politically active people and 
politicians are seen to have high status, and manifest traits associated with it, those cues will 
promote less of a sense of difference amongst those who see themselves as high status. Given 
that perception of privilege in society and of the difference of politically active people are 
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positively associated with political participation, the negative effects of self-perceived status 
become explicable. 
Moving beyond the core components of perception of privilege, the previously 
mentioned positive effects of perceiving politically active people as different are counter to 
expectations and suggest a grievance-based explanation.381 By contrast, the expected negative 
effect of perceiving politically active people as privileged is observed. Thus, viewing 
politically active people as different from one’s self without applying the label of privilege 
sparks political participation, perhaps on the grounds that politics should be run by more 
‘normal’ people. By contrast, a privileged-based recognition of their difference seems to 
promote a sense of alienation that causes disengagement from the political arena. Crucially, 
the results provide a clear indication that the elements of perception of privilege do not 
promote or suppress the types of participation in a uniform fashion. Indeed, patterns are 
observed in which the effects of each component of perception of privilege increase or 
decrease in line with the level of social interaction required by the type of political activity. 
Thus, self-perceived status, perception of privilege in society, and perception of the difference 
of politically active people all have stronger effects on individualised activities than on other 
forms. More important than the patterns in the effects of each element, however, are their 
combined effects. 
Taken together, the effects of perception of privilege in society and in one’s own life 
suggest an important role for the fundamental attribution error in shaping political 
participation.382 Specifically, those who apply consistent privilege-based explanations for both 
status in society and their own status are apt to engage in all three forms of participation. By 
contrast, those who view status in society as defined by social influences but their own status 
to results from individual characteristics have their political participation limited to 
individualised activities. That is to say, the negative effect attributing own status to individual 
characteristics depresses contacting and collective participation but does not outweigh the 
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positive effect on individual activities of perceiving status in society to result from privilege. 
Thus, endorsing the fundamental attribution error, and so perceiving others to be the 
beneficiaries of privilege that one has not enjoyed, channels people towards less social forms 
of political participation. Specifically, this means such people are apt to engage in activities 
such as petition signing, online expression of views, and boycotting of products, but not to 
interact with elected representatives or government departments, or to get involved with public 
meetings or protests. This observation is the second main contribution of the research, and 
suggests that despite the persistence of inequalities in new forms of political participation, 
online modes may at least remain open to those who are disinclined to interact or coordinate 
face-to-face in relation to politics. 
The above findings suggest that the distinction between individualised, contacting, 
and collective activities is more than just a useful typology of participation. It seems that the 
distinction is used by people not only in terms of the time and effort required but also in terms 
of their social nature. Thus, the distinction is meaningful in a social sense, and this is further 
supported by the strong positive effect of perceiving the difference of politically active people 
on individualised activities alone. In other words, a disinclination to interact with people who 
are seen as different from one’s self is apparent in relation to political participation. This is 
complemented by the previous observation of a positive relationship between diversity of 
friends and political participation, which is stronger in relation to more social forms of activity. 
Further, and returning to the effects of cultural capital, it may be that people perceive the 
cultural milieu they inhabit and its similarity or difference to those inhabited by politically 
active people. Thus, it is clear that structural privilege, especially in the form of cultural capital, 
enables participation in politics. That participation is then channelled to more or less social 
forms of participation depending in part on the gaps that are perceived between people, society, 
and those involved in politics. 
The enabling and channelling of political participation by structural and perceived 
privilege may, of course, be specific to the time and place in which the research was conducted. 
In terms of the first of those considerations, there is no comparable data that has been gathered 
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over time in the United Kingdom but speculative comments can be made on the basis of three 
changes that have occurred in the latter half of the twentieth and first part of the twenty-first 
centuries. First, educational levels have increased over that period and, to the extent that those 
who gain such qualifications increase their stock of legitimate cultural capital, this can be 
expected to have opened the political arena to people who might otherwise have found it harder 
to enter. This is linked to the idea of the demise of the United Kingdom’s rigid class structure 
and the increase in social mobility, though there is competing evidence regarding the latter and 
its effects may be unevenly spread.383 Second, the increase in the diversity of the population 
over that period can be expected to have raised participation amongst those who might 
otherwise have had less diverse social networks. As with the effects of education and social 
mobility, however, these effects are not likely to be spread uniformly throughout the 
population, particularly in light of the geographically concentrated nature of diversity.384 Thus, 
whilst both of these trends have positive implications they are limited by their uneven 
distribution, which may increase participatory inequality. This is also the case with the third 
change, which is the decline of the trade union movement. This has been argued to have 
increased participatory inequality by closing a major route to participation associated with 
working class backgrounds, and trends in the House of Commons may reflect those in society 
at large. 385 They show that the positive increase of the chamber’s representativeness in terms 
of sex, ethnicity, and sexuality has been countered by its increasing domination by those with 
university degrees and, after a decline towards the end of the last century, independent 
educations.386 Together, this suggests that some of the participatory inequalities of the past are 
in decline whilst others have found new expression in the cultural domain, and that this is 
                                                     
383 Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg, and Stephen Machin, ‘Social mobility in Britain: low and falling’, CentrePiece, Vol. 10, No. 1 
(Spring, 2005), pp. 18-20, viewed at: http://cep.lse.ac.uk/centrepiece/v10i1/blanden.pdf on 26.04.2017; Christopher Snowdon, 
‘Social mobility in the UK’, Institute of Economic Affairs, Saturday 10 October 2015, viewed at: https://iea.org.uk/themencode-
pdf-viewer-sc/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Social%20Mobility%20in%20the%20UK%20-
%20CS.pdf&settings=111111011&lang=en-GB#page=&zoom=75&pagemode on 26.04.2017. 
384 Stephen Jivraj, ‘How has ethnic diversity grown 1991-2001-2011?’, Centre on Dynamics of Ethnicity, Tuesday 11 
November 2014, viewed at: http://www.ethnicity.ac.uk/medialibrary/briefings/dynamicsofdiversity/how-has-ethnic-diversity-
grown-1991-2001-2011.pdf on 26.04.2017. 
385 Michael Biggs, ‘Has Protest Increased Since the 1970s? How a Survey Question Can Construct a Spurious Trend’, The British 
Journal of Sociology, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Mar., 2015), pp. 141-162. 
386 University education an imperfect measure of cultural capital but is the best available: The Sutton Trust 'The Educational 
Background of Members of Parliament 2010' p. 7; The Sutton Trust, ‘The Educational Backgrounds of Members of the House 
of Commons and House of Lords’, The Sutton Trust, Thursday 01 December 2005, p. 11, viewed at: 
http://www.suttontrust.com/wp-content/uploads/2005/12/PoliticiansBackgrounds_09-Dec-05.pdf on 26.04.2017. 
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likely to have promoted the perception of privilege in politics amongst some groups but not 
others. 
Turning to the applicability of the research findings in different locations, the first 
point to note is that Bourdieu’s research focused on France but the theory that he developed 
was not intended to be context-specific.387 Indeed, the findings of the current research and past 
research focusing on capital and inequality in the United Kingdom demonstrate the 
applicability of the theory in a context beyond the one in which it was developed. It may be, 
however, that this country provides the weakest test of the cross-cultural applicability of 
Bourdieu’s theory because of the unusually widespread concern with the concept of class in 
Britain. However, the current research breaks with the class determinism of Bourdieu and, as 
such, certainly supports the relevance of two overarching components of the theory in different 
contexts. The first of those components is the idea that all three forms of capital must be 
accounted for when explaining the workings of privilege. The second is the idea that the 
particular types of capital that have value are defined by competition between groups in any 
given context. Thus, the posited mechanism of structural privilege, embodied in the forms of 
capital, are expected to be observable in multiple contexts but the specific types of capital that 
hold particular importance will change across those contexts. Taking the case of cultural 
capital, it should be possible to observe the distinction between legitimate and other forms of 
capital in different contexts, but the particular cultural tastes and activities that are designated 
as legitimate will differ. Further, the particular background characteristics that shape capital 
profiles will vary between contexts, though the role of those capital profiles in recreating 
structural privilege will be the same. These proposition needs to be tested with future research, 
which could fruitfully focus on comparisons with India and the United States. In the former 
instance there is a clear alternative system of social stratification based on caste and a markedly 
different set of cultural traditions. This would allow testing of the effects not only of different 
background characteristics but also of different types of capital within the three forms. By 
                                                     
387 Bourdieu, Distinction, pp. 82-83, p. 365, pp. 476-477. 
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contrast, the latter case would provide a ‘class free’ context in which to test the role of capital 
as a mechanism of privilege. Both contexts would also allow the testing of the effects of 
perception of privilege, which should be expected to vary in line with both structural privilege 
and prevailing understandings of society and the self. 
In addition to testing the applicability of a model encompassing the forms of capital 
and perception of privilege in different contexts, there are a number of other questions that 
future research should address. First, a larger sample with better measurement and 
representation of a range of background characteristics would allow a fuller analysis of the 
roots of capital profiles. The current research uses crude measures of ethnicity and disability, 
and does not consider sexuality, all of which may be found to have important implications for 
capital if better measured and represented. Second, the question of causal order is perhaps the 
largest issue requiring future investigation, despite theoretical justification for the adopted 
causal interpretation. In terms of immediate action this can be partially addressed by testing 
models that embody alternative causal propositions, such as the idea that all forms of capital 
and behaviour, including political participation, precede and influence perceptions, and vice 
versa. This, of course, will not conclusively answer questions of causality and an expensive 
longitudinal study of the development of capital, perceptions, and participation seems unlikely 
to be possible in the near future. As such, a good way to test some of the causal propositions 
of the model would be an experimental approach in which the effects of cultural stimuli on 
perceptions, and of perceptions on political engagement, are tested. Third, such future tests 
should include measures of the Big Five personality traits and basic values to test for the 
relationships between underlying psychological disposition, values, capital, perception of 
privilege, and political participation.388 Fourth, forty-five in-depth focus groups and interviews 
with politicians, volunteers and activists, and members of the public were conducted for the 
research underpinning this thesis but, due to the demands of structural equation modelling, 
were not analysed. Future research must analyse this qualitative data and relate the emerging 
                                                     
388 Shalom H. Schwartz, ‘An Overview of the Schwartz Theory of Basic Values’, Online Readings in Psychology and Culture, 
Vol. 2, No. 1 (Dec., 2012), viewed at  https://doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1116 on 27.04.2017. 
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findings to the results of the qualitative analysis. Fifth and finally, a small third wave survey 
was conducted after the 2015 general election and future research should utilise this data set 
to analyse the effects of institutional demand on political participation. 
 Building on the final point above, the analysis undertaken in this thesis has been 
steeped in terms of the characteristics that enable, or incline people towards, political 
participation. That is to say it has focused on the supply of potential and actual political 
participants rather than the impact of demand, constituted by institutional efforts to promote 
or activate political participation. Indeed, the only part of the full model that relates to demand, 
in the form of receipt of recruitment requests, focuses on individuals’ close social connections 
rather than recruitment by institutions. Such requests are directed towards those in diverse 
social networks, who engage in religious activity, and who perceive themselves to be 
politically engaged, but less to those who hold a great deal of political knowledge. As noted, 
perceived political engagement is heavily influenced by legitimate cultural tastes, so requests 
to get involved are more likely to reach those with particular types of capital, though this is 
likely to be a manifestation of the prevalence of political activity in their cultural milieu than 
the targeting of demand. Indeed, the argument of this thesis is that privilege is a feature of 
society at large, and that the forms of capital that act as the mechanism of that privilege, as 
well as perception of privilege, are the results of an array of background characteristics and 
life experiences. Of course, institutions in a tight sense of the word, meaning organisations 
that can create demand for participation, are not necessarily responsible for the creation of 
inequalities stemming from structural and perceived privilege. However, this does not mean 
that they have no role to play in overcoming those inequalities, and there are clear implications 
for the nature of that role. 
 This thesis began by noting the recognition, common to ministers and campaigners 
alike, that democracy, however envisaged, cannot function without public involvement. Thus, 
to the extent that some groups are less able to participate in politics due to structural and 
perceived privilege there is a problem for democracy. It may be the case that some people 
actively choose to not to participate in politics, but the strength of the results make it clear that 
247 
 
 
such disengagement is not randomly distributed in the population, and is thus unlikely to be 
based solely on personal choice. The findings regarding perception of privilege suggest that 
people need to see a more representative cross-section of the population engaged in politics. 
Thus, political organisations should frequently and explicitly convey the message that they are 
open to all. This is already done, to an extent, with ‘easy asks’ such as petitions and social 
media campaigns, but these could be complemented by messages focussing on members or 
supporters who were previously disengaged in order to demonstrate the openness of 
organisations and offer concrete examples of how to get involved. More to the point, the people 
represented in campaigns connected to politics need to be diverse not only in terms of 
background characteristics but also the cultural milieus that they inhabit. Such superficial 
changes, of course, cannot and should not be the only attempts to address unequal access to 
politics. 
Presenting politics as open to people with diverse backgrounds and cultural profiles is 
a lot easier and more convincing if it is actually the case. This means that political 
organisations need to proactively engage politically disengaged communities in the spaces that 
they already inhabit, and this needs to be done consistently. Thus, if it is not already the case, 
surgeries and meetings should be held in cafes and shopping centres rather than town halls or 
other formal institutions. Organisations should undertake recruitment campaigns through 
current members and supporters, but asking them to focus their requests on acquaintances that 
they would not usually approach. Where appropriate, links should be built between 
organisations with distinct memberships in order to promote diversity in each, whilst 
campaigns and recruitment focused on educational institutions should be complemented by 
efforts to engage people who do not inhabit those contexts. Similarly, campaigns that are 
explicitly focused on legitimate cultural institutions, either as targets or locations for activities, 
should be understood to appeal only to some people. They should thus be complemented or 
replaced by campaigns dealing with issues of interest to a less restricted cultural milieu. This 
might involve asking a wider audience what their political priorities are and focusing 
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campaigns on changing or conserving different elements of society in so far as those priorities 
fit with organisations’ aims and objectives. 
Thus, whilst cultural institutions need to continue their efforts to be as open and 
accessible as possible, the solutions suggested here are explicitly not about educating people 
or converting them to legitimate tastes and habits. Rather, organisations should move outside 
their comfort zones and engage those who are not active on their own terms, and on their own 
turf, regardless of their backgrounds and cultural preferences. Further, this speaks of the 
importance of reinforcing or complementing the role of trade unions as forums for political 
engagement because the majority of the population must hold employment for at least some 
part of their lives, and workplaces thus encompass people with diverse backgrounds and 
capital profiles. These efforts seem all the more important in the aftermath of political events 
that have emphasised the divide between the population and a detached political elite. Thus, 
now more than ever, politics must be open to all, regardless of their privilege, and must 
explicitly challenge the perception that it is not. 
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{ Joe Greenwood Final Version 2014-03-17 17:41:42. 
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Module: IntropdlUpdate 
Page: Wave1_Intro 
Thank you for taking this survey, which is about your free time, who you know, and your 
voluntary activities. Your YouGov Account will be credited with 75 points for completing the 
survey. We have tested the survey and found that, on average it takes around 17 to 20 minutes 
to complete. This time may vary depending on factors such as your Internet connection speed 
and the answers you give. Please click the forward button to continue. 
 
 
  
Page: pdl_EducLeve 
EducLeve-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have? 
 
1 ○ No formal qualifications  
2 ○ Youth training certificate/skillseekers  
3 ○ Recognised trade apprenticeship 
completed 
 
4 ○ Clerical and commercial  
5 ○ City & Guilds certificate  
6 ○ City & Guilds certificate - advanced  
7 ○ ONC  
8 ○ CSE grades 2-5  
9 ○ CSE grade 1, GCE O level, GCSE, 
School Certificate 
 
10 ○ Scottish Ordinary/ Lower Certificate  
11 ○ GCE A level or Higher Certificate  
12 ○ Scottish Higher Certificate  
13 ○ Nursing qualification (eg SEN, SRN, 
SCM, RGN) 
 
14 ○ Teaching qualification (not degree)  
15 ○ University diploma  
16 ○ University or CNAA first degree (eg BA, 
B.Sc, B.Ed) 
 
17 ○ University or CNAA higher degree (eg 
M.Sc, Ph.D) 
 
18 ○ Other technical, professional or higher 
qualification 
 
19 ○ Don't know  
20 ○ Prefer not to say  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
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Page: pdl_WorkStat 
WorkStat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of these applies to you? 
 
1 ○ Working full time (30 or more hours per 
week) 
 
2 ○ Working part time (8-29 hours a week)  
3 ○ Working part time (Less than 8 hours a 
week) 
 
4 ○ Full time student  
5 ○ Retired  
6 ○ Unemployed  
7 ○ Not working  
8 ○ Other  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_MariStat 
MariStat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
What is your marital status? 
 
7 ○ Civil Partnership  
4 ○ Divorced  
2 ○ Living as married  
1 ○ Married  
6 ○ Never married  
3 ○ Separated (after being married)  
5 ○ Widowed  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: pdl_Household 
HousStat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of these applies to your home? 
 
1 ○ Own the leasehold/freehold outright  
2 ○ Buying leasehold/freehold on a 
mortgage 
 
3 ○ Rented from local authority  
4 ○ Rented from private landlord  
5 ○ It belongs to a Housing Association  
6 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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HousSize-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many people, including yourself, are there in your household? Please include both 
adults and children. 
 
1 ○ 1  
2 ○ 2  
3 ○ 3  
4 ○ 4  
5 ○ 5  
6 ○ 6  
7 ○ 7  
8 ○ 8 or more  
9 ○ Don't know  
10 ○ Prefer not to say  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
ChilStat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many of the people in your household are under 18? 
 
1 ○ 0  
2 ○ 1  
3 ○ 2  
4 ○ 3  
5 ○ 4  
6 ○ 5  
7 ○ 6 or more  
8 ○ Don't know  
9 ○ Prefer not to say  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
end module: IntropdlUpdate 
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Module: VolPolAct 
 
Page: VolPolAct_OfficPosit 
OfficPosit-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
First, have you ever held or do you currently hold any of the following positions? 
 
Local councillor (for local authority, town, or parish) 
School governor 
Parent-teacher association member 
Tenants' or residents' association member 
Neighbourhood watch member 
Volunteer Police Special Constable 
Magistrate 
1 ○ Currently  
2 ○ In the past  
3 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_ConsidOfficPosit 
ConsidOfficPosit-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking about the positions you've just seen, would you consider holding any of them in 
future? 
 
1 ○ Definitely  
2 ○ Probably  
3 ○ Probably not  
4 ○ Definitely not  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_PolActFreq 
Now we'd like to ask you about things you've done in relation to issues that matter to you. 
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PolActFreq-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
In the last five years roughly how often have you done the following things in relation to 
any issue that you care about personally? 
 
Displayed campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, stickers) 
Signed a petition or taken an online action (e.g. joined a group, liked 
a page, or posted a link on a social network) 
Chosen to boycott a product or company 
Met with an elected representative 
Attended a public meeting 
Gone on a public rally, protest or demonstration 
Taken a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to 
something) 
Organised a public meeting or set up a group 
Contacted an elected representative or a government body 
Contacted the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or 
newspapers) 
Urged someone to take any of the actions we've just asked about 
1 ○ Once a month or more often  
2 ○ Once every two to three months  
3 ○ Once every six months  
4 ○ Once a year  
5 ○ Less often  
6 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_PolActRecruit 
Here's the list of things that we just asked about: 
- Display campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, or stickers) 
- Sign a petition or take an online action (e.g. join a group, like a page, or post a link on a 
social network) 
- Boycott a product or company 
- Meet with an elected representative 
- Attend a public meeting 
- Go on a public rally, protest or demonstration 
- Take a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to something) 
- Organise a public meeting or set up a group 
- Contact an elected representative or a local or national government body 
- Contact the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or newspapers) 
- Urge someone to take any of the actions we've just asked about 
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PolActRecruit-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those things... 
 
...via a mass email, mass social network request, or mass letter? 
...by a family member? 
...by a friend? 
...by a neighbour? 
...by someone at work? 
...by a member of a local religious congregation? 
...by someone from a political party, trade union or professional 
association, charity, or campaigning or voluntary organisation that 
you're already involved in? 
...by a campaigner or volunteer for an organisation that you're not 
involved in (including by phone or in the street)? 
1 ○ Once a month or more often  
2 ○ Four times a year or more often  
3 ○ Two or three times a year  
4 ○ Once a year or less often  
5 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: VolPolAct_PolActPotent 
PolActPotent-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
You said that you've never done some of the things we asked about. Would you do those 
things in the future in relation to an issue that you cared about? 
 
Display campaign materials (e.g. posters, badges, or stickers) 
Sign a petition or take an online action (e.g. join a group, like a page, 
or post a link on a social network) 
Choose to boycott a product or company 
Meet with an elected representative 
Attend a public meeting 
Go on a public rally, protest or demonstration 
Take a direct action (e.g. a public stunt, or chaining yourself to 
something) 
Organise a public meeting or set up a group 
Contact an elected representative or a government body 
Contact the media (i.e. local or national radio, TV, or newspapers) 
Urged someone to take one of the actions we've asked about 
1 ○ Definitely  
2 ○ Probably  
3 ○ Probably not  
4 ○ Definitely not  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_GroupInvolv 
Now we're interested in the organisations that you support. 
GroupInvolv-  
GRID-CHECK 
In the last five years have you been involved in any of the following types of organisation in 
any of the ways listed? Please select all the options that apply: 
 
Political party 
Trade Union or professional association 
Campaigning organisation 
Charity 
1 □ Donate any money (e.g. sponsorship, 
direct debit, or spare change) 
 
2 □ Volunteer time  
3 □ Am a member  
4 □ Hold an unpaid position of responsibility 
(e.g. chair, secretary, or organisor) 
 
5 □ Not involved  
 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_GroupRecruit 
Here's the list of ways to support organisations that we just asked about: 
- Donate money 
- Volunteer time 
- Become a member 
- Take up an unpaid position of responsibility 
GroupRecruit-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those things... 
 
...via a mass email, mass social network request, or mass letter? 
...by a family member? 
...by a friend? 
...by a neighbour? 
...by someone at work? 
...by a member of a local religious congregation? 
...by someone from a political party that you're already involved in? 
...by someone from a trade union or professional organisation that 
you're already involved in? 
...by someone from a campaigning organisation that you're 
already involved in? 
...by someone from charity that you're already involved in? 
...by a campaigner or volunteer for an organisation that you're not 
involved in (including by phone or in the street)? 
1 ○ Once a month or more often  
2 ○ Four times a year or more often  
3 ○ Two or three times a year  
4 ○ Once a year or less often  
5 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_Break 
Next we want to know more about the things you do for the organisations that you support. 
 
Page: VolPolAct_CivSkillGroup  
CivSkillGroup-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE DYNAMIC GRID 
Over the last six months, have you engaged in any of the following activities for... 
 
...the political party that you're involved in? Please select all those 
that apply: 
...the trade Union or professional association that you're involved 
in? Please select all those that apply: 
...the campaigning organisation that you're involved in? Please 
select all those that apply: 
...the charity that you're involved in? Please select all those that 
apply: 
1 □ Written a formal email or letter  
2 □ Attended a meeting where you made 
decisions 
 
3 □ Planned or chaired a meeting  
4 □ Given a presentation  
5 □ None of these  
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_Donate 
Donate-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly what is the total amount of money that you have personally donated to all the 
organisations that you support over the last twelve months? This includes donations to 
collection tins, sponsorship, and direct debits, but not membership fees: 
 
1 ○ £24.99 or less  
2 ○ Between £25 and £49.99  
3 ○ Between £50 and £99.99  
4 ○ Between £100 and £249.99  
5 ○ Between £250 and £499.99  
6 ○ £500 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_DonateDK  
DonateDK-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
You just moved on without answering this question? Can you estimate roughly what the 
total amount of money is that you have personally donated to all the organisations that you 
support over the last twelve months? This includes donations to collection tins, 
sponsorship, and direct debits, but not membership fees: 
 
1 ○ £24.99 or less  
2 ○ Between £25 and £49.99  
3 ○ Between £50 and £99.99  
4 ○ Between £100 and £249.99  
5 ○ Between £250 and £499.99  
6 ○ £500 or more  
7 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_Vol 
VolFreq-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking of all of the organisations that you volunteer for, roughly how frequently have you 
volunteered in the last twelve months? 
 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ 2-3 times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ 2-3 times a month  
5 ○ Once a month or less  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
 
VolTime-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And on average, roughly how much time did you give each time you volunteered? 
 
1 ○ Less than one hour  
2 ○ One or two hours  
3 ○ Three to five hours  
4 ○ Six to eight hours  
5 ○ Nine to eleven hours  
6 ○ Twelve hours or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_MemberPolPar 
MemberPolPar-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How long have you been a member of any political party (including if you have been a 
member of different parties over the years)? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
VolPolAct_MemberTradUnProfAsso
c  
MemberTradUnProfAssoc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How long have you been a member of any trade union or political association (including if 
you have been a member of different unions or associations over the years)? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: 
VolPolAct_MemberCampaignOrg  
MemberCampaignOrg-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How long have you been a member of any campaigning organisation (including if you have 
been a member of different campaigning organisations over the years)? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_MemberCharity 
MemberCharity-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How long have you been a member of any charity (including if you have been a member of 
different charities over the years)? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: VolPolAct_UnpaidPosPolPar 
UnpaidPosPolPar-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a political party, how long have you 
held this or a similar position in any political party? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: 
PolPolAct_UnpaidPosTradUnProfAss
oc 
UnpaidPosPosTradUnProfAssoc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a trade union or professional 
association, how long have you held this or a similar position in any union or association? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: 
VolPolAct_UnpaidPosCampaignOrg 
UnpaidPosCampaignOrg-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a campaigning organisation, how long 
have you held this or a similar position in any campaigning organisation? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: VolPolAct_UnpaidPosCharity 
UnpaidPosCharity-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking of your unpaid position of responsibility in a charity, how long have you held this 
or a similar position in any charity? 
 
1 ○ Less than 1 year  
2 ○ 1-2 years  
3 ○ 3-5 years  
4 ○ 6-10 years  
5 ○ More than 10 years  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: VolPolAct_OrgName 
CampaignOrgName-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You've said you support a campaigning organisation in one of the ways we asked about. 
What is the name of that campaigning organisation? If you support more than one 
campaigning organisation then please list them all: 
 
 
 
 
CharityName-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You've said you support a charity in one of the ways we asked about. What is the name of 
that charity? If you support more than one charity then please list them all: 
 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_PolActNonMult  
PolActNonMult-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Here are some reasons people have given about why they don’t take the kind of actions 
that we've asked about. Which of these, if any, are reasons why you haven't taken any of 
those actions? Please select all that apply: 
 
1 □ I don't have enough time  
2 □ It wouldn't make a difference  
3 □ I'm not knowledgeable enough  
4 □ I don't have the skills needed  
5 □ I don't have enough money  
6 □ No one ever asked me  
7 □ No one I know does those sorts of things  
8 □ Those sorts of things aren't for people 
like me 
 
9 □ I don't have the confidence  
10 □ Other  
 
Questionnaire  
263 
 
Page: 
VolPolAct_PolActNonMultOthText 
PolActNonMultOthText-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that there are other reasons that you haven't taken the kinds of actions that we've 
asked about. What are those reasons? 
 
 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_PolActNonLes 
PolActNonLes-  
RANKING 
Please rank the options that you selected in terms of their importance as reasons for you 
not taking the actions that we asked about: 
 
Rank in 3 slots 
1 x I don't have enough time  
2 x It wouldn't make a difference  
3 x I'm not knowledgeable enough  
4 x I don't have the skills needed  
5 x I don't have enough money  
6 x No one ever asked me  
7 x No one I know does those sorts of things  
8 x Those sorts of things aren't for people 
like me 
 
9 x I don't have the confidence  
10 x Other  
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Page: 
VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonMult  
GroupInvolvNonMult-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Here are some reasons people have given about why they don’t volunteer for or donate 
money to groups. Which of these, if any, are reasons why you haven't donated to or 
volunteered for the kinds of groups that we asked about? Please select all that apply: 
 
1 □ I don't have enough time  
2 □ It wouldn't make a difference  
3 □ I'm not knowledgeable enough  
4 □ I don't have the skills needed  
5 □ I don't have enough money  
6 □ No one ever asked me  
7 □ No one I know does those sorts of things  
8 □ Those sorts of things aren't for people 
like me 
 
9 □ I don't have the confidence  
10 □ Other  
 
Page: 
VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonMultOth
Text 
GroupInvolvNonMultOthText-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that there are other reasons that you haven't donated to or volunteered for the 
kinds of groups that we asked about. What are those reasons? 
 
 
Page: VolPolAct_GroupInvolvNonLes 
GroupInvolvNonLes-  
RANKING 
Please rank the options that you selected in terms of their importance as reasons for you 
not volunteering for or donating money to the kinds of groups that we asked about: 
 
Rank in 3 slots 
1 x I don't have enough time  
2 x It wouldn't make a difference  
3 x I'm not knowledgeable enough  
4 x I don't have the skills needed  
5 x I don't have enough money  
6 x No one ever asked me  
7 x No one I know does those sorts of things  
8 x Those sorts of things aren't for people 
like me 
 
9 x I don't have the confidence  
10 x Other  
 
end module: VolPolAct 
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Module: FreeTimeHols 
Page: FreeTimeHols_Intro 
Now we're moving on from questions about your voluntary activities to questions about what 
you do with your time. 
Page: FreeTimeHols_Time 
Time-  
GRID-OPEN 
First, we would like to ask you about how you divide your hours between various activities. 
On average, roughly how many hours per weekday do you spend doing each of the 
following things? Please round your answers to the nearest whole number and enter zero if 
you do not spend time doing that thing. Your total must equal 24 hours: 
 
Sleeping 
Caring for your family, for instance children or elderly relatives 
Housework such as cooking, cleaning, and shopping 
Paid employment including work you bring home 
Commuting to and from your place of work or study 
Commuting to and from your place of work 
Studying 
Looking after yourself (e.g. eating, showering, exercising) 
Other 
1  Hours per weekday  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_AnyWork 
AnyWork-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
You said that you don't do any paid work during the week. When was the last time you had 
paid work? 
 
1 ○ I do currently have paid work, but only 
at weekends 
 
2 ○ In the last year  
3 ○ Between one and two years ago  
4 ○ Between two and five years ago  
5 ○ Between five and ten years ago  
6 ○ More than ten years ago  
7 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: 
FreeTimeHols_CivSkillWorkCurr 
CivSkillWorkCurr-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Thinking about your paid employment, in the last six months roughly how frequently have 
you... 
 
...written a formal email or letter? 
...gone to a meeting where you took part in making decisions? 
...planned or chaired a meeting? 
...given a presentation? 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ A couple of times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ Once a fortnight  
5 ○ Once a month  
6 ○ Less than once a month  
7 ○ Not in the last six months  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: 
FreeTimeHols_CivSkillWorkPast 
CivSkillWorkPast-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Thinking about your last paid employment, roughly how frequently did you... 
 
...write a formal email or letter? 
...go to a meeting where you took part in making decisions? 
...plan or chair a meeting? 
...give a presentation? 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ A couple of times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ Once a fortnight  
5 ○ Once a month  
6 ○ Less than once a month  
7 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: FreeTimeHols_Break 
Now we're going to ask you about how you spend your free time. 
Page: FreeTimeHols_CultCapExt 
CultCapExt-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Roughly how often, if at all, do you... 
 
...go to the cinema? 
...go to live music gigs? 
...go to classical music or opera performances? 
...go to the theatre or a musical? 
...visit museums? 
...visit art galleries? 
...visit historic buildings? 
...go out to eat with others? 
...go to the bingo? 
...go to watch dance or ballet? 
...go to watch live sport (not on TV)? 
...go out to a pub, bar, or cafe? 
...go out to a nightclub? 
...go to see stand-up comedy? 
...go shopping for pleasure? 
...go out for a walk for pleasure? 
...play sport with others? 
1 ○ A couple of times a month or more  
2 ○ Once a month  
3 ○ Once every two to three months  
4 ○ Once every six months  
5 ○ Once a year  
6 ○ Less often  
7 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_EatOutVenue 
EatOutVenue-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
When you go out to eat with others, where do you go? Please select as many of the options 
as apply: 
 
1 □ Cafe or tea shop  
2 □ Pub  
3 □ Wine bar or bistro  
4 □ Hotel  
5 □ Fast food outlet  
6 □ High street restaurant (chain)  
7 □ High street restaurant (independent)  
8 □ Fine dining restaurant  
9 □ Market or street stall  
10 □ Other  
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Page: FreeTimeHols_EatOutType 
EatOutType-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
And what types of food do you eat? Please select as many of the options as apply: 
 
1 □ British  
2 □ French  
3 □ Italian  
4 □ Spanish  
5 □ Greek  
6 □ Turkish  
7 □ Eastern European  
8 □ Other European  
9 □ American  
10 □ Mexican  
11 □ Latin American  
12 □ South Asian (e.g. Indian, Bangladeshi, 
Pakistani) 
 
13 □ East Asian (e.g. Chinese, Thai, 
Japanese, Vietnamese) 
 
14 □ African  
15 □ Middle Eastern  
16 □ Other  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_CultCapInt 
CultCapInt-  
GRID 
Roughly how often, if at all, do you... 
 
...spend time reading a book (including on an electronic device) 
...read a magazine (including online) 
...listen to the radio 
...listen to music (not on the radio) 
...watch TV programmes or films at home (including live TV, 
streaming, catch-up services and DVDs) 
...play computer or video games 
...browse the internet (excluding news and social network websites) 
...use social networking websites 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ 2-3 times a week  
3 ○ Around once a week  
4 ○ Less than once a week  
5 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
269 
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_MusicGenre  
MusicGenre-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
What types of music do you like to listen to? Please select all the options that apply: 
 
1 □ Alternative/Indie  
2 □ Rock/Pop  
3 □ Classical/Opera  
4 □ Country  
5 □ Dance/Electronic  
6 □ Folk  
7 □ Metal/Punk  
8 □ Jazz/Blues  
9 □ Rap/Hip-Hop  
10 □ RnB/Urban  
11 □ Soul/Funk  
12 □ World Music  
13 □ Other  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_FilmGenre  
FilmGenre-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
What types of films do you like to watch? Please select all the options that apply: 
 
1 □ Action  
2 □ Classics  
3 □ Comedy   
4 □ Crime  
5 □ Documentaries  
6 □ Drama   
7 □ Family  
8 □ Fantasy  
9 □ Foreign/Art House  
10 □ History/Biography  
11 □ Horror  
12 □ Musicals and Dance movies  
13 □ Romance  
14 □ Sci-fi  
15 □ Thrillers  
16 □ Other  
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Page: FreeTimeHols_HolsFreq 
HolsFreq-  
GRID 
On average, how often do you go on holiday (including weekend breaks)... 
 
...on your own? 
...with your partner and/or children? 
...with your partner? 
...with family? 
...with friends? 
1 ○ Twice a year or more  
2 ○ Once a year  
3 ○ Less than once a year  
4 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_HolAct  
HolAct-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
When you go on holiday, what do you spend your time doing? Please select as many of the 
options as apply: 
 
1 □ Clubbing or going out  
2 □ Learning about local history or culture  
3 □ Reading  
4 □ Relaxing by doing as little as possible  
5 □ Sightseeing  
6 □ Shopping  
7 □ Trying local cuisine  
8 □ Taking part in organised group tours  
9 □ Taking part in organised group activities 
(such as hikes or treks, sports, or 
performances) 
 
10 □ Visiting places of natural beauty  
11 □ Other things not listed above  
 
Page: FreeTimeHols_HolsActOthText  
HolsActOthText-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that you do other things when you're on holiday. What are those things? 
 
end module: FreeTimeHols 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
271 
 
 
Module: SocNet 
 
Page: SocNet_Intro 
Now we're going to ask you about the people you know and the ways they might help you out. 
 
Page: SocNet_WhoKnow 
WhoKnow-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Do you know anyone who does this sort of job? 
 
Teacher, nurse, or social worker 
Artist, musician, or performer 
Secretary, office clerk, or call centre agent 
Chief executive, finance manager, or military officer 
Mechanic, plumber, electrician, gardener, or farmer 
Postal worker, security guard, caretaker, machine operator or farm 
worker 
Sales assistant, catering assistant, or receptionist 
Military non-officer, labourer, porter, or cleaner 
Bus, coach, lorry, or van driver 
Waiter or waitress, or bar staff 
Pub, shop, bank, office, or restaurant manager 
Accountant, solicitor, or medical practitioner 
Civil engineer, researcher or scientist 
No job (long-term unemployed) 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: SocNet_FriendsNo 
Friends_Daily-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many friends do you have who you see or are in contact with daily or nearly every 
day? 
 
1 ○ None  
2 ○ 1 or 2  
3 ○ 3 to 5  
4 ○ 6 to 9  
5 ○ 10 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Friends_Weekly-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And what about other friends who you see or are in contact with weekly or nearly every 
week? 
 
1 ○ None  
2 ○ 1 or 2  
3 ○ 3 to 5  
4 ○ 6 to 9  
5 ○ 10 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Friends_Monthly-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And now, what about other friends who you see or are in contact with monthly or nearly 
every month? 
 
1 ○ None  
2 ○ 1 or 2  
3 ○ 3 to 5  
4 ○ 6 to 9  
5 ○ 10 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: SocNet_NeighboursKnow 
NeighboursKnow-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly how many people, if any, do you know in your neighbourhood (excluding family 
members who live near you)? 
 
1 ○ None  
2 ○ 1 or 2  
3 ○ 3 to 5  
4 ○ 6 to 9  
5 ○ 10 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: SocNet_NeighboursTalk 
NeighboursTalk-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How often, if at all, do you talk to any of your neighbours? 
 
1 ○ On most days  
2 ○ Once or twice a week  
3 ○ Once or twice a month  
4 ○ Less than once a month  
5 ○ Never  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: SocNet_FriendSex 
FriendSex 
RULE 
Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same sex as you? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendSexDK 
FriendSexDK-  
RULE 
You just moved on without answering this question.  
 Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends are the same sex as you? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendEth  
FriendEth 
RULE 
Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same ethnic group as you? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendEthDK  
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FriendEthDK-  
RULE 
You just moved on without answering this question.  
 Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends are the same ethnic group as 
you? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendRel  
FriendRel 
RULE 
Roughly what proportion of your friends have the same religious beliefs as you (including if 
you have no religious beliefs)? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendRelDK 
FriendRelDK-  
RULE 
You just moved on without answering this question.  
 Can you estimate roughly what proportion of your friends have the same religious beliefs 
as you (including if you have no religious beliefs)? 
 
left 0% 
right 100% 
 
Page: SocNet_FriendMeet  
FriendHome-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly how often do you spend time with friends at your home or one of theirs? 
 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ A couple of times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ Once a fortnight  
5 ○ Once a month  
6 ○ A few times a year  
7 ○ Once a year or less often  
8 ○ Never  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
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FriendOut-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly how often do you go out with your friends? 
 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ A couple of times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ Once a fortnight  
5 ○ Once a month  
6 ○ A few times a year  
7 ○ Once a year or less often  
8 ○ Never  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
ColleaguesOut- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly how often do you go out socially with your colleagues? 
 
1 ○ Daily  
2 ○ A couple of times a week  
3 ○ Once a week  
4 ○ Once a fortnight  
5 ○ Once a month  
6 ○ A few times a year  
7 ○ Once a year or less often  
8 ○ Never  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Page: SocNet_FamilyClose 
FamilyCloseBy-  
GRID 
Apart from any relatives who you live with, how many close relatives live... 
 
...within a 15-20 minutes walk or 5-10 minute drive? 
...further away? 
1 ○ None  
2 ○ 1 or 2  
3 ○ 3 to 5  
4 ○ 6 to 9  
5 ○ 10 or more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
276 
 
Page: SocNet_HelpReceived 
HelpReceived-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE DYNAMIC GRID 
Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have 
helped you in these ways: 
 
Helped you write your C.V. 
Given you career advice or asked someone they know to give you 
career advice 
Searched for jobs or work experience for you 
Contacted people they know to get you a job or work experience 
Put in a good word for you with a potential employer 
Offered you a job or work experience 
Given you financial support or paid your fees when you were a 
student 
Given you financial support (or paid debts) whilst you were 
unemployed or looking for work 
Loaned you money in an emergency 
Helped you financially when buying a house 
Helped you move house 
Helped you with childcare 
Helped you in a crisis 
1 □ Partner  
2 □ Family  
3 □ Friends  
4 □ Family friends  
5 □ Colleagues  
6 □ None of these groups  
7 □ Not applicable  
 
Page: SocNet_HelpWouldGet 
HelpWouldGet- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking generally, if you asked for help how likely do you think it is that you would receive 
it? 
 
1 ○ Very likely  
2 ○ Likely  
3 ○ Unlikely  
4 ○ Very unlikely  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: SocNet_HelpWouldAsk 
HelpWouldAsk- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
And finally, would you ask for help if you needed it? 
 
1 ○ Definitely  
2 ○ Probably  
3 ○ Probably not  
4 ○ Definitely not  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
end module: SocNet 
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Appendix B: Full Wave 2 Survey 
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Module: ViewsPol 
Page: ViewsPol_Intro 
Thank you for taking this survey, which is about your interest in politics, views on British 
society, and background. Your YouGov Account will be credited with 75 points for completing 
the survey. We have tested the survey and found that, on average it takes around 17 to 20 
minutes to complete. This time may vary depending on factors such as your Internet 
connection speed and the answers you give. Please click the forward button to continue. 
 
Page: ViewsPol_SISE 
SISE-  
SCALE 
Before we start the main questions, we'd just like to ask how true the following statement 
is of you:   I have high self-esteem 
 
min 1 
max 7 
 
Page: ViewsPol_PolForYou1 
Now we're moving on to some questions about politics. 
PolForYou1-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
First, generally speaking to what extent do you think that politics is for people like you? 
 
1 ○ Completely  
2 ○ Largely  
3 ○ Somewhat  
4 ○ Not really  
5 ○ Not at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_PolPers1 
PolPers1-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And to what extent would you describe yourself as a political person? 
 
1 ○ Completely  
2 ○ Largely  
3 ○ Somewhat  
4 ○ Not really  
5 ○ Not at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: ViewsPol_IntNat 
IntNat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How much attention, if any, do you pay to what's going on in national politics? 
 
1 ○ A great deal  
2 ○ Quite a lot  
3 ○ Some  
4 ○ Hardly any  
5 ○ None at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsPol_IntLoc 
IntLoc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And thinking about your local community, how much attention, if any, do you pay to local 
politics? 
 
1 ○ A great deal  
2 ○ Quite a lot  
3 ○ Some  
4 ○ Hardly any  
5 ○ None at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_DiscNat 
DiscNat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, how often do you discuss national politics? 
 
1 ○ Every day or almost every day  
2 ○ A few times a week  
3 ○ Once or twice a week  
4 ○ A few times a month  
5 ○ Once or twice a month  
6 ○ A few times a year  
7 ○ A couple of times a year or less  
8 ○ Never  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
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Page: ViewsPol_DiscLoc 
DiscLoc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And generally speaking, how often do you discuss local politics with others? 
 
1 ○ Every day or almost every day  
2 ○ A few times a week  
3 ○ Once or twice a week  
4 ○ A few times a month  
5 ○ Once or twice a month  
6 ○ A few times a year  
7 ○ A couple of times a year or less  
8 ○ Never  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
Page: ViewsPol_RealComfDiscWell 
RealComfDiscWell-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, when you discuss politics with people who you know well how 
confident are you in expressing your views? 
 
1 ○ Very confident  
2 ○ Confident  
3 ○ Fairly confident  
4 ○ Not very confident  
5 ○ Not at all confident  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
Page: 
ViewsPol_HypComfDiscNotWell 
HypComfDiscNotWell- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
And generally speaking, if you were discussing politics with some people who you'd just 
met how confident would you be in expressing your views? 
 
1 ○ Very confident  
2 ○ Confident  
3 ○ Fairly confident  
4 ○ Not very confident  
5 ○ Not at all confident  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: ViewsPol_Understand 
Understand-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
To what extent do you agree or disagree that it is generally hard for you to understand 
what is going on in government and politics? 
 
1 ○ Strongly agree  
2 ○ Agree  
3 ○ Tend to agree  
4 ○ Tend to disagree  
5 ○ Disagree  
6 ○ Strongly disagree  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsPol_KnowPerc 
KnowPerc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How much would you say that you know about British politics? 
 
1 ○ A great deal  
2 ○ Quite a lot  
3 ○ A little bit  
4 ○ Hardly anything  
5 ○ Nothing  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_KnowVenue 
KnowVenue-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Off the top of your head, can you think of a place in your local area that you could use if you 
wanted to arrange a public meeting or set up a group? 
 
1 ○ There aren't any places like that in my 
local area 
 
2 ○ I can't think of any places like that in my 
local area 
 
3 ○ I have an idea of a place or some places 
that I might be able to use 
 
4 ○ I definitely know a place or some places 
that I could use 
 
5 ○ I don't know whether there are any 
places like that in my local area 
 
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: ViewsPol_KnowLetter 
KnowLetter-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Many people don't know whether MPs are required to respond to contact from them. Do 
you know which of the following statements is true? 
 
1 ○ MPs are not required to reply to letters 
or emails that they receive, regardless 
of who they come from 
 
2 ○ MPs are required to reply to all letters or 
emails that they receive from their 
constituents 
 
3 ○ MPs are required to reply to all letters or 
emails that they receive from British 
citizens 
 
4 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_KnowMP 
knowMP-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of the following people is the MP in your UK parliamentary constituency? 
 
1 ○ John Robertson  
2 ○ Mary Davies  
3 ○ Susan Stewart  
4 ○ David Johnston  
5 ○ [correct local MP]  
6 ○ Salaam Fadhil  
7 ○ Don't know  
998  Skipped  
999  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsPol_MPsPrivSch 
MPsPrivSchRule-  
RULE 
What percentage of Members of Parliament do you think were privately educated? 
 
right 100% 
left 0% 
 
Page: ViewsPol_Knowledge 
Knowledge-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Please match the following people to their jobs: 
Ed Miliband  
Nick Clegg  
Justine Greening  
Theresa May  
John Bercow  
1 ○ International Development Secretary  
2 ○ Deputy Prime Minister  
3 ○ Leader of the Labour Party  
4 ○ Home secretary  
5 ○ Speaker of the House of Commons  
6 ○ Work and Pensions Secretary  
7 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsPol_LeftRight 
LeftRight-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that... 
 
... it's not government's job to 
redistribute income from the 
better off to those who are less 
well off? 
...big business takes advantage 
of ordinary people? 
...ordinary working people get 
their fair share of the nation's 
wealth? 
...there is one law for the rich and 
one for the poor? 
...management will always try to 
take advantage of employees if it 
gets the chance? 
...private enterprise is the best 
way to solve Britain's economic 
problems? 
1 ○ Strongly disagree  
2 ○ Tend to disagree  
3 ○ Both disagree and agree  
4 ○ Tend to agree  
5 ○ Strongly agree  
6 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsPol_LibAuth 
LibAuth-  
DYNAMIC GRID 
Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that... 
 
...people in Britain should be 
more tolerant of people who lead 
unconventional lives? 
...for some crimes, the death 
penalty is the most appropriate 
sentence? 
...schools should stress the 
importance of obeying authority 
to children? 
...people should always be 
allowed to organize public 
meetings to protest against the 
government? 
...people who break the law 
should be given stiffer sentences 
than they are at present? 
...even political parties that wish 
to overthrow democracy should 
not be banned? 
1 ○ Strongly disagree  
2 ○ Tend to disagree  
3 ○ Both disagree and agree  
4 ○ Tend to agree  
5 ○ Strongly agree  
6 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_SysInfluence 
SysInfluence-  
GRID 
Generally speaking, how much influence would you say that members of the public have 
over decisions affecting relevant policies in... 
 
...their local area (within 20 
minutes walk of their homes)? 
...their city or region?  
...the United Kingdom?  
1 ○ None at all  
2 ○ Hardly any  
3 ○ A little bit  
4 ○ Quite a lot  
5 ○ A great deal  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsPol_IndInfluence 
IndInfluence-  
GRID 
Compared to most people, how much influence would you say that you have over decisions 
affecting relevant policies in... 
 
...your local area (within 20 
minutes walk of your home)? 
...your city or region?  
...the United Kingdom?  
1 ○ Much less  
2 ○ Slightly less  
3 ○ About the same  
4 ○ Slightly more  
5 ○ Much more  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_RepLoc 
RepLoc-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, if you had a complaint about a something that your council was doing 
and took it to your councillor, how much attention do you think that they would pay to 
what you say? 
 
1 ○ A great deal  
2 ○ Quite a lot  
3 ○ A little bit  
4 ○ Hardly any  
5 ○ None at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsPol_RepNat 
RepNat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, if you had a complaint about a national political issue and took it to 
your MP, how much attention do you think that they would pay to what you say? 
 
1 ○ A great deal  
2 ○ Quite a lot  
3 ○ A little bit  
4 ○ Hardly any  
5 ○ None at all  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsPol_MPsLoseTouch 
MPsLoseTouch-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, which of the following statements best represents whether the people 
we elect as MPs are in touch with the public? 
 
1 ○ They stay in touch with the public even 
once they're elected 
 
2 ○ They lose touch with the public once 
they're elected 
 
3 ○ They were never in touch with the public 
in the first place 
 
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_LeftRightSelf 
LeftRightSelfGrid-  
GRID 
In politics, people talk of 'left wing' and 'right wing'. Where would you place your views, 
generally speaking? 
 
1 ○ Left wing  
2 ○   
3 ○   
4 ○   
5 ○   
6 ○   
7 ○   
8 ○   
9 ○   
10 ○ Right wing  
11 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: pdl_PartyID 
PartyID- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as Conservative, Labour, Liberal 
Democrat, Scottish National Party(SNP) or Plaid Cymru, or don't you usually think of 
yourself as any of these things?  
 
1 ○ Yes - Labour  
2 ○ Yes - Conservative  
3 ○ Yes - Liberal Democrat  
4 ○ Yes - Scottish National Party (SNP)   
5 ○ Yes - Plaid Cymru  
6 ○ Yes - Green Party  
7 ○ Yes - UK Independence Party (UKIP)  
8 ○ Yes - British National Party (BNP)  
9 ○ Yes some other party  
10 ○ No don’t think of myself as any of these  
11 ○ Don't know  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Page: ViewsPol_PartyCloser 
PartyCloser-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you feel a little closer to one of the political parties than the others? 
 
1 ○ Yes - Labour  
2 ○ Yes - Conservative  
3 ○ Yes - Liberal Democrat  
4 ○ Yes - Scottish National Party (SNP)  
5 ○ Yes - Plaid Cymru  
6 ○ Yes - Green Party  
7 ○ Yes - UK Independence Party (UKIP)  
8 ○ Yes - British National Party (BNP)  
9 ○ Yes - some other party  
10 ○ No - I don't feel closer to any of these  
11 ○ Don't know  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
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Page: pdl_PastVote 
PastVote- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Thinking back to the General Election in May 2010, do you remember which party you 
voted for then - or perhaps you didn't vote? 
 
1 ○ Did not vote  
2 ○ Conservative Party  
3 ○ Labour Party  
4 ○ Liberal Democrats  
5 ○ Scottish National Party  
6 ○ Plaid Cymru  
7 ○ British National Party (BNP)  
8 ○ Green Party  
9 ○ Respect  
10 ○ United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP) 
 
11 ○ Some other party  
12 ○ Don't know  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
end module: ViewsPol 
 
 
Module: ViewsImpBack 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_Intro 
Now we're going to ask you about some of your views about British society and your place in 
it. Remember, these questions are about your opinions so there are no right or wrong answers; 
it's just important to us that you answer truthfully. 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsImpBack_Trust 
TrustGrid-  
GRID 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too 
careful in dealing with people? 
 
1 ○ You can't be too careful about people  
2 ○   
3 ○   
4 ○   
5 ○   
6 ○   
7 ○   
8 ○   
9 ○   
10 ○ Most people can be trusted  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_ReasStatMult 
ReasStatMult-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which of the following do you think are reasons for some people achieving higher status 
than others? Please select all the options that you think have any effect on the status that 
people achieve: 
 
1 □ Because they have been lucky  
2 □ Because they work hard  
3 □ It's an inevitable part of modern life  
4 □ Because of their backgrounds  
5 □ Because they are ambitious  
6 □ Because of inequality based on things 
like sex, race, and religion 
 
7 □ Other things not covered above  
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Page: ViewsImpBack_ReasStatOth 
ReasStatOth-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that there are other reasons for some people achieving higher status than others. 
What are those reasons? 
 
 
 
Page: 
ViewsImpBack_ReasStatRankLes 
ReasStatRankLes-  
RANKING 
Please rank the reasons that you selected in order of their importance for the status that 
people achieve: 
 
1 x Because they have been lucky  
2 x Because they work hard  
3 x It's an inevitable part of modern life  
4 x Because of their backgrounds  
5 x Because they are ambitious  
6 x Because of inequality based on things 
like sex, race, and religion 
 
7 x The other reasons you listed  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_StatBreak 
Now we'd like to ask you about the things that have contributed to the social status that you 
have achieved. 
 
Page: 
ViewsImpBack_BackImpSelfRank 
BackImpSelfRank-  
RANKING 
Which of the reasons that we've asked about have played the most important part in the 
social status that you have achieved? If you think an option has not played a part in the 
social status that you have achieved then you do not need to rank it: 
 
1 x Luck  
2 x Hard work  
3 x Innevitable status differences in modern 
life 
 
4 x Background  
5 x Ambition  
6 x Inequality based on things like sex, 
race, and religion 
 
7 x Other reasons  
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Page: 
ViewsImpBack_ReasStatBackNot 
ReasStatBackNot-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
You didn't rank background as one of the reasons for the social status that you have 
achieved. Do you think that your background has played any part at all in the social status 
that you have achieved? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
ViewsImpBack_BackImpPosNeg 
BackImpPosNegGrid-  
GRID 
Using this scale, where -5 equals "very negative" and 5 equals "very positive", please 
indicate whether your own background has had a negative or positive impact on the social 
status you have achieved: 
 
1 ○ -5 very negative  
2 ○ -4  
3 ○ -3  
4 ○ -2  
5 ○ -1  
6 ○ 0 Equally positive and negative  
7 ○ 1  
8 ○ 2  
9 ○ 3  
10 ○ 4  
11 ○ 5 very positive  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: 
ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenMult 
IndStatGenMult-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which of the following things, for you, are indicators of people's status? Please select all 
the things that you think indicate people's status: 
 
1 □ Their appearance and dress  
2 □ The way they speak  
3 □ Their ideas  
4 □ Their cultural interests and activities  
5 □ The things they buy or own  
6 □ Their type of occupation  
7 □ Their education  
8 □ Who they know  
9 □ Where they live  
10 □ Their income  
11 □ Other things not covered above  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenOth 
IndStatGenOth-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that there are other indicators of people's status. What are those indicators? 
 
 
 
Page: 
ViewsImpBack_IndStatGenRankLes 
IndStatGenRankLes-  
RANKING 
Please rank the options that you selected according to which is the most important 
indicator of people's status: 
 
1 x Their appearance and dress  
2 x The way they speak  
3 x Their ideas  
4 x Their cultural interests and activities  
5 x The things they buy or own  
6 x Their type of occupation  
7 x Their education  
8 x Who they know  
9 x Where they live  
10 x Their income  
11 x The other things you listed  
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Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolMult 
IndStatPolMult-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Now please think about people who get involved in politics. Do you think any of the things 
we've asked about make them different from you?   Please select all the options that you 
think make people who get involved in politics different from you: 
 
1 □ Their appearance and dress  
2 □ The way they speak  
3 □ Their ideas  
4 □ Their cultural interests and activities  
5 □ The things they buy or own  
6 □ Their type of occupation  
7 □ Their education  
8 □ Who they know  
9 □ Where they live  
10 □ Their income  
11 □ Other things not covered above    
12 □ The same things I ranked in the last 
question also make people who get 
involved in politics different from me 
 
13 □ Nothing makes people who get involved 
in politics different from me 
 
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolOth 
IndStatPolOth-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
You said that there are other things that make people who get involved in politics different 
from you. What are those things? 
 
 
 
Page: 
ViewsImpBack_IndStatPolRankLes 
IndStatPolRankLes-  
RANKING 
Please rank the options that you selected according to which makes people who get 
involved in politics most different from you: 
 
1 x Their appearance and dress  
2 x The way they speak  
3 x Their ideas  
4 x Their cultural interests and activities  
5 x The things they buy or own  
6 x Their type of occupation  
7 x Their education  
8 x Who they know  
9 x Where they live  
10 x Their income  
11 x The other things you listed  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsImpBack_LadSoc1 
LadSoc1-  
RANKING 
Imagine that all the people in society are on different rungs of the ladder shown below in 
terms of their status. Those with the lowest status are on rung 10. Those with the highest 
status are on rung 1. Compared to people in society in general, which rung are you on? 
 
1 x People in society  
2 x People in society  
3 x People in society  
4 x People in society  
5 x People in society  
6 x You  
7 x People in society  
8 x People in society  
9 x People in society  
10 x People in society  
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_LadKnow1 
LadKnow1-  
RANKING 
Now imagine that the people you know personally are on different rungs of the same 
ladder. Again, those with the highest status are on rung 1 and those with the lowest status 
are on rung 10. In your opinion which rung are you on? 
 
1 x People you know  
2 x People you know  
3 x People you know  
4 x People you know  
5 x People you know  
6 x You  
7 x People you know  
8 x People you know  
9 x People you know  
10 x People you know  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_SocClaSelFil 
SocClaSelFil-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you feel like you belong to a particular social class? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: 
ViewsImpBack_SocClaSelfOpen 
SocClaSelfOpen-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
What social class do you feel you belong to? Please write your answer: 
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_PolPrivSelf 
PolPrivSelf-  
GRID 
Generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than you do you think the following 
people are? 
 
People who become politicians  
People who get involved in 
politics generally 
1 ○ A lot less privileged than me  
2 ○ Less privileged than me  
3 ○ A little less privileged than me  
4 ○ About equally privileged to me  
5 ○ A little more privileged than me  
6 ○ More privileged than me  
7 ○ A lot more privileged than me  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: ViewsImpBack_PolPrivPop 
PolPrivPop-  
GRID 
And generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than most people in the 
population do you think that those people are? 
 
People who become politicians  
People who get involved in 
politics generally 
1 ○ Much less privileged  
2 ○ Less privileged  
3 ○ A little less privileged  
4 ○ About equally privileged  
5 ○ A little more privileged  
6 ○ More privileged  
7 ○ Much more privileged  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: ViewsImpBack_PrivDef 
PrivDef-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
If you hear people talking about someone being ‘privileged’, what kinds of things come to 
your mind? 
 
end module: ViewsImpBack 
 
Module: UpbringCurrCirc 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_Intro 
Finally, we're going to ask you some questions about your background and current 
circumstances. 
 
Page: pdl_Ethnicity 
Ethnicity- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
To which of these groups do you consider you belong? 
 
1 ○ White British  
2 ○ Any other white background  
3 ○ White and Black Caribbean  
4 ○ White and Black African  
5 ○ White and Asian  
6 ○ Any other mixed background  
7 ○ Indian  
8 ○ Pakistani  
9 ○ Bangladeshi  
10 ○ Any other Asian background  
11 ○ Black Caribbean  
12 ○ Black African  
13 ○ Any other black background  
14 ○ Chinese  
15 ○ Other ethnic group  
16 ○ Prefer not to say  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
300 
 
Page: pdl_Sexuality 
Sexuality- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of the following best describes your sexuality? 
 
1 ○ Heterosexual  
2 ○ Gay or lesbian  
3 ○ Bisexual  
4 ○ Other  
5 ○ Prefer not to say  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ParentWork 
ParentWork-  
GRID 
Thinking about when you were 14, did your mother or father have paid employment? 
 
Mother  
Father  
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
3 ○ Not applicable  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_MotherWork 
Please explain a bit more about your mother's work when you were 14. Please give enough 
information to give a clear picture of what she did. 
Questionnaire  
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MotherOcc-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
What job did your mother have? What was the name or title of her job? 
 
 
 
MotherOrg-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
What did the firm or organisation your mother worked at when you were 14 mainly make 
or do? 
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccStatus 
MotherOccStatus-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Was your mother an employee or self-employed/an independent contractor? 
 
1 ○ An employee  
2 ○ Self-employed/an independent 
contractor 
 
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccSupervi
se  
MotherOccSupervise-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Did your mother supervise or was she responsible for the work of any other people? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccOrgSize 
MotherOccOrgSize-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
About how many people worked for your mother's employer at the place where she 
worked?  
 
1 ○ 1 to 24 employees   
2 ○ 25 to 499 employees  
3 ○ 500 or more employees  
4 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherOccEmploy
ees 
MotherOccEmployees-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Did your mother work on her own or did she have employees? 
 
1 ○ She did not have employees  
2 ○ She had employees  
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherNumEmplo
yees 
MotherNumEmployees-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many people did she employ at the place she worked? 
 
1 ○ 1 to 24 employees  
2 ○ 25 to 499 employees  
3 ○ 500 or more employees  
99 ○ Don't know  
998  Skipped  
999  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FatherWork 
Please explain a bit about your father's job when you were 14. Please give enough information 
to give a clear picture of what he did.  
Questionnaire  
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FatherOcc-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
What job did your father have? What was the name or title of his job? 
 
 
 
FatherOrg-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
What did the firm or organisation your father worked at when you were 14 mainly make or 
do? 
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccStatus 
FatherOccStatus-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Was your father an employee or self-employed/an independent contractor? 
 
1 ○ An employee  
2 ○ Self-employed/an independent 
contractor 
 
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccSupervis
e 
FatherOccSupervise-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Did your father supervise or was he responsible for the work of any other people? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccOrgSize 
FatherOccOrgSize-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
About how many people worked for your father's employer at the place where he worked?  
 
1 ○ 1 to 24 employees   
2 ○ 25 to 499 employees  
3 ○ 500 or more employees  
4 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_FatherOccEmploye
es 
FatherOccEmployees-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Did your father work on his own or did he have employees? 
 
1 ○ He did not have employees  
2 ○ He had employees  
3 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_FatherNumEmploy
ees 
FatherNumEmployees-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many people did he employ at the place he worked? 
 
1 ○ 1 to 24 employees  
2 ○ 25 to 499 employees  
3 ○ 500 or more employees  
4 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_MotherEdLev 
MotherEdLev-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your mother 
finished? 
 
1 ○ Never finished school  
2 ○ O-Levels  
3 ○ GCEs  
4 ○ GCSEs  
5 ○ A-Levels  
6 ○ Undergraduate Degree  
7 ○ Postgraduate Degree  
8 ○ Other  
9 ○ Not applicable  
10 ○ Don't know  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FatherEdLev 
FatherEdLev-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your father 
finished? 
 
1 ○ Never finished school  
2 ○ O-Levels  
3 ○ GCEs  
4 ○ GCSEs  
5 ○ A-Levels  
6 ○ Undergraduate Degree  
7 ○ Postgraduate Degree  
8 ○ Other  
9 ○ Not applicable  
10 ○ Don't know  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_EducAge 
Now we're moving on from your parents to think about your own education. 
Questionnaire  
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EducAge- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
At what age did you finish full-time education? 
 
1 ○ 15 or under  
2 ○ 16  
3 ○ 17-18  
4 ○ 19  
5 ○ 20+  
6 ○ Still at school/Full time student  
7 ○ Can't remember  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_SchTypLast 
SchTypLast-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
What type of school or college did you last attend? 
 
1 ○ Academy  
2 ○ City Technology College  
3 ○ Comprehensive School  
4 ○ Faith School  
5 ○ Foundation or Trust School  
6 ○ Grammar School  
7 ○ Independent (Private) School  
8 ○ Secondary Modern School  
9 ○ Other State Secondary School 
(including Community Colleges) 
 
10 ○ State Sixth Form College (separate from 
a school) 
 
11 ○ Other - please specify the type:  
12 ○ Not applicable  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_SchTypPriMid 
SchTypPriMid-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
And did you attend an independent (private) school at primary or middle-school level? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_SchFees 
SchFees-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How were the fees paid? 
 
1 ○ My parents/guardians paid them in full 
(including if they had help from other 
family members) 
 
2 ○ The school covered them in part (for 
instance through a scholarship) but my 
family paid the rest 
 
3 ○ The school covered them in full (for 
instance through a scholarship) 
 
4 ○ Other  
5 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_Region 
Region- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which area of the UK do you live in? 
 
1 ○ North East  
2 ○ North West  
3 ○ Yorkshire and the Humber  
4 ○ East Midlands  
5 ○ West Midlands  
6 ○ East of England  
7 ○ London  
8 ○ South East  
9 ○ South West  
10 ○ Wales  
11 ○ Scotland  
12 ○ Northern Ireland  
13 ○ Non UK & Invalid Show if 0 
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ChilReg 
ChilReg-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which area of the UK did you grow up in? 
 
1 ○ North East  
2 ○ North West  
3 ○ Yorkshire and the Humber  
4 ○ East Midlands  
5 ○ West Midlands  
6 ○ East of England  
7 ○ London  
8 ○ South East  
9 ○ South West  
10 ○ Wales  
11 ○ Scotland  
12 ○ Northern Ireland  
13 ○ I grew up elsewhere in Europe  
14 ○ I grew up outside Europe  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_AccentYesNo 
AccentYesNo-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Would you say that you have a regional accent? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_AccentText 
AccentText-  
OPEN TEXTBOX 
How would you describe your accent? 
 
 
 
Page: pdl_PersInc 
PersInc- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Gross PERSONAL income is an individual’s total income received from all sources, including 
wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions...What is your gross personal income? 
 
1 ○ under £5,000 per year  
2 ○ £5,000 to £9,999 per year  
3 ○ £10,000 to £14,999 per year  
4 ○ £15,000 to £19,999 per year  
5 ○ £20,000 to £24,999 per year  
6 ○ £25,000 to £29,999 per year  
7 ○ £30,000 to £34,999 per year  
8 ○ £35,000 to £39,999 per year  
9 ○ £40,000 to £44,999 per year  
10 ○ £45,000 to £49,999 per year  
11 ○ £50,000 to £59,999 per year   
12 ○ £60,000 to £69,999 per year   
13 ○ £70,000 to £99,999 per year  
14 ○ £100,000 and over  
15 ○ Don't know  
16 ○ Prefer not to answer  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_HousInc 
HousInc- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Gross HOUSEHOLD income is the combined income of all those earners in a household from 
all sources, including wages, salaries, or rents and before tax deductions. What is your gross 
household income? 
 
1 ○ under £5,000 per year  
2 ○ £5,000 to £9,999 per year  
3 ○ £10,000 to £14,999 per year  
4 ○ £15,000 to £19,999 per year  
5 ○ £20,000 to £24,999 per year  
6 ○ £25,000 to £29,999 per year  
7 ○ £30,000 to £34,999 per year  
8 ○ £35,000 to £39,999 per year  
9 ○ £40,000 to £44,999 per year  
10 ○ £45,000 to £49,999 per year  
11 ○ £50,000 to £59,999 per year  
12 ○ £60,000 to £69,999 per year  
13 ○ £70,000 to £99,999 per year  
14 ○ £100,000 to £149,999 per year  
15 ○ £150,000 and over  
16 ○ Don't know  
17 ○ Prefer not to answer  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_Property 
Property- 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which, if any, of the following do you own? 
 
1 □ Residential property for own use – 
owned outright 
 
2 □ Residential property for own use – on 
mortgage 
 
3 □ Residential property rented out to others  
4 □ Plot of land over 1 acre with no 
development 
 
5 □ Commercial property - i.e. property used 
for business purposes, either used by 
yourself or rented to someone else 
 
98 □ Not sure  
99 □ None of these  
 
Questionnaire  
311 
 
Page: pdl_Assets 
Assets- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
*Please can you provide an estimate of the total value of your wealth and assets?*  
This includes, for example, your savings, investments, shares, stock and option holdings in 
the company you work for, properties you own OTHER THAN YOUR MAIN RESIDENCE, 
works of art and other collectible items, and your pension fund IF YOU ARE RETIRED.  
Please exclude the value of your main home that you live in, any businesses that you own, 
your pension fund if you are not retired and please subtract the value of any debts secured 
against your assets, e.g. a mortgage you might have on a second home. 
 
1 ○ Up to £9,999  
2 ○ £10,000 to £24,999  
3 ○ £25,000 to £49,999  
4 ○ £50,000 to £74,999  
5 ○ £75,000 to £99,999  
6 ○ £100,000 to £249,999  
7 ○ £250,000 to £499,999  
8 ○ £500,000 to £749,999  
9 ○ £750,000 to £999,999  
10 ○ £1 million to £1,999,999  
11 ○ £2 million to £4,999,999  
12 ○ £5 million to £9,999,999  
13 ○ £10 million to £19,999,999  
14 ○ £20 million or more  
99 ○ Don’t know  
100 ○ Prefer not to answer  
998  Skipped  
999  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_Debts 
Debts- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which one of the following statements BEST describes how well you (and your partner if 
you live with someone else) are keeping up with your bills and credit commitments at the 
moment? 
 
1 ○ I am/we are keeping up with all bills and 
commitments without any difficulties 
 
2 ○ I am/we are keeping up with all bills and 
commitments, but it is a struggle from 
time to time 
 
3 ○ I am/we are keeping all bills and 
commitments, but it is a constant 
struggle 
 
4 ○ I am/we are falling behind with some 
bills or credit commitments 
 
5 ○ I am/we are having real financial 
problems and have fallen behind with 
many bills or credit commitments 
 
6 ○ I/we don't have any bills or credit 
commitments 
 
7 ○ Don't know  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_Benefits 
Benefits- 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which, if any, of the following government benefits are you currently claiming? 
 
1 □ Council tax reductions  
2 □ Disability benefit  
3 □ Carers allowance  
4 □ Housing benefits  
5 □ Means-tested benefits  
6 □ Health benefits  
7 □ Heating benefits  
8 □ Child benefit  
9 □ Child tax credit  
10 □ Income support  
11 □ Pension credit  
12 □ The Social Fund  
98 □ Prefer not to say  
99 □ None of these  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_Disability 
Disability- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Are your day-to-day activities limited because of a health problem or disability which has 
lasted, or is expected to last, at least 12 months? 
 
1 ○ Yes, limited a lot  
2 ○ Yes, limited a little  
3 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: pdl_Health 
Health- 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Have you been diagnosed with any of the following?  Please tick all that apply. 
 
1 □ Alzheimer’s  
2 □ Arthritis - Osteoarthritis  
3 □ Arthritis - rheumatoid arthritis  
4 □ Arthritis - other / unsure which type  
5 □ Asthma  
6 □ Autism  
7 □ Cancer  
8 □ Cerebral Palsy  
9 □ Cystic fibrosis  
10 □ Dementia  
11 □ Diabetes  
12 □ Dyslexia  
13 □ Epilepsy  
14 □ Hearing impairment  
15 □ HIV/ Aids  
16 □ Multiple Sclerosis  
17 □ Osteoporosis  
18 □ Parkinson’s disease  
19 □ Mental health illness  
100 □ Prefer not to say  
99 □ None of these  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_Children 
Children- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
How many children do you have, including those who are now aged 18 or over? 
 
0 ○ None  
1 ○ 1  
2 ○ 2  
3 ○ 3  
4 ○ 4  
5 ○ 5  
6 ○ 6  
7 ○ 7  
8 ○ 8 or more  
100 ○ Prefer not to say  
998  Skipped  
999  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: 
UpbringCurrCirc_CarRespNoChi 
CarRespNoChi-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you have caring responsibilities for anyone? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_CarRespChi 
CarRespChi-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you have caring responsibilities for anyone other than your children? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_Religion 
Religion- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you regard yourself as belonging to any particular religion, and if so, to which of these 
do you belong?  
 
1 ○ No, I do not regard myself as belonging 
to any particular religion.  
 
2 ○ Yes - Church of 
England/Anglican/Episcopal 
 
3 ○ Yes - Roman Catholic  
4 ○ Yes - Presbyterian/Church of Scotland  
5 ○ Yes - Methodist  
6 ○ Yes - Baptist  
17 ○ Yes – Orthodox  
18 ○ Yes - Pentecostal (e.g. Assemblies of 
God, Elim Pentecostal Church, New 
Testament Church of God, Redeemed 
Christian Church of God) 
 
19 ○ Yes - Evangelical – independent/non-
denominational (e.g. FIEC, Pioneer, 
Vineyard, Newfrontiers) 
 
7 ○ Yes - United Reformed Church  
8 ○ Yes - Free Presbyterian  
9 ○ Yes - Brethren  
10 ○ Yes - Judaism  
11 ○ Yes - Hinduism  
12 ○ Yes - Islam  
13 ○ Yes - Sikhism  
14 ○ Yes - Buddhism  
15 ○ Yes - Other  
16 ○ Prefer not to say  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligAttend 
ReligAttend-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
How often do you attend religious services? 
 
1 ○ Never  
2 ○ Less than once a month  
3 ○ Once a month  
4 ○ 2-3 times a month  
5 ○ Once a week  
6 ○ 2-3 times a Week  
7 ○ Daily  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligInst 
ReligInst-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Do you belong to, or are you a member of, a religious institution in your local area or a 
nearby area? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligPar 
ReligPar-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
When you attend services do you usually go to the same congregation or parish?  
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligVol 
ReligVol-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Other than attending services, in the past twelve months have you been an active member 
of your congregation by serving on a committee, giving time for a special project, or helping 
to organise meetings? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligVolTim 
ReligVolTim-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
In an average week about how many hours do you give to religious activity other than 
attending services? For instance, how many hours do you give to participating in 
educational, charitable, or social activities, or in other congregation affairs?  
 
1 ○ Four hours or more  
2 ○ Between two and four hours  
3 ○ Between one and two hours  
4 ○ One hour or less  
5 ○ None  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligOfficPos 
ReligOfficPos-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
In the past five years, have you served on a board or held an official position in your 
congregation?  
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_ReligDonat 
ReligDonat-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Roughly how much money do you contribute to your religion each year?  
 
1 ○ £500 or more  
2 ○ Between £250 and £500  
3 ○ Between £100 and £250  
4 ○ Between £50 and £100  
5 ○ £50 or less  
6 ○ Nothing  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
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Page: UpbringCurrCirc_CivSkillRel 
CivSkillRel-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Here is a list of things that people are sometimes asked to do as part of their involvement 
with a religious congregation. Have you engaged in any of these activities in the last six 
months? Please select all of those that apply. 
 
1 □ Written a letter  
2 □ Gone to a meeting where you took part 
in making decisions 
 
3 □ Planned or chaired a meeting  
4 □ Given a presentation or speech  
5 □ None of these  
 
Page: pdl_Newspaper 
Newspaper- 
SINGLE CHOICE 
Which daily newspaper do you read most often? 
 
1 ○ The Express  
2 ○ The Daily Mail / The Scottish Daily Mail  
3 ○ The Mirror / Daily Record  
4 ○ The Daily Star / The Daily Star of 
Scotland 
 
5 ○ The Sun  
6 ○ The Daily Telegraph  
7 ○ The Financial Times  
8 ○ The Guardian  
9 ○ The Independent  
10 ○ The Times  
11 ○ The Scotsman  
12 ○ The Herald (Glasgow)  
13 ○ The Western Mail  
14 ○ Other local daily morning newspaper  
15 ○ Other Newspaper  
16 ○ None  
98  Skipped  
99  Not Asked  
 
Questionnaire  
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Page: pdl_Magazines 
Magazines-  
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which, if any, of the following types of magazine do you ever read? 
 
1 □ Fashion  
2 □ Beauty  
3 □ Celebrity/Gossip  
4 □ Real life stories  
5 □ Home  
6 □ Gardening  
7 □ Sport (excluding football)  
8 □ News/Topical  
9 □ Financial/Economic  
10 □ Professional/Trade (i.e. magazines for 
specific professions or industries) 
 
11 □ Political  
12 □ Health/Fitness  
13 □ Technology  
14 □ Music  
15 □ Automotive  
16 □ Food/Cooking  
17 □ Business  
18 □ Art  
19 □ Gaming  
20 □ Travel  
21 □ Men's interests/lifestyle  
22 □ Women's interests/lifestyle  
23 □ Parenting  
24 □ Family  
27 □ Hobbies  
28 □ Football  
97 □ Other  (open [Magazines_Other])  
99 □ Not applicable - I do not read any type of 
magazine 
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Page: pdl_Radio 
Radio- 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which, if any, of the following radio stations do you ever listen to? 
 
1 □ Absolute Radio  
2 □ BBC Radio 1  
3 □ BBC Radio 1Xtra  
4 □ BBC Radio 2  
5 □ BBC Radio 3  
6 □ BBC Radio 4  
7 □ BBC Radio 5 Live  
8 □ BBC Asian Network  
9 □ BBC World Service  
10 □ Classic FM  
11 □ Smooth FM  
12 □ talkSPORT  
13 □ Capital FM  
14 □ Choice FM  
15 □ Gold  
16 □ Heart  
17 □ Kerrang!  
18 □ Kiss  
19 □ LBC 97.3  
20 □ Magic 105.4  
21 □ XFM  
22 □ Other local commercial radio station  
(open [Radio_OtherLocal]) 
 
23 □ Other local BBC radio station  (open 
[Radio_OtherBBC]) 
 
98 □ Don't know  
99 □ None of the above  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page: pdl_TV 
TV- 
MULTIPLE CHOICE 
Which, if any, of the following TV channels do you ever watch (including any +1 or catch-
up/on-demand services)? (Please select all that apply) 
Questionnaire  
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1 □ BBC One  
3 □ BBC Two  
2 □ BBC Three  
49 □ BBC Four  
4 □ ITV1 (or STV/UTV)  
5 □ ITV2  
6 □ ITV3  
7 □ ITV4  
8 □ Channel 4  
9 □ E4  
10 □ More 4  
11 □ Channel 5  
12 □ Sky 1, 2 or 3  
13 □ Sky Atlantic  
14 □ Sky Living  
15 □ Dave  
16 □ G.O.L.D  
17 □ S4C  
18 □ Hallmark Channel  
19 □ CBS Action  
20 □ CBS Drama  
21 □ CBS Reality  
22 □ Challenge  
23 □ Comedy Central  
24 □ E! Enterainment  
25 □ Sky Arts (1 or 2)  
26 □ Discovery Channel  
50 □ National Geographic  
27 □ Good Food  
28 □ Home  
29 □ MTV (any MTV channel)  
30 □ VH1  
31 □ ESPN  
33 □ Sky Movies (any Sky Movies channel)  
34 □ Film 4  
35 □ TNT  
36 □ Pick TV  
37 □ Quest  
38 □ Sky News  
39 □ BBC News  
40 □ Bloomberg  
41 □ CNBC  
42 □ CNN  
43 □ al-Jazeera  
44 □ Russia Today  
45 □ Euro News  
46 □ Sky Sports 1, 2, 3 or 4  
47 □ Sky Sports News  
51 □ Disney (any Disney channel)  
52 □ cBeebies  
53 □ Nickledeon  
54 □ 4Music  
55 □ 4Seven  
56 □ 5 USA  
57 □ 5*  
58 □ BT Sport (1 or 2)  
59 □ Eden  
60 □ Kiss TV  
61 □ Smash Hits  
62 □ The Box  
Questionnaire  
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63 □ TLC  
64 □ Viva  
65 □ Watch  
66 □ Yesterday  
98 □ Don't know  
99 □ None of the above  
 
 
 
Page: UpbringCurrCirc_FocGroup 
Thank you for completing this survey; it's very much appreciated. The questions that you've 
just answered are part of a wider research project about people's lifestyles, backgrounds, 
opinions, and their voluntary and political activity. As part of that research we are also 
organising interviews and focus groups. 
FocGroup-  
SINGLE CHOICE 
Would you be willing to be contacted to be interviewed or invited to a focus group for this 
research? 
 
1 ○ Yes  
2 ○ No  
8  Skipped  
9  Not Asked  
 
end module: UpbringCurrCirc 
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Appendix C: Full Model Variable Descriptive Tables and Charts 
 
Tables and Charts 
 
 
Table C1. Respondents by Number of Property Types Owned p. 338 
 
Table C2. Respondents by Levels of Religious Activity p. 340 
 
Table C3. Highest Educational Qualification by Age of Leaving Formal 
Education 
p. 342 
 
Table C4: Percentages of Respondents by Sex and Ethnicity p. 345 
  
 
Chart C1. Frequency of Undertaking Eleven Political Acts p. 325  
 
Chart C2. Percentage of Respondents by Number of Political Acts Undertaken p. 326 
 
Chart C3. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency of Receiving 
Requests to get Involved with Groups from Eleven Sources 
p. 326 
 
Chart C4. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of 
Own Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels 
p. 327 
 
Chart C5. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of 
Population Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels 
p. 327  
 
Chart C6. Percentage of Respondents Correctly Identifying Political Figures p. 328  
 
Chart C7. Percentage of Respondents by 
Self-Perceived Knowledge of British Politics 
p. 328  
 
Chart C8. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency 
of Discussing National and Local Politics 
p. 329   
 
Chart C9. Percentage of Respondents by Level 
of Attention Paid to National and Local Politics 
p. 329  
 
Chart C10. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and Ranking 
Differences between Themselves and Politically Involved People 
p. 330  
 
Chart C11. Percentages of Respondents Perceiving Politicians and Politically 
Active People as More or Less Privileged than Themselves and Society 
p. 330  
 
Chart C12. Percentage of Respondents Selecting 
And Ranking Explanations for Own Status 
p. 331  
 
Chart C13. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and 
Ranking Explanations for Status Differences in Society 
p. 331  
 
Chart C14. Percentage of Respondents by Self-Ranked 
Status in Relation to Society and Acquaintances 
p. 332  
 
Chart C15. Number of Respondents by Number of Types of Help Received p. 332  
 
Chart C16. Mean Types of Help Received from Each Group p. 333  
 
Chart C17. Mean Number of Groups from which Types of Help have been 
Received 
p. 333  
 
Chart C18. Percentage of Respondents who are Acquainted 
with Someone from Fourteen Occupational Status Categories 
p. 334  
 
Chart C19. Number of Respondents Indicating the Percentages 
of their Friends Who Share their Sex, Ethnicity, and Religion 
p. 334  
 
Chart C20. Percentage of Respondents by Number of 
Friends Seen or Contacted Daily, Weekly, or Monthly 
p. 335  
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Tables and Charts (Continued) 
 
 
Chart C21. Percentage of Respondents who Listen to Thirteen Music 
Genres 
p. 335  
 
Chart C22. Percentage of Respondents who Watch Sixteen Film Genres p. 336 
 
Chart C23. Percentage of Respondents by 
Number of Cultural Activities Participated In 
p. 336  
 
Chart C24. Frequency of Undertaking Nine Cultural Activities p. 337  
 
Chart C25. Percentage of Respondents by 
Frequency of Exercising Four Civic Skills at Work 
p. 337  
 
Chart C26. Percentage of Respondents by Net Assets p. 338  
 
Chart C27. Percentage of Respondents by Household Income p. 339  
 
Chart C28. Percentages of Respondents Holding Authoritarian Social 
Views 
p. 339  
 
Chart C29. Percentages of Respondents Holding Left-Wing Views p. 340   
 
Chart C30. Percentage of Respondents by Work Type p. 341  
 
Chart C31. Percentage of Respondents by Social Grade p. 341  
 
Chart C32. Percentage of Respondents by Age of Leaving Formal 
Education 
p. 342  
 
Chart C33. Percentage of Respondents by Highest Educational 
Qualification 
p. 343  
 
Chart C34. Percentage of Respondents’ Parents by NS-SEC Category p. 343  
 
Chart C35. Percentage of Respondents’ Parents by Education Level p. 344  
 
Chart C36. Number of Respondents by Age p. 344  
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Notes 
 
- With few exceptions, the variables are ordinal or binary so the charts display the 
percentages selecting answers or the distribution of respondents across categories. Means 
and standard deviations are provided for interval variables. 
- Responses to the questions, and the results, have been weighted using YouGov’s standard 
demographic weights in order to improve the representativeness of the sample and, unless 
otherwise stated, there are 1,480 cases. 
 
 
Chart C1. Frequency of Undertaking Eleven Political Acts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘In the last five years roughly how often have you done the following things in relation to any issue that you care 
about personally?’ 
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Chart C2. Percentage of Respondents by Number 
of Political Acts Undertaken (Mean = 4.4, S.D. = 3.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart C3. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency of 
Receiving Requests to get Involved with Groups from Eleven Sources 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: Here's the list of ways to support organisations that we just asked about: Donate money; Volunteer time; Become a 
member; Take up an unpaid position of responsibility. Roughly how often, if ever, have you been asked to do any of those 
things...’ 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
Number of Political Acts Undertaken
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
Source of Recruitment Requests
Once a month
or more often
Four times a year
or more often
Two or three
times a year
Once a year
or less often
Never
  
327 
 
Chart C4. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of 
Own Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Compared to most people, how much influence would you say that you have over 
decisions affecting relevant policies in... […your local area/your city or region/the United Kingdom]’ 
 
Chart C5. Percentage of Respondents by Perceived Level of 
Population Influence at Local, Regional, and National Levels 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Generally speaking, how much influence would you say that members of the public have over 
decisions affecting relevant policies in... […their local area/their city or region/the United Kingdom]’ 
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Chart C6. Percentage of Respondents Correctly Identifying Political Figures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Which of the following people is the MP in your UK parliamentary constituency?’ 
‘Please match the following people to their jobs:’ 
 
Chart C7. Percentage of Respondents by 
Self-Perceived Knowledge of British Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘How much would you say that you know about British politics?’ 
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Chart C8. Percentage of Respondents by 
Frequency of Discussing National and Local Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Generally speaking, how often do you discuss national politics?’ 
‘And generally speaking, how often do you discuss local politics with others?’ 
 
Chart C9. Percentage of Respondents by 
Level of Attention Paid to National and Local Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘How much attention, if any, do you pay to what's going on in national politics?’ 
‘And thinking about your local community, how much attention, if any, do you pay to local politics?’ 
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Chart C10. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and Ranking 
Differences between Themselves and Politically Involved People 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Now please think about people who get involved in politics. Do you think any of the things we've asked about make them 
different from you? Please select all the options that you think make people who get involved in politics different from you:’ 
‘Please rank the options that you selected according to which makes people who get involved in politics most different from you:’ 
 
Chart C11. Percentages of Respondents Perceiving Politicians and Politically 
Active People as More or Less Privileged than Themselves and Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than you do you think the following people are?’ 
‘And generally speaking, how much more or less privileged than most people in the population do you think that those people are?’ 
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Chart C12. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and 
Ranking Explanations for Own Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Now we'd like to ask you about the things that have contributed to the social status that you have achieved. Which 
of the reasons that we've asked about have played the most important part in the social status that you have achieved? If you 
think an option has not played a part in the social status that you have achieved then you do not need to rank it:’ 
‘You didn't rank background as one of the reasons for the social status that you have achieved. Do you think that your 
background has played any part at all in the social status that you have achieved?’ 
 
Chart C13. Percentage of Respondents Selecting and 
Ranking Explanations for Status Differences in Society 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Which of the following do you think are reasons for some people achieving higher status than others? Please select 
all the options that you think have any effect on the status that people achieve:’ 
‘Of the reasons that you selected which do you think are the three most important reasons for the status that people achieve?’ 
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Chart C14. Percentage of Respondents by Self-Ranked 
Status in Relation to Society and Acquaintances 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Imagine that all the people in society are on different rungs of the ladder shown below in terms of their status. Those 
with the lowest status are on rung 10. Those with the highest status are on rung 1. Compared to people in society in general, 
which rung are you on?’ 
‘Now imagine that the people you know personally are on different rungs of the same ladder. Again, those with the highest 
status are on rung 1 and those with the lowest status are on rung 10. In your opinion which rung are you on?’ 
 
Chart C15. Number of Respondents by Number of Types of Help Received 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:’ 
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Chart C16. Mean Types of Help Received from Each Group (Max. = 13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:’ 
 
 
Chart C17. Mean Number of Groups from which 
Types of Help have been Received (Max. = 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Has anyone ever done the following things for you? Please select all the people that have helped you in these ways:’ 
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Chart C18. Percentage of Respondents who are Acquainted 
with Someone from Fourteen Occupational Status Categories 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Do you know anyone who does this sort of job? [examples provided]’ 
 
 
Chart C19. Number of Respondents Indicating the Percentages 
of their Friends Who Share their Sex, Ethnicity, and Religion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Roughly what proportion of your friends are the same [sex/ethnic group/have the same religious beliefs] as you? 
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Chart C20. Percentage of Respondents by Number of 
Friends Seen or Contacted Daily, Weekly, or Monthly  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘How many friends do you have who you see or are in contact with [daily/weekly/monthly] or nearly every 
[day/week/month]?’ 
 
Chart C21. Percentage of Respondents who Listen to 
Thirteen Music Genres (Mean = 5, S.D. = 4.2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘What types of music do you like to listen to? Please select all the options that apply:’ 
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Chart C22. Percentage of Respondents who Watch 
Sixteen Film Genres (Mean = 6.4, S.D. = 3.3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘What types of films do you like to watch? Please select all the options that apply:’ 
 
 
Chart C23. Percentage of Respondents by Number of 
Cultural Activities Participated In (Mean = 10.5, S.D. = 3.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Roughly how often, if at all, do you... [participate in seventeen cultural activities]’ 
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Chart C24. Frequency of Undertaking Nine Cultural Activities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Roughly how often, if at all, do you... [go to]’ 
 
Chart C25. Percentage of Respondents by Frequency 
of Exercising Four Civic Skills at Work 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Thinking about your paid employment, in the last six months roughly how frequently have you...’/ 
‘Thinking about your last paid employment, roughly how frequently did you...’ 
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Chart C26. Percentage of Respondents by Net Assets (n = 1,177) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Please can you provide an estimate of the total value of your wealth and assets? 
This includes, for example, your savings, investments, shares, stock and option holdings in the company you work for, 
properties you own OTHER THAN YOUR MAIN RESIDENCE, works of art and other collectible items, and your pension 
fund IF YOU ARE RETIRED. 
Please exclude the value of your main home that you live in, any businesses that you own, your pension fund if you are not 
retired and please subtract the value of any debts secured against your assets, e.g. a mortgage you might have on a second 
home.’ 
 
Table C1. Respondents by Number 
of Property Types Owned (n = 1,454) 
 
Number of Property 
Types Owned 
No. % 
Zero 496 34.1% 
One 911 62.7% 
Two 39 2.7% 
Three 6 0.4% 
Four 1 0.1% 
Five 1 0.1% 
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Chart C27. Percentage of Respondents by Household Income (n = 1,177) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘What is your gross household income?’ 
 
 
Chart C28. Percentages of Respondents Holding Authoritarian Social Views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...’ 
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Chart C29. Percentages of Respondents Holding Left-Wing Views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Generally speaking, how much do you agree or disagree that...’ 
 
Table C2. Respondents by Levels of Religious Activity 
 
Religious 
Activity 
Frequency or Amount No. % 
Attendance 
at Services 
Never 1036 70.0% 
Less than once a month 274 18.5% 
Once a month 30 2.0% 
2-3 times a month 27 1.8% 
Once a week 75 5.1% 
2-3 times a week 30 2.0% 
Daily 8 0.5% 
    
Hours of 
Volunteering 
None 1393 94.1% 
One hour or less 15 1.0% 
Between one and two hours 13 0.9% 
Between two and four hours 25 1.7% 
Four hours or more 34 2.3% 
    
Donation 
of Money 
Nothing 1144 77.3% 
£50 or less 169 11.4% 
Between £50 and £100 31 2.1% 
Between £100 and £250 35 2.4% 
Between £250 and £500 43 2.9% 
£500 or more 58 3.9% 
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Chart C30. Percentage of Respondents by Work Type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Please tell us which one of the following options best describes the sort of work you do. 
(If you are not working now, please tell us what you did in your last job.)’ 
 
Chart C31. Percentage of Respondents by Social Grade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Respondents were coded into the above categories by YouGov. 
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Chart C32. Percentage of Respondents by Age of Leaving Formal Education (n = 1,404) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘At what age did you finish full-time education?’ 
 
Table C3. Highest Educational Qualification by Age of Leaving Formal Education (n = 1,437) 
 
   Highest Educational Qualification  
   CSE or 
lower 
GCSE or 
equivalent 
A-Level or 
equivalent 
Undergraduate 
degree or 
equivalent 
Postgraduate 
degree or 
equivalent 
Total 
Age of 
Leaving 
Formal 
Education 
15 or 
under 
Count 97 14 7 3 17 138 
% 30.9% 7.2% 3.1% 0.8% 6.7% 10.0% 
16 
Count 120 112 32 26 38 328 
% 38.2% 57.4% 14.0% 6.8% 15.1% 23.9% 
17-18 
Count 70 61 122 43 49 345 
% 22.3% 31.3% 53.5% 11.2% 19.4% 25.1% 
19 
Count 16 5 36 9 14 80 
% 5.1% 2.6% 15.8% 2.3% 5.6% 5.8% 
10+ 
Count 11 3 31 304 134 483 
% 3.5% 1.5% 13.6% 79.0% 53.2% 35.2% 
 
Total 
Count 314 195 228 385 252 1374 
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Chart C33. Percentage of Respondents by Highest Educational Qualification 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘What is the highest educational or work-related qualification you have?’ 
 
Chart C34. Percentage of Respondents’ Parents by NS-SEC Category 
(n = 1,346 for mothers, n = 1,324 for fathers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘Thinking about when you were 14, did your mother or father have paid employment?’ 
‘Please explain a bit about your [their] job when you were 14. Please give enough information to give a clear picture of what 
[they] did. 
What job did your [mother/father] have? What was the name or title of [her/his] job? 
What did the firm or organisation your [mother/father] worked at when you were 14 mainly make or do?’ 
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Chart C35. Percentage of Respondents’ Parents by Education Level 
(n = 1,039 for mothers, n = 1,007 for fathers) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Question: ‘Which of the following best describes the highest educational level that your [mother/father] finished?’ 
 
 
Chart C36. Number of Respondents by Age (Mean = 47, S.D. = 16) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Questions: ‘On what day of the month were you born?’; ‘In what month were you born’, ‘Please enter your year of birth’. 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e 
o
f 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
Qualification Level
Mother
Father
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
18202224262830323436384042444648505254565860626466687072747678808284
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
R
es
p
o
n
d
en
ts
Age
  
345 
 
 
Table C4: Percentages of Respondents by 
Sex (n = 1,480) and Ethnicity (n = 1,456) 
 
Sex Percentage 
Female 51.5% 
Male 48.5% 
  
Ethnicity Percentage 
Non-White British 10.4% 
White British 89.6% 
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Appendix D: Additional Factor Score Distributions 
 
 
Chart D1. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Work-Based Civic Skills 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart D2. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Economic Capital 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
348 
 
 
Chart D3. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Occupational Status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart D4. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Education 
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Chart D5. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Religious Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart D6. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Authoritarian Social Views 
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Chart D7. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Left-Wing Views 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart D8. Histogram of the Factor Scores for Parental Social Class 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
351 
 
Appendix E: Model Development Information 
 
Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models 
in the Development of the Full Model 
 
No. Description 
Specification 
Information 
Fit 
Information 
 
1 
 
Name: fullsem1 
First full model. 
 
 
 
 
Indicators: 109 
Factors: 40 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
 
No convergence 
due to iterations 
being exceeded. 
2 Name: fullsem2 
Development of Model 1, testing the first half of 
the model (relating to background characteristics 
and the forms of capital) in order to identify 
significant loading to retain in the simplified full 
model to avoid non-convergence. 
 
Indicators: 74 
Factors: 29 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
 
Chi2: 3935.960 
DF: 2290 
RMSEA: 0.022 
CFI: 0.939 
TLI: 0.928 
3 Name: fullsem3 
Development of Model 1, testing the second half 
of the model (relating to perceptions of privilege, 
political interest, and participation) in order to 
identify significant loading to retain in the 
simplified full model to avoid non- convergence. 
 
Indicators: 35 
Factors: 11 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 1882.388 
DF: 521 
RMSEA: 0.042 
CFI: 0.963 
TLI: 0.958 
4 Name: fullsem4 
Development of Model 1, testing the middle 
section of the model (relating to capital and 
perceptions) in order to identify significant 
loading to retain in the simplified full model to 
avoid non-convergence. 
 
Indicators: 64 
Factors: 21 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
No convergence 
due to iterations 
being exceeded. 
5 Name: fullsem5 
Development of Model 2 and Model 3, including 
background characteristics,       capital, 
perceptions of privilege, political engagement, 
and participation factors, and combining the 
loadings from the two preceding SEMs. 
 
Indicators: 109 
Factors: 40 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
No convergence 
due to iterations 
being exceeded. 
7 Name: fullsem7 
Development of 2016-09-02 Final ECPR General 
Conference Full Model, introducing the amended 
parental NS-SEC factor and amending the help 
received loose and close networks factors to load 
onto the indicators identified in the exploratory 
factor analyses, as a first step towards amending 
the starting model to create a full model. 
Indicators: 95 
Factors: 33 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 7418.609 
DF: 4263 
RMSEA: 0.022 
CFI: 0.932 
TLI: 0.929 
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Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models 
in the Development of the Full Model (Continued) 
 
No. Description 
Specification 
Information 
Fit 
Information 
 
Intervening models tested the effects of introducing theoretically important factors one at a 
time (due to the potential repercussions of each change) in order to construct a convergent full 
model. Subsequently, insignificant loadings were removed before theoretically justifiable 
amendments were made on the basis of modification indices, also one at a time. 
 
72 Name: fullsemindivi1 
Development of Model 61, with relevant 
variables inverted for ease of interpretation. 
 
 
 
Indicators: 102 
Factors: 38 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 8917.217 
DF: 4945 
RMSEA: 0.023 
CFI: 0.917 
TLI: 0.914 
73 Name: fullsemindivid1 
Development of Model 72, using the binary 
indicators of background characteristics 
directly rather than via single indicator 
factors, as advised by Mplus Support. 
 
Indicators: 102 
Factors: 32 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 9074.471 
DF: 4945 
RMSEA: 0.024 
CFI: 0.913 
TLI: 0.910 
78 Name: fullsemindividgt1 
Development of Model 75, adding the general 
trust variable on the advice of the supervisory 
board, and specifying structural loadings onto 
number of friends and diversity of friends, as 
well as of external efficacy onto general trust. 
 
Indicators: 102 
Factors: 32 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 9182.097 
DF: 4958 
RMSEA: 0.024 
CFI: 0.913 
TLI: 0.910 
79 Name: fullsemidgt1 
Development of Model 78, adding the 
additional dependent factors relating to 
contacting and collective political activity in 
order to test whether they can be included in 
the same model. 
 
Indicators: 110 
Factors: 34 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 10276.909 
DF: 5786 
RMSEA: 0.023 
CFI: 0.910 
TLI: 0.907 
88 Name: fullsemacts1 
Development of Model 86, adding attendance 
at private school, responsibility at work, 
difference of the statuses of acquaintances, 
and self-identified class as third indicators of 
two-indicator factors (education, occupational 
status, friend diversity, and self-perceived 
status respectively), amending issues with the 
recoding of the attendance at religious 
services indicator, recoding 'skipped' values in 
a binary indicators as zeros (due to routing in 
the survey), reintroducing the non-combined 
efficacy indicators and, at the same time, re-
introducing the regional external efficacy 
indicator. 
Indicators: 115 
Factors: 34 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 11458.383 
DF: 6347 
RMSEA: 0.023 
CFI: 0.899 
TLI: 0.896 
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Table E1: Summary Results from Key Models 
in the Development of the Full Model (Continued) 
 
No. Description 
Specification 
Information 
Fit 
Information 
 
Again, intervening models removed insignificant loadings were before theoretically justifiable 
amendments were made on the basis of modification indices, all one at a time. 
 
110 Name: fullsemacts23 
Final full model. 
Indicators: 111 
Factors: 34 
Estimator: 
WLSMV 
Chi2: 10511.338 
DF: 5903 
RMSEA: 0.023 
CFI: 0.903 
TLI: 0.900 
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Appendix F: Model Fit Information 
 
Table F1. Full Model Fit Indices 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit  
Value 10511.338 
Degrees of Freedom 5903 
P-Value 0.000 
  
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation) 
 
Estimate 0.023 
90 Percent Confidence Intervals 
0.022 - 
0.024 
Probability RMSEA <= .05 1.000 
  
CFI/TLI  
CFI 0.903 
TLI 0.900 
  
Adjusted R-square  
Individualised Acts 0.471 
Contacting Acts 0.505 
Collective Acts 0.516 
 
 
Table F2. Cross-Validation: First Model Fit Indices 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit  
Value 8160.760 
Degrees of Freedom 5903 
P-Value 0.000 
  
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation) 
 
Estimate 0.023 
90 Percent Confidence Intervals 
0.022 - 
0.024 
Probability RMSEA <= .05 1.000 
  
CFI/TLI  
CFI 0.904 
TLI 0.901 
  
Adjusted R-square  
Individualised Acts 0.435 
Contacting Acts 0.422 
Collective Acts 0.400 
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Table F3. Cross-Validation: Second Model Fit Indices 
 
Chi-Square Test of Model Fit  
Value 8537.670 
Degrees of Freedom 6516 
P-Value 0.000 
  
RMSEA (Root Mean Square Error of 
Approximation) 
 
Estimate 0.021 
90 Percent Confidence Intervals 
0.020 - 
0.022 
Probability RMSEA <= .05 1.000 
  
CFI/TLI  
CFI 0.898 
TLI 0.905 
  
Adjusted R-square  
Individualised Acts 0.538 
Contacting Acts 0.552 
Collective Acts 0.572 
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Appendix G: Full Model Measurement Results 
 
Table G1: Standardised Measurement Loadings for Full Model 
 
Factors and Indicators Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-
Taile
d 
P-
Value 
     
Parental Social Class by     
 Mother's Education 0.731 0.049 14.974 0.000 
 Father's Education 0.804 0.054 14.934 0.000 
 Mother's Occupational Status 0.338 0.049 6.946 0.000 
 Father's Occupational Status 0.472 0.054 8.799 0.000 
     
Religious Activity by     
 Religious Attendance 0.884 0.017 52.938 0.000 
 Religious Volunteering 0.964 0.019 51.820 0.000 
 Religious Donations 0.941 0.015 60.909 0.000 
     
Left-Right Position by     
 Big Business Takes Advantage 0.720 0.021 33.755 0.000 
 Different Law for Rich and Poor 0.833 0.021 39.601 0.000 
 Managers Take Advantage 0.719 0.021 34.349 0.000 
     
Social Authoritarianism by     
 Death Penalty Appropriate 0.774 0.033 23.369 0.000 
 Schools Stress Authority 0.423 0.039 10.754 0.000 
 Stiffer Sentences 0.776 0.034 23.060 0.000 
     
Education by     
 Highest Qualification 0.500 0.027 18.778 0.000 
 Age Left Education 0.507 0.028 18.078 0.000 
     
Occupational Status by     
 Social Grade 0.636 0.025 25.078 0.000 
 Work Type 0.619 0.030 20.296 0.000 
 Work Responsibility 0.276 0.068 4.032 0.000 
     
Economic Capital by     
 Household Income 0.682 0.035 19.646 0.000 
 Assets 0.641 0.036 18.044 0.000 
 Property Types 0.671 0.039 17.239 0.000 
     
Work-Based Civic Skills by     
 Meeting Participation 0.871 0.013 69.103 0.000 
 Meeting Chairing 0.898 0.015 61.047 0.000 
 Presentations 0.862 0.013 64.432 0.000 
     
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances by     
 Classical and Opera 0.862 0.021 40.627 0.000 
 Theatre and Musicals 0.817 0.020 40.506 0.000 
 Dance and Ballet 0.806 0.026 30.870 0.000 
     
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions by     
 Museums 0.886 0.011 82.997 0.000 
 Art Galleries 0.899 0.012 75.287 0.000 
 Historic Buildings 0.836 0.013 62.457 0.000 
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Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued) 
 
Factors and Indicators Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-Tailed 
P-Value 
     
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities by     
 Eating Out 0.894 0.033 27.293 0.000 
 Going to Pubs, Bars, and Cafes 0.723 0.03 23.985 0.000 
 Shopping for Pleasure 0.301 0.036 8.472 0.000 
     
Preference for Family-Friendly Films by     
 Family Films 0.743 0.033 22.681 0.000 
 Musicals and Dance Films 0.646 0.039 16.677 0.000 
 Romance Films 0.875 0.038 22.752 0.000 
     
Preference for Blockbuster Movies by     
 Action Films 0.712 0.030 23.73 0.000 
 Fantasy Films 0.848 0.028 30.736 0.000 
 Sci-Fi Films 0.911 0.026 35.032 0.000 
     
Preference for Educational and Informative Films 
by 
    
 Classic Films 0.642 0.049 13.178 0.000 
 Documentary Films 0.659 0.044 14.902 0.000 
 Historical and Biographical Films 0.937 0.045 21.000 0.000 
     
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music by     
 Dance and Electronic Music 0.678 0.040 16.969 0.000 
 Rap and Hip Hop Music 0.946 0.025 37.415 0.000 
 RnB and Urban Music 0.843 0.029 29.576 0.000 
     
Legitimate Cultural Tastes by     
 Winebars and Bistros 0.457 0.048 9.556 0.000 
 Foreign and Arthouse Films 0.491 0.047 10.400 0.000 
 BBC Radio 3 0.589 0.060 9.786 0.000 
     
Number of Friends by     
 Friends Contacted Daily 0.550 0.030 18.297 0.000 
 Friends Contacted Weekly 0.870 0.024 36.119 0.000 
 Friends Contacted Monthly 0.809 0.027 30.272 0.000 
     
Diversity of Friends by     
 Percentage with Different Ethnicities 0.596 0.043 14.017 0.000 
 Percentage with Different Religious Beliefs 0.513 0.038 13.398 0.000 
 Percentage with a Different Sex 0.342 0.040 8.573 0.000 
     
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances by     
 Senior Manager Known 0.612 0.036 16.891 0.000 
 Traditional Professional Known 0.646 0.034 19.057 0.000 
 Research Professional Known 0.698 0.036 19.479 0.000 
     
Family Friend Support by     
 Family Friend CV Help 0.598 0.116 5.135 0.000 
 Family Friend Good Word with Employer 0.387 0.111 3.497 0.000 
 Family Friend Loan 0.442 0.105 4.206 0.000 
     
Partner, Friends, and Family Support by     
 Partner Advice 0.796 0.090 8.860 0.000 
 Family Contact Job 0.527 0.085 6.217 0.000 
 Friends Contact Job 0.461 0.085 5.412 0.000 
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Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued) 
 
Factors and Indicators Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-
Taile
d 
P-
Value 
     
Self-Perceived Status by     
 Status in Society 0.991 0.027 36.721 0.000 
 Status amongst Acquaintances 0.814 0.023 35.143 0.000 
     
Perception of Privilege in Society by     
 Status Differences Based On Hard Work -0.301 0.037 -8.199 0.000 
 Status Differences Based On Background 0.608 0.033 18.653 0.000 
 Status Differences Based On Inequality 0.156 0.044 3.524 0.000 
     
Perception of Own Privilege by     
 Own Status Inevitable 0.587 0.029 20.427 0.000 
 Own Status Based On Background 0.453 0.027 16.970 0.000 
 Own Status Based On Inequality 0.796 0.036 22.351 0.000 
     
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors by     
 Where Political Actors Live 0.575 0.044 13.105 0.000 
 Political Actors Education 0.615 0.037 16.606 0.000 
 Political Actors Income 0.603 0.039 15.262 0.000 
     
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors by     
 Politician Privilege Compared to Society 0.915 0.010 92.650 0.000 
 Political Actor Privilege Compared to Society 0.877 0.010 86.456 0.000 
 Political Actor Privilege Compared to Respondent 0.850 0.010 89.018 0.000 
 Politician Privilege Compared to Respondent 0.832 0.011 77.473 0.000 
     
Political Disposition by     
 Attention to National Politics 0.883 0.011 77.071 0.000 
 Discussion of National Politics 0.883 0.012 73.899 0.000 
 Perceived Political Knowledge 0.792 0.016 48.727 0.000 
     
National Political Knowledge by     
 Know Local MP Name (Binary) 0.725 0.041 17.553 0.000 
 Know Ed Miliband Role (Binary) 0.867 0.025 34.453 0.000 
 Know Nick Clegg Role (Binary) 0.901 0.027 33.759 0.000 
 Know John Bercow Role (Binary) 0.843 0.038 22.096 0.000 
     
Systemic Efficacy by     
 Local System Open to Public Influence 0.699 0.036 19.603 0.000 
 National System Open to Public Influence 0.723 0.036 20.187 0.000 
     
Individual Efficacy by     
 Able to Influence Local Politics 0.887 0.009 98.800 0.000 
 Able to Influence Regional Politics 0.976 0.007 137.857 0.000 
 Able to Influence National Politics 0.863 0.011 77.246 0.000 
     
Group Recruitment by     
 Requests from Family 0.754 0.025 30.570 0.000 
 Requests from Friends 0.802 0.023 35.641 0.000 
 Requests from Neighbours 0.724 0.032 22.416 0.000 
 Requests from Religious Congregation Members 0.761 0.030 25.609 0.000 
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Table G1: Measurement Loadings for Full Model (Continued) 
 
Factors and Indicators Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-
Taile
d 
P-
Value 
     
Individualised Political Activity by     
 Petitions and Online Actions 0.694 0.021 32.837 0.000 
 Boycotting 0.754 0.019 39.042 0.000 
 Urging Others 0.861 0.017 49.391 0.000 
     
Contacting Political Activity by     
 Meeting a Representative 0.823 0.017 48.361 0.000 
 Contacting Government 0.830 0.015 54.564 0.000 
 Contacting the Media 0.747 0.021 35.485 0.000 
     
Collective Political Activity by     
 Displaying Materials 0.782 0.019 41.326 0.000 
 Attending Public Meetings 0.836 0.015 54.586 0.000 
 Attending Protests 0.847 0.016 52.791 0.000 
 Attending Direct Actions 0.792 0.033 24.310 0.000 
 Organising Public Meetings 0.834 0.024 35.066 0.000 
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Appendix H: Full Model Structural Results 
 
Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model 
 
Factors Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-Tailed 
P-Value 
     
Religious Activity on     
 Education 0.335 0.038 8.833 0.000 
 Female 0.123 0.037 3.337 0.001 
     
Left-Right Position on     
 Economic Capital  -0.321 0.038 -8.508 0.000 
     
Social Authoritarianism on     
 Education -0.474 0.032 -14.874 0.000 
     
Education on     
 Parental Social Class  0.256 0.034 7.572 0.000 
 Female -0.167 0.031 -5.394 0.000 
 White British -0.160 0.034 -4.738 0.000 
     
Occupational Status on     
 Education  0.587 0.030 19.685 0.000 
 Age 0.276 0.036 7.745 0.000 
 Disability with a Great Deal of Daily Impact -0.274 0.032 -8.528 0.000 
     
Economic Capital on     
 Occupational Status 0.780 0.033 23.486 0.000 
 Relationship  0.276 0.039 7.020 0.000 
     
Work-Based Civic Skills on     
 Education 0.280 0.045 6.170 0.000 
 Occupational Status 0.452 0.046 9.823 0.000 
     
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances on     
 Education  0.753 0.020 37.192 0.000 
     
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions on     
 Education  0.792 0.018 43.689 0.000 
     
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities on     
 Professional and Managerial Acquaintances 0.493 0.038 12.919 0.000 
     
Preference for Family-Friendly Films on     
 Female 0.456 0.031 14.555 0.000 
     
Preference for Blockbuster Movies on     
 Age -0.216 0.039 -5.611 0.000 
 Female -0.228 0.035 -6.595 0.000 
     
Preference for Educational and Informative Films on     
 Education 0.294 0.036 8.183 0.000 
 Age 0.240 0.041 5.826 0.000 
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Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model (Continued) 
 
Factors Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-
Tailed 
P-
Value 
     
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music on     
 Left-Right Position 0.157 0.043 3.626 0.000 
 Age -0.628 0.033 -19.119 0.000 
     
Legitimate Cultural Tastes on     
 Education  0.832 0.041 20.513 0.000 
     
Number of Friends on     
 Education 0.098 0.039 2.514 0.012 
 Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities 0.314 0.035 8.987 0.000 
 Religious Activity 0.234 0.038 6.113 0.000 
     
Diversity of Friends on     
 Education 0.196 0.064 3.039 0.002 
 Occupational Status -0.513 0.072 -7.168 0.000 
 Work-Based Civic Skills 0.475 0.070 6.816 0.000 
 White British -0.417 0.035 -11.807 0.000 
     
Professional and Managerial Acquaintances on     
 Education  0.590 0.046 12.688 0.000 
 Economic Capital 0.309 0.051 6.101 0.000 
     
Family Friend Support on     
 Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances 0.533 0.051 10.551 0.000 
 Age -0.415 0.058 -7.178 0.000 
     
Partner, Friends, and Family Support on     
 Professional and Managerial Acquaintances 0.367 0.063 5.815 0.000 
 Age -0.534 0.050 -10.716 0.000 
     
General Trust on     
 Education 0.350 0.029 11.974 0.000 
     
Self-Perceived Status on     
 Economic Capital  0.318 0.042 7.643 0.000 
 Family Friend Support  0.521 0.061 8.583 0.000 
 Partner, Friends, and Family Support -0.382 0.069 -5.556 0.000 
 Preference for Educational and Informative Films -0.269 0.043 -6.267 0.000 
     
Perception of Privilege in Society on     
 Left-Right Position  0.663 0.037 17.742 0.000 
 Preference for Blockbuster Movies 0.249 0.049 5.048 0.000 
 Number of Friends 0.175 0.047 3.762 0.000 
 Self-Perceived Status -0.396 0.039 -10.037 0.000 
     
Perception of Own Privilege on     
 Family Friend Support  0.433 0.052 8.400 0.000 
 Occupational Status -0.352 0.044 -7.976 0.000 
     
Perception of the Difference of Political Actors on     
 Perception of Privilege in Society  0.557 0.047 11.822 0.000 
 Self-Perceived Status  -0.158 0.047 -3.375 0.001 
 Social Authoritarianism  0.341 0.059 5.818 0.000 
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Table H1. Standardised Structural Loadings for Full Model (Continued) 
 
Factors Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
Estimate/ 
Standard 
Error 
 Two-
Tailed 
P-
Value 
     
Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors on     
 Perception of Privilege in Society  0.568 0.031 18.311 0.000 
 Social Authoritarianism  0.170 0.033 5.094 0.000 
 Family Friend Support -0.326 0.042 -7.716 0.000 
     
Political Disposition on     
 Legitimate Cultural Tastes  0.558 0.035 15.814 0.000 
 Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music -0.315 0.046 -6.781 0.000 
 Preference for Family-Friendly Films -0.131 0.043 -3.069 0.002 
 Preference for Educational and Informative Films 0.179 0.040 4.540 0.000 
 Perception of Privilege in Society  0.234 0.034 6.902 0.000 
     
National Political Knowledge on     
 Political Disposition 0.608 0.037 16.278 0.000 
 Perception of Own Privilege  -0.291 0.040 -7.263 0.000 
 Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors 0.141 0.036 3.948 0.000 
     
Systemic Efficacy on     
 Legitimate Tastes  0.175 0.049 3.551 0.000 
 Perception of the Privilege of Political Actors  -0.322 0.033 -9.743 0.000 
 General Trust 0.157 0.039 3.980 0.000 
     
Individual Efficacy on     
 Legitimate Tastes  0.173 0.049 3.509 0.000 
 Systemic Efficacy  0.446 0.040 11.145 0.000 
 Social Authoritarianism -0.184 0.041 -4.494 0.000 
     
Group Recruitment on     
 Religious Activity 0.397 0.036 11.178 0.000 
 Diversity of Friends  0.409 0.044 9.306 0.000 
 Political Disposition 0.573 0.069 8.337 0.000 
 National Political Knowledge  -0.506 0.082 -6.158 0.000 
     
Individualised Political Activity on     
 Perception of the Difference of Political Actors  0.205 0.034 5.962 0.000 
 Group Recruitment  0.306 0.036 8.431 0.000 
 Political Disposition 0.326 0.037 8.766 0.000 
 Individual Efficacy 0.105 0.035 3.047 0.002 
 Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.236 0.038 6.150 0.000 
     
Contacting Political Activity on     
 Group Recruitment  0.465 0.039 12.013 0.000 
 Political Disposition 0.297 0.034 8.730 0.000 
 Individual Efficacy 0.234 0.033 7.183 0.000 
     
Collective Political Activity on     
 Group Recruitment  0.506 0.031 16.423 0.000 
 Individual Efficacy 0.180 0.040 4.455 0.000 
 Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.304 0.036 8.400 0.000 
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Appendix I: Bivariate Relationships between Cultural Capital, 
Perception of Privilege, and Political Participation 
 
 
Table I1. Bivariate Regressions Loadings of each Form of 
Political Participation on each Element of Perception of Privilege 
 
 Individualised Contacting Collective 
Perception of Privilege in Society 0.424*** 0.296*** 0.394*** 
Perception of Own Privilege 0.026 0.026 0.164*** 
Self-Perceived Status -0.072** 0.071** 0.153*** 
Perception of the Difference of the Politically Active 0.000 -0.172*** -0.147*** 
Perception of the Privilege of the Politically Active -0.015 -0.149*** -0.272*** 
 
 
Table I2. Bivariate Regressions Loadings of each Form of 
Political Participation on each Type of Cultural Capital 
 
 Individualised Contacting Collective 
Attendance at Legitimate Cultural Performances 0.339*** 0.397*** 0.532*** 
Visits to Legitimate Cultural Institutions 0.420*** 0.385*** 0.489*** 
Consumption-Orientated Cultural Activities 0.131*** 0.039 0.073* 
Legitimate Cultural Tastes 0.396*** 0.357*** 0.310*** 
Preference for Bass and Sample Heavy Music -0.013 -0.197*** -0.058 
Preference for Family-Friendly Films -0.017 -0.185*** -0.103** 
Preference for Educational and Informative Films 0.287*** 0.135*** 0.109** 
Preference for Blockbuster Movies 0.020 -0.114*** -0.130*** 
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